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Jens Seeberg, Andreas Roepstorff and Lotte Meinert
Anthropological explorations of the worlds we live in have systematically 
destabilised the boundary between nature and culture that once served 
as a founding dichotomy of anthropology as a discipline. Not only has the 
idea of nature as a domain that can exist outside the reach of the impact 
of (human) culture been challenged by the massive impact of humanity 
on the global ecosystem, as reflected in the labelling of our current geo-
logical epoch as the Anthropocene, it has also become increasingly clear 
that the ability to produce culture is not an exclusively human capacity. 
Indeed, the anthropological concept of culture can no longer ignore 
‘cultivation practices in non-human cultures, such as ants, that go back 
hundreds of millions of years’ (Lien et al. 2018, 16). Furthermore, as 
Palsson has pointed out, life itself has become unstable in a range of ways 
(Palsson 2016). Body parts and organs are augmented or replaced with 
implants. Organs travel from one body to the next and from one species 
to another. The renewed importance of the field of epigenetics, as well as 
the unfolding exploration of the human microbiome, increasingly unset-
tles old constructs of the individual, highlighting permeability and rela-
tionality between organisms and between organism and environment. 
These and related developments in our understanding and production of 
life have led to a suggestion to replace the notion of ‘human being’ with 
one of ‘human becoming’ (Ingold 2013).
Such changes and insights call for a repositioning of anthropology 
vis-à-vis biology, as they seem to open new possibilities for both disci-
plines. Biodeterminism – the assumption that life is genetically predeter-
mined or inscribed – no longer upholds the status of dominant scientific 
paradigm among biologists. Keller, for example, has pointed to the long 
history of the nature–nurture debate and its refusal to die (Keller 2010). 
Yet the debate thrives from the continuous production of new data in one 
camp that ought to convince members of the other camp, and she argues 
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that semantic difficulties have contributed significantly to driving the dis-
agreement. Importantly, Keller points to the mirage of a space between 
nature and nurture and, tracing the expression back to Galton, asserts 
that attempting to replace genetic determinism on the one hand with a 
similarly reductionist opposite of social determinism on the other would 
lead nowhere (Keller 2010). However, as noted by Lewontin and many 
others, some very real effects emerged from this ‘mirage of a space’: the 
separation of the natural and the social had opened the space in which 
deterministic ‘projections’ could be cast in both directions between the 
two, each constituting a Platonic screen for the other (Lewontin 1993). 
Latour pointed out this model in his critique of the social sciences, high-
lighting the projection of the social onto the natural (Latour 1993), but, 
we argue, the reverse projection is equally problematic.
Thus, this volume brings together state-of-the-art contributions to 
critical anthropological thought around the social and biological as well 
as ethnographic explorations of human and non-human life in the light 
of changing understandings of biology.
Projection
We shall use two short stories by author Hans Christian Andersen (1805–
1875) – a contemporary of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) – to illustrate 
what we mean by projections of determinism in the space created by the 
separation of the social and the biological.
In the well-known fairy tale of ‘The Ugly Duckling’ (1846), after 
the hatching of a brood of beautiful ducklings, a bigger egg takes longer 
to develop than the others. When the bird finally comes out of the egg, 
its large size makes it appear ugly and deformed in the eyes of the others. 
Initially suspected of being a turkey, the young bird, however, proves to 
be a good swimmer, thus passing as a duckling. However, its size, shape 
and behaviour make it the target of constant ridicule and rejection, lead-
ing the youngster to run away. Having miraculously survived a long and 
lonely winter, the ‘ugly duckling’ happens upon three beautiful swans 
on a fine spring day. As it approaches them with little expectation for 
a warm welcome, it sees its own reflection in the water, now ‘a grace-
ful and beautiful swan’. Andersen’s well-known moral of the story, ‘to be 
born in a duck’s nest, in a farmyard, is of no consequence to a bird, if 
it is hatched from a swan’s egg’ (Andersen 1846), when understood as 
the allegory of human life so patiently explained by countless parents 
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to their children, projects the biological onto the social. The story was a 
key to Andersen’s international breakthrough and has been widely read 
and made into films and theatre plays. Like all good literature, it allows 
for varying interpretations, focusing, for example, on parallels with 
Andersen’s own life (Andersen 2003), or the pain of genealogical bewil-
derment in children with substitute parents (Sants 1964). Across them, 
it certainly places innate qualities over environmental influences in the 
understanding of life: predetermined human being rather than human 
becoming, to paraphrase Ingold (2013). Despite social influences, the 
‘true’ biological being will unfold at some point. The appeal of the story 
has made it a useful metaphor in a range of scientific contexts, including 
for the redemption of sympatric speciation as an organising principle in 
evolutionary biology (Via 2001).
In contrast, in a less well-known story by Andersen, ‘The Drop of 
Water’ (1847), the author illustrates the projection of the social onto 
nature. Since it is less known, we shall quote it at some length. The tale 
tells of the marvels of the magnifying glass ‘that makes everything a 
hundred times larger than it really is’. When looking at a drop of water 
through it, Creep-and-Crawl, an old man ‘who would always make the 
best out of everything’, sees a ferocious fight among human-like microor-
ganisms. He magically colours them with a drop of witch blood to make 
them now appear like ‘naked savages’ and calls the other protagonist of 
the story, a nameless wizard.
The wizard who had no name looked through the magnifying glass. 
It actually appeared like a whole town, where all the inhabitants 
ran about without clothes! it was terrible, but still more terrible to 
see how the one knocked and pushed the other, bit each other, and 
drew one another about. What was undermost should be topmost, 
and what was topmost should be undermost!–See there, now! his 
leg is longer than mine!–whip it off, and away with it! There is one 
that has a little lump behind the ear, a little innocent lump, but it 
pains him, and so it shall pain him still more! And they pecked at it, 
and they dragged him about, and they ate him, and all on account 
of the little lump. There sat one as still as a little maid, who only 
wished for peace and quietness, but she must be brought out, and 
they dragged her, and they pulled her, and they devoured her!
‘It is quite amusing!’ said the wizard.
‘Yes; but what do you think it is?’ asked Creep-and-Crawl. ‘Can 
you find it out?’
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‘It is very easy to see,’ said the other. ‘It is some great city, they all 
resemble each other. A great city it is, that’s sure!’ (Andersen 1847, 
23–4)
The story first appeared in a collection sent to Charles Dickens in grat-
itude of his hospitality during Andersen’s first visit to London. Ander-
sen took a romantic rather than a revolutionary position. Still, he was 
abhorred by the brutality of urban poverty at the height of industrialisa-
tion, described in Dickens’ works and echoing some of Andersen’s own 
early life experiences. To Andersen, the big city epitomised a primitive 
cruelty found in nature and in ‘naked savages’ as they had been described 
and construed in colonial Europe.
Invoking Andersen’s two stories allows us to argue that projections 
in the space between the biological and the social cannot be reduced to 
discussions of theory-building in biology and the social sciences. Rather, 
they constitute pervasive imaginations that transcend understandings of 
health and the body that have travelled across generations and societies. 
Similarly, the projections of thinkers like Darwin and Spencer may be 
recast as efforts to systematise ideas that were common in vaguer ver-
sions in contemporary societies.
The projection of principles of competition based on a capitalist 
world order onto natural evolution in Darwinism (Lewontin 1993) was 
followed by a projection back onto the social ordering of societies and civ-
ilisations based on the logic of ‘survival of the fittest’ of social Darwinism. 
Whereas these classical contributions to secular understandings of evo-
lution have been softened since their original appearance, their neo- 
Darwinian incarnations are fiercely protected, as shown by Lewontin in 
his critique of doctrines of sociobiology (Lewontin 1993). Ingold shows 
how this neo-Darwinian defence work maintains the duality of the natu-
ral and the social, enabling projections between the two (Ingold 2013). 
Such projections carry a directional causality, and so constitute powerful 
means to establish discursive authority. Perhaps paradoxically, even if we 
argue for the de-separation of the biological and the social, it remains 
important to unfold the consequences of their discursive separation.
Many of the contributions in this volume point us to a gap between 
the two, and analyse what may be seen as projections. The works of 
the contributing authors open new ways to think about the biosocial 
in anthropology, either by way of anthropological reflection or through 
ethnographic case studies. Focusing primarily on the projection of the 
biological onto the social, the chapters point to some of the very real 
impacts of this duality, while also creating stepping stones for further 
 INTRODUCTION 5
contemplation on how to develop analytical lenses that serve to de- 
separate the biological and the social. For example, Livingston’s chapter 
provides a critique of the projection of singular disease categories onto 
complex situations of co-morbidity, while the chapter of Meinert and 
Whyte explores how categories of trauma or spirits may project differ-
ent ‘plans of action’, with adjacent ideas about biology and sociality, for 
dealing with legacies of violence. Petryna’s chapter shows the projection 
of the end of the world onto the screen of climate change, behind whose 
horizon ‘blindsidedness’ reigns. Other chapters explore how neonatal 
babies are projected onto piglets (Svendsen), or the brain onto the gut 
(Young), or the social onto the body (Lock; Napier). While they point to 
the workings of projections, they also combine to show new analytical 
potentials to narrow and eventually close the gap between the biological 
and the social.
Health environment
For several decades, up to the completion of the Human Genome project 
in 2003, the nature–nurture debate that had been central to early Amer-
ican anthropology seemed to have tilted to the advantage of the ‘nature’ 
position, leaving only a limited space for critical dialogue. The Human 
Genome project was celebrated as ‘nature’s complete genetic blueprint 
for building a human being’ (National Human Genome Research Institute 
2015). Perhaps paradoxically, this achievement contributed to a realisa-
tion that the implied genetic predetermination of human lives and human 
behaviour was vastly exaggerated within the Darwinian paradigm. This 
led to the return of the field of epigenetics that explores the interaction 
between environment and activation or deactivation of genetic disposi-
tions that influence the individual human life – and potentially the lives 
of subsequent generations (see Lock, this volume; Napier, this volume). 
Such new understanding of the malleability of human biology potentially 
undermines the century-long insistence within the fields of medicine and 
epidemiology on the universality of human biology. It calls, instead, for 
an understanding of local biologies, as first proposed by Lock, implying 
that ‘differing accounts about biological ageing are not simply the result 
of culturally shaped interpretations of a universal physical experience 
but the products […] of an ongoing dialectic between biology and cul-
ture in which both are contingent’ (Lock 1993, xxi).
At first glance, it seems as if the move from genetics to epigenetics 
should signal a drive to understand the role of the environment in the 
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development of an organism, whether human or non-human. However, 
as pointed out by both Lock and Niewöhner (this volume), the epige-
netic framework remains predominantly a genetic perspective. Although 
the environment enters into the genetic, co-determining what is being 
expressed and how the organism is shaped, it does so via a molecular 
mechanism, for example, as the phosphorylation of DNA or modification 
of histone complexes. Seen from within this framework, the environment 
ultimately becomes molecularised, that is, the environment exists to the 
extent that it can be traced as a variable that shapes a particular molecu-
lar configuration, and hence changes the properties of the genome.
Radicalising this claim, one may argue that epigenetics teaches us 
something new and valuable about genetics, but it is difficult to see how 
it could scale up to be the general story of how organisms and environ-
ments interact. Instead, Niewöhner argues, we should go beyond both a 
‘gene-centric’ and an ‘environment-centric’ approach to identify the par-
ticular practices that dynamically shape both environments and genes. 
Such an approach may trace its pedigree from a long lineage focusing on 
‘natural history’, and may ultimately be Aristotelian in the focus on habits 
(Atran 1993). It argues for a customary biology (Niewöhner 2011), that 
is, a biology which shifts the analytical focus away from genes and envi-
ronment to how customs, or patterned practices (Roepstorff et al. 2010), 
may shape environment and genome. In this understanding, the notions 
of ‘health’ and ‘environment’ are entangled in a way that moves their rela-
tion beyond interdependence to one of inseparability. The subtitle of this 
volume captures this insight through the concept of ‘health environment’.
‘Health environment’ may, we believe, allow for a fresh analyt-
ical perspective on Lock’s notion of local biology. This is beautifully 
illustrated in Svendsen’s analysis (this volume) of pigs as experimental 
model animals in a Danish context. Already, the ordinary Danish pig, 
‘with leaner meat, an extra rib and large litters’, is an instance of a local 
biology, which is currently being exported to the rest of the world. The 
Danish pigs are the result of highly specific practices of breeding based 
on systematic selection. Underlying mechanisms, most likely not only – 
if at all – epigenetic, shape the genetic makeup of the pig, and go hand 
in hand with a specific environment in which the pigs are reared. The 
general case of the local biology of the Danish pig is taken a step further 
in the laboratory practices Svendsen studies. Here, the local biology of 
immature piglets born prematurely by Caesarian section become models 
of weak infants at risk of potentially devastating inflammation of the gut, 
thus ideally improving the health of preterm human infants worldwide. 
Paraphrasing Willerslev, it is the piglet’s status as non-human on the one 
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hand that makes it ethically justifiable to force early birth on the piglets 
and ultimately kill them, while their existence as non non-humans on the 
other is the rationale for making them model animals in the first place, so 
comparable to infants that findings may be generalised from one species 
to the other (Willerslev 2004).
While this case certainly involves genes and environments in very 
specific and dynamic configurations, the engine infusing energy into these 
interactions can be found neither at the level of genes nor of environment. 
Rather, it is embedded in very particular networks and institutions of 
power, interest and intentions. Failing to take these into account means 
failing to identify critical factors shaping both environment and genes.
Scale
The discussion about how to define and delineate the environment also 
involves questions of scale. Following Niewöhner’s concept of the embed-
ded body (Niewöhner 2011), Lock points out that an epigenetic world (as 
perceived from an anthropological perspective) is one where ‘recogni-
tion of intergenerational continuities other than by the transmission of 
DNA brings about a crucial ontological shift; an embedded body is not 
the product of interactions of nature and nurture but, by definition, is 
situated in an entanglement of nature–nurture that transcends gener-
ations, raising profound questions about concepts of self and body as 
clearly bounded entities’ (Lock 2013, 303). Such permeability of bodies, 
which had previously been seen as bounded entities, contributes further 
to undermining the traditional ‘division of labour’ between anthropology 
and biology. Opening disciplinary boundaries allows us to move beyond 
the problem of bounded environments to a discussion of scale as a central 
question of analysis – a need that has appeared in other debates as well, 
for example, in the context of globalising dynamics (for instance, Collier 
and Ong 2005; Tsing 2015) and in global health (Adams 2016).
In the context of the present volume, this move can be seen as requir-
ing an extension of anthropology to include reflections on the social life of 
the bacterial cells living in or on the human body seen as a holobiont (Young, 
this volume). Young uses the study of the human biome to move us beyond 
the positions of determinism versus free will as he discusses how bacteria 
take decisions to create (or not) biofilm, or to send out (or not) into the 
universe themselves as they are transformed into spores (sporulation) that 
may eventually mature into biofilm elsewhere. While it is still little under-
stood how gut bacteria communicate bi-directionally with the brain, and 
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what effects this may have on human decision-making processes, moods 
and behaviours – if, indeed, these should not just be seen as integral – 
Young points out that bacterial decision making is itself not predetermined. 
Rather, we should understand quorum-sensing of bacteria as a capacity for 
stochastic intelligence: ‘During periods of collective stress, such as exposure 
to antibiotics, a small fraction of individuals become “competent”, able to 
take up DNA from the environment. Competence is a stochastic function 
(the result of randomness in transcription) that enables the leader to exploit 
noise (random variation) generated during quorum-sensing’ (Young, this 
volume). Scale works at two levels here. One is the qualitative shift incurred 
by the sheer number of micro organisms, leading to increasing differentia-
tion among them and involving individual decision making; and the other 
is the shift of analytical scale, relating the behaviour of people accessible to 
standard ethnographic methods to the behaviour of bacteria in the gut, seen 
through the lens of (an anthropological reading of) microbiology.
Scale is also important in the analysis of development of  multi 
drug-resistant tuberculosis (MDRTB) by Seeberg (this volume). He 
compares the stress experienced by Mycobacterium tuberculosis (M. 
TB) when exposed to anti-tuberculosis medicines to that resulting from 
attacks by mycobacteriophages, viruses that target tuberculosis (TB) 
bacteria. The outcome of both kinds of engagement is unpredictable and 
may be either beneficial or detrimental for the TB bacteria, depending on 
events at other scales of reality. These include, for example, the life con-
ditions of the host and his or her interaction with family and healthcare 
providers; the constitution of the healthcare system providing treatment; 
and decisions of global actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
to fund technological solutions to be rolled out in contexts that favour 
budget cuts in government-funded healthcare in low-income countries 
where TB is rampant. In theory, the combination therapy that has been 
used for decades should make the development of drug resistance impos-
sible. However, the configuration of actors at very different scales seems 
to create a situation where M. TB is able to engage with anti-TB drugs in 
ways similar to its engagements with mycobacteriophages.
The many glitches in drug delivery and global policy priorities cre-
ate ample opportunity for TB bacteria to make use of their stochastic 
intelligence. Indeed, even if the intention is to kill them, drug-resistant 
bacteria may de facto be considered to be domesticated versions of treat-
able TB, created as they are by human intervention. Hence, one could 
apply Napier’s phrase: ‘… human selection for tameness is not “natural 
selection”; it is “human selection” – a social process about creating social 
 INTRODUCTION 9
environments in which certain genetic traits emerge. As such, it has quite 
a bit to do with evolution, but as much, or more, with the effects of social 
environments – including experimental settings – on genetics’ (Napier, 
this volume). Only, Napier is talking about multi- species interaction at 
a different scale, namely of domestication through selective breeding 
of foxes that become dog-like after only a few generations, and subse-
quently remain ‘dogs’. Napier shows here that social exposure is the key 
variable that allows genes to function or be shut off. He goes on to discuss 
another ‘social disease’, namely that of diabetes, where such biosocial 
dynamics have been largely ignored, globally leading to an over-reliance 
on biomedical and technical explanations and interventions that are 
too expensive to access for most people in most countries, while largely 
ignoring the social dynamics that drive diabetes in individual bodies on 
a global scale.
The critique of neo-Darwinian evolution that informs many of the 
contributions in this volume points to the centrality of the discussion of 
temporal scales with its embedded issues of ontogenesis and phylogenesis. 
Even if nature–nurture can now be de-separated, and bacteria and brain 
inform each other’s decisions through biosocial processes, scales of time 
become further complicated by the attempts to bridge such different scales 
of sociality. The return of epigenetics may imply an ‘evolution on speed’ 
in the sense that genetic changes may take effect much faster than pre-
viously assumed. If a conducive health environment exists, such change 
happens at the speed of generational turnover for a given kind of organism. 
In humans, it seems to happen at a pace (accentuated by the size of the 
population) that increasingly translates so-called non-communicable con-
ditions and ‘lifestyle diseases’ into epidemics (Seeberg and Meinert 2015).
At the level of bacteria, change in the form of mutation happens 
at the speed of cell division, and decision making as described by Young 
may take place in the course of hours. Temporality is complicated by the 
interaction of organisms with different timescales, as in the case of M. 
TB. TB cases with drug-resistant strains constituted a negligible popula-
tion a few decades ago, whereas the impact of the current failure to con-
trol TB may result in children and grandchildren of today’s TB patients 
attracting incurable strains of TB in coming decades. The temporal scales 
of different organisms are out of sync, so to speak, and the natural limi-
tations of humans to act outside the scope of their own temporal horizon 
poses challenges to interdisciplinary ambitions.
Petryna (this volume) addresses this issue in her discussion of the 
human capacity, including that of scientists, to understand ecosystemic 
transformation in the context of global climate change. Here, both spatial 
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and temporal scales are maximised, and yet the human capacity to pre-
dict – with whatever degree of uncertainty – the future impact of current 
man-made emissions into the global ecosystem is, by and large subject to 
arbitrary timeframes – and is furthermore characterised by the inability 
to understand sudden non-linear changes that may be either catastrophic 
tipping points or trigger points for remedial action. While such sudden 
changes may be observed relatively easily (thanks to technological inter-
mediaries) at the microscopic level (because they happen rapidly when 
perceived through a human scale of time), the reverse is true for the per-
ceived slow development of global change.
Behind folds of the changing horizon loom landscapes hidden 
by ‘blindsidedness’, Petryna points out, as she invokes Fabian’s classic 
work on coevalness. However, where Fabian criticised evolutionism in 
the social sciences for placing contemporary populations at different 
temporal levels (Fabian 1983), Petryna points us to a parallel temporal- 
teleological displacement in the relationship between science and nature, 
most clearly exemplified by Darwinism with its teleological assumption 
that adaptation necessarily prevails.
Synergies
How do conventional ways of classifying disease establish barriers to 
understanding the biosocial complexities that frame the workings of 
both disease and treatment? In her chapter on co-morbidity in Botswana, 
Livingston points out that biology is often assumed to be a main deter-
minant of singular illnesses, but in situations of multiple sickness biol-
ogy often points in many directions simultaneously: co-morbidities may 
be clearly intertwined with social, political and health systemic factors, 
which themselves interact at biological levels. The complex co- morbidity 
of TB, HIV/AIDS, and cancer can be seen as a biosocial synergy that plays 
itself out not only at the levels of social distribution and epidemiology of 
disease. It also shapes processes at the clinical level, when patients seek 
diagnosis and treatment in health systems whose institutional infrastruc-
ture is designed to separate disease categories into, for example, TB, HIV, 
or cancer. Yet, in the bodies and lives of patients these disease catego-
ries are intertwined, and this kind of synergy challenges our analytical 
categories and calls for reconceptualisation. Ontological certainties that 
distinguish one disease from the other are questioned, and how the dis-
eases interact with each other and with social and other factors is fore-
grounded. Livingston gives the example of one form of cancer, Kaposi’s 
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sarcoma, which practically does not exist in women unless they are HIV 
positive. So, are Kaposi’s sarcoma and HIV two diseases or one? Such mat-
ters of definition continue to be highly impacted by political, economic, 
moral and institutional projects that arise around specific diseases.
Whether diseases and epidemics are defined as single or multiple 
entities may be quite significant in cases where such definition comes to 
determine how health problems are addressed. If cancer is seen as inti-
mately intertwined with and part of the HIV epidemic, this may have 
consequences for how funding is spent, how prevention and treatment is 
organised, and how patients are met in clinical contexts.
Co-morbidity, at the scale of epidemics, has been conceptualised as 
syndemic in response to the dominant biomedical conception of diseases 
as distinct entities in nature, located in specific organs, separate from other 
diseases and independent of the social and cultural contexts in which they 
are found (Singer 2009, 25). The syndemic perspective allows us to think 
about disease in relational rather than categorical terms, and to consider 
the importance of interacting social (and environmental) conditions that 
promote the spread of disease. In syndemics, the health effects of co- 
morbid conditions are not additive, but multiplicative (Singer 2009, 26).
Synergies are further explored in Meinert and Whyte’s description of 
the rapid spread of trauma and spirits in Northern Uganda after the civil 
war. The number of local healers dealing with spirit possessions grew signif-
icantly alongside an influx of NGOs and humanitarian organisations treat-
ing PTSD. The authors suggest analysing the spread as related syndemic 
processes of situated and concerned responses to violence, which involve 
local biosocial worlds, as well as humanitarian psychology. Pointing out 
that the behavioural symptoms of both spirits and trauma often co- exist 
with other problems such as alcoholism, HIV and diverse health condi-
tions, the authors discuss how these problems are intimately intertwined, 
making the separation of the biological and the social untenable.
In biomedical discourse, PTSD, alcoholism and HIV are commonly 
described as forms of co-morbidity. Yet when these problems tend to 
come in the same clusters repeatedly, it should make us ask questions 
about the categories that make them appear as separate conditions. From 
a broader perspective, trauma and related problems thrive in particular 
social, economic and historical conditions, and their rapid spread may, 
indeed, be seen as syndemic (Singer 2009; Singer and Clair 2003) at the 
population level. Where a biomedical perspective on PTSD foregrounds 
the damage to the individual (biological) brain during traumatic events 
and regards other factors (such as alcoholism) merely as ‘triggers’ or con-
sequences of disease, a syndemic perspective enables a synergetic view 
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of biosocial interaction, which does not reduce or range factors and con-
sequences as biological or social. This perspective on biosocial becom-
ing involving many different kinds and levels of influences obviously has 
consequences for how health problems related to legacies of violence are 
dealt with.
Beyond determinism
Biosocial worlds, therefore, are created in the engagement with the 
human condition more broadly, as described in this volume, and they are 
co-created by these descriptions, either as propositions or as critiques. 
Building on Lock (this volume), we have suggested that the tendency in 
biology to downscale the environment to something that is experimen-
tally practical is a threat to the understanding of biosocial dynamics. 
Here, biology may learn from anthropology.
However, this raises the problem of scale and how to work across 
very different scales of experience. In their common forms of knowledge 
production, biology has access to knowledge at scales that are usually 
inaccessible to anthropology, whereas anthropology has access to theo-
retical understanding of social complexities that are inaccessible to biol-
ogy. This anthropological contribution points to the need for developing 
an analytics of biosocial complexity that may very well come at the cost 
of some of the taxonomical neatness that has been a founding principle 
of biology, and therefore of biomedicine.
How is it possible to pursue this agenda in shared spaces of explo-
ration and interdisciplinary dialogue between anthropology, biology and 
medicine? Many cases presented in this volume indicate – and critically 
challenge – such spaces, whether they be laboratories or clinical spaces 
(Svendsen; Niewöhner; Livingston); biosocial spaces where the micro-
scopic may be integrated in anthropological analysis (Young; Seeberg); 
or the broader exploration of the effects of tensions between biologically 
grounded categories and biosocial complexities (Lock; Napier; Meinert 
and Whyte; Petryna).
Clearly, the degree of proximity matters. The closer the collabora-
tion, the greater the need for scientists to find mutually agreeable entry 
points for interdisciplinary dialogue and exploration. We suggest that the 
focus on scale may be a useful entry point, not for a backward- looking 
re-enactment of disciplinary boundaries within neatly carved ‘scalar’ 
principles, but as a point of fruitful exploration of such boundaries with 
the intention of challenging and reshaping them, accepting that scale and 
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scalability are also political and moral spaces, and that the ‘non- scalable’ 
(Tsing 2015) should not be lost from analysis.
Doing so may open spaces for the larger issues of complex synergies 
between biosocial entities otherwise too often conceptualised as distinct, 
as well as the definition of environment, which in anthropology is closely 
related to the fluid engagement with the concept of context. Our book 
requires a move beyond the Darwinist luggage of adaptive evolution that 
has provided not only the core of biological determinism up to its human 
genomic climax, but has also spilled over into many other domains, as 
shown in this volume.
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Permeable Bodies and Environmental 
Delineation
Margaret Lock
The ‘control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the 
Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed 
that nature exists for the convenience of man. (Carson 1962, 197)
Traumatised environments
A group of experts speaking at an International Geological Congress in late 
August 2016 declared that the geological epoch known as the Holocene 
through which humans have lived during the past 11,000 years and longer 
has been eclipsed. We are now living in the Anthropocene, an era charac-
terised by cumulative destructive human activity on earth itself, much of 
it seemingly irreversible. The historian Dipesh Chakrabarty highlights the 
peculiarity of this new epoch: ‘the Anthropocene spells the collapse of the 
Kantian distinction between natural history and human history’ (Chakra-
barty 2009). He bases this assertion on abundant evidence that, in contrast 
to previous epochs, humans are the primary force transforming the globe 
today, with enormous effects on human health and wellbeing. Conferences 
about the Anthropocene started to take place long before its formal decla-
ration, and between 2013 and 2015, 27 had already occurred.
Numerous mineral compounds, including more than 500 million 
 metric tonnes of pure aluminium, have been manufactured since the Second 
World War, much of which has sedimented into earth’s layers. Even more 
striking are ‘mineraloids’ – glass and plastics – 300 million tonnes of which 
are made annually and are present everywhere on the earth’s crust and in all 
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the oceans. As each couple of minutes pass, Coca-Cola produces 9,000 new 
plastic bottles. Concrete, a rock of our own making, encases much of the 
globe. Our chemical footprint has accumulated worldwide as toxic waste, 
principally in the form of CO2, nitrogen fertilizer, pesticides, and diesel fuel.
Environment – nature – is exhibiting all the signs of stress, trauma, 
toxicity and abuse usually associated with suffering human bodies – the 
‘ruins of capitalism’, as Anna Tsing puts it, are all too evident in vast 
swaths of the globe (Tsing 2015). But geologists need hard evidence of 
an irreversible transition in order to identify a new epoch. Their decisions 
are pegged to a so-called ‘golden spike’ – a marker that appears in ice-
cores, the oceans, lake sediments, and soils, where recognisable fossil-
ised strata appear that can be hammered, sampled, and/or dug up. Such 
changes are known as a ‘time-rock unit’. Following much debate, the 
International Union of Geological Sciences agreed that July 1945 consti-
tuted such a spike – the day when the first nuclear device was exploded, 
leaving rare isotopes of plutonium distributed all over the globe, includ-
ing Antarctica and Greenland (Biello 2015).
For more than a decade we have been living with another funda-
mental change known as the ‘post-genomic’ era. The human genome is 
no longer recognised unequivocally as the driving force of life, but rather 
as ‘reactive’ to environments external and internal to the body (Gilbert 
2003). In other words, the very ‘nature’ of what it is to be human has been 
revised on the basis of knowledge, largely brought to light when mapping 
the human genome, with enormous consequences for understanding 
human development, health, ill-health, and possibly our very survival.
Anthropocenic destruction of the environment and its impact on 
human wellbeing is not distributed equally worldwide; its effects are sca-
lar. Readily apparent in places such as Dhaka, Bangladesh, where children 
as young as eight spend their days breathing in toxic fumes produced by 
leather tanning, in other geographical locations, closer investigation is 
required to discern how individual genomes everywhere are responding 
to environmental stimuli affecting health and wellbeing. In April 2017, 
Greenpeace reported that research has shown that plastic ingested by fish 
is liable to end up on our dinner plates; plastic pollution in our oceans is 
now so widespread, it is becoming part of the food chain everywhere.
Behavioural epigenetics
In what follows, I first set out the surprising findings that emerged when 
mapping the human genome. These discoveries encouraged a burgeoning 
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of research in the field known today as ‘behavioural epigenetics’, a dis-
cipline anchored by the impact of environmental variables external and 
internal to the body on human development throughout the life course, 
from the moment of conception on. The idea of ‘environment’ is appar-
ently self-evident, so much so that Raymond Williams gave it no entry in 
Keywords (Williams 1983), although he describes nature, often associated 
with environment, as ‘perhaps the most complex word in the English lan-
guage’. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the earliest definition 
of the word ‘environment’ appears in the mid-eighteenth century as ‘that 
which environs’ and also as ‘the objects or the region that surrounds any-
thing’ (Oxford English Dictionary). Contemporary dictionaries include the 
following meanings: ‘The aggregate of surrounding things, conditions, or 
influences; milieu, the air, water, minerals, organisms, and all other external 
factors surrounding and affecting a given organism at any time and, further, 
the social and cultural forces that shape the life of a person or a population.’ 
Clearly, if the notion of environment is central to any given scientific endeav-
our, it requires delineation, demarcation and/or contouring at the outset.
Epigenetics is being heralded as a scientific discipline that may 
well transcend the reductionism associated with many investigations 
carried out in the field of molecular genetics. However, several social 
scientists have expressed concern about the apparent neo- reductionism 
evident in the majority of projects currently being conducted under the 
umbrella of environmental epigenetics (Lock 2013a, 2013b; Niewöhner 
2011; Richardson 2015). Several of the illustrative examples presented 
in this paper make it clear that a tendency exists on the part of epige-
neticists to systematically scale down and miniaturise what is deline-
ated as environment in their research projects. This practice enables 
standardisation of methodologies, and makes it possible to carry out 
all-important replication studies. The result is that economic and socio- 
political variables that contribute in profound ways to health and illness 
are set to one side. This is in no way to deny the importance of the 
molecularlised findings as such, but to suggest that if the implications 
of these rich insights emerging in epigenetics are to be fully grasped, 
then limiting accounts to the effects of proximate variables on human 
bodies falls short.
Epigenetics is slowly exposing certain of the molecular pathways 
both external and internal to the body by means of which depredating 
situations literally transform individual genomes; findings such as these 
are regarded by many scientists and non-scientists as ‘hard’ data, tout 
court, and such molecular profiles will almost certainly become the first 
line of evidence to assist in decision making in the courts and by policy 
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makers in connection with neglect, abuse and other forms of violence. 
The cases discussed below make clear how important it is that documen-
tation of bodily epigenetic changes not be limited to proximate variables. 
On the contrary, when it comes to medical care, policy making and legal 
cases, economic and socio-political variables that impact on everyday life 
that have clearly contributed to the situation should be included. In addi-
tion, narratives given by affected individuals furnish invaluable data.
The field of epigenetics is young, and many research findings are at 
present provisional. Even so, this burgeoning specialty has the potential 
to bring about a paradigm shift that has already transformed the world of 
genomics to a considerable extent. Similarly, the fields of epidemiology 
and public health are undergoing a seismic shift in thinking about nosol-
ogies of ill health and early death: the effects of poverty, violence and low 
levels of education that have long been researched by epidemiologists 
and public health practitioners can now be linked directly to epigenetic 
changes that affect brain development and functioning throughout life. 
Moreover, it is increasingly clear that even if such epigenetic changes are 
not transmitted intergenerationally they are all too often produced anew 
in ensuing generations if the social conditions are not changed. Media 
reporting and social media make it clear that clinicians and the public 
at large are processing this information, although not always with the 
required accuracy and precaution that is needed.
The reactive genome
Following the announcements in 2001 that the human genome had 
been mapped (which was not at that time, strictly speaking, true) many 
surprises came to light, certain of which scientists had predicted prior 
to embarking on the Human Genome project (HGP), but that had been 
ignored. It was revealed that humans have approximately 20,000 genes, 
and not 100,000 as had been predicted. Numerous plants have many more 
genes than do humans, and the diminutive worm C. elegans has about the 
same number as ourselves. The size of a genome bears no relationship to 
its complexity, and the genome is not a template for the organism as a 
whole. Only approximately 1.2 per cent of DNA segments actually code 
for proteins, and the remaining 98.8 per cent was initially labelled dis-
paragingly as ‘junk’ (Gibbs 2003). Given that DNA is among the most 
non- reactive, chemically inert molecules in the world, with no ‘power to 
reproduce itself’, as Richard Lewontin puts it (Lewontin 2000, 141), it is 
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somewhat surprising in retrospect that so much significance was attrib-
uted to this molecule in the first place.
Non-coding segments of the genome initially appeared to have no 
obvious function. It soon became evident that they are frequently rem-
nants of bacterial and viral genomes that serve to separate out the cod-
ing parts of the genome, thus inhibiting unwanted mutational changes 
during DNA transmission between generations. Moreover, numerous of 
these non-coding DNA sequences are highly conserved, implying that 
they have been present in genomes for hundreds of millions of years, 
strongly suggesting that they are crucial to both the fundamental pro-
cesses of life and to evolutionary change.
Furthermore, it is well established that the activities of non-coding 
RNA (ncRNA) comprise a comprehensive regulatory system that func-
tions to create the ‘architecture’ of organisms, without which chaos would 
reign. To this end, ncRNA profoundly affects the timing of processes that 
occur during development, including stem cell maintenance, cell prolifer-
ation, apoptosis (programmed cell death), the occurrence of cancer and 
other complex ailments (Mattick 2004). These findings greatly advanced 
understanding of the structure and function of the genome itself.
An important shift in orientation that commenced decades before the 
HGP, but which had remained largely quiescent, started to attract significant 
attention boosted by the post-genomic surprises. This shift was towards an 
investigation of the way in which environmental stimuli influence molec-
ular activity. Today the majority of biologists, whatever their specialty, 
accept that cellular differentiation associated with human development is 
governed by processes akin to what was first described by the developmen-
tal biologist, embryologist, and philosopher Conrad Waddington in the 
mid-twentieth century as the epigenetic landscape; that is, a complex pan-
orama of networks and feed-forward loops that determine when exactly 
stem cells are activated to form a lineage (Ramirez-Goicoechea 2013, 66). 
In other words, a chronological process that is context-specific. Numerous 
scientists also agree that these changes are not only initiated inside the 
body, but that external stimuli interact directly with individual genomes, 
resulting in epigenetic changes, or markers. Many such changes are stable, 
while others are reversible. Over the past decade molecular epigenetics has 
added numerous insights to this complex picture.
The assertion that multiple mechanisms of inheritance exist, and 
that variation in genomic sequences alone cannot account for phenotypic 
differences (Ramirez-Goicoechea 2013, 66–7) inevitably raises ontolog-
ical concerns similar to those apparent in the days of Lamarck, regard-
less of the question of intergenerational inheritance, and epigenetics 
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has been described as neo-Lamarckian by some researchers. Of course, 
given that neo-Lamarckism is grounded in molecular biology, its original 
claims are significantly modified, but the central tenet that environment 
makes a major contribution to the characteristics that are passed along to 
ensuing generations informs the foundational thinking of the burgeon-
ing discipline of epigenetics.
The philosopher of science Evelyn Fox Keller sums up the situation 
thus: ‘The role of the genome has been turned on its head, transforming 
it from an executive suite of directional instructions to an exquisitely sen-
sitive … system that enables cells to regulate gene expression in response 
to their immediate environment’ (Keller 2014, 2425). We live now with 
a ‘reactive genome’ (Gilbert 2003, 92). Furthermore, if genes are con-
ceptualised as in effect ‘real’ entities, then they should be understood as 
composite rather than as unitary, somewhat analogous to ‘the solar sys-
tem, or a forest, or a cell culture’ as Barnes and Dupré put it (Barnes and 
Dupré 2008, 53). A dynamic epigenetic network with a ‘life of its own’ – 
a context-dependent reactive system of which DNA is just one part has 
been exposed. Thus, contingency displaces determinism.
Gene regulation – above all how, and under what circumstances, 
genes are expressed and modulated – is central to epigenetic investiga-
tion, and whole cells, rather than DNA segments, are the primary targets 
of investigation. Effects of evolutionary, historical, and environmental 
variables on cellular activity, developmental processes, health, and dis-
ease have, in theory, become central to the research endeavour in epi-
genetics, although, to date, this is by no means the case in most basic 
science investigations into genomics.
Over the past decade, then, a profound shake-up has occurred in 
connection with knowledge about genes and how they function. The 
consolidation of the field of molecular epigenetics has brought about a 
demotion of the gene, and challenges the unexamined assumption held 
by many geneticists, researchers in human development, certain social 
scientists, and members of the public, that genes determine who we are.
Two decades ago, the neurobiologist Steven Rose argued that 
we must be concerned above all with the dynamics of life, that is, with 
process, and the continuous interchange between organisms and their 
environments. Our ‘lifelines’, he argued, constituted by life processes, 
generate our sense of self (Rose 1997).
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Sculpting the genome
We must now ask to what, precisely, is the genome reactive? This forces 
us to consider the concept of ‘environment’. Lewontin noted long ago: 
‘An egg, before fertilisation, contains a complete apparatus of production 
deposited there in the course of its cellular development. We inherit not 
only genes made of DNA but an intricate structure of cellular machinery 
made up of proteins’ (Lewontin 2001, 143). For genes to function, they 
must be activated (switched on) and, when appropriate, deactivated 
(switched off) by means of complex processes bringing about differentia-
tion that takes place at the cellular level throughout the life cycle.
The epigenetic mechanism best researched to date is methylation, 
a process uncovered in 1975 in which methyl groups are added to a 
DNA molecule. DNA methylation is found in all vertebrates, plants and 
many non-vertebrates and is highly conserved, indicating that it has long 
been involved with evolutionary change and developmental processes. 
Enzymes initiate such modifications that do not alter the actual DNA 
sequence, but simply attach a methyl group to residues of the nucleotide 
cytosine, thus rendering that portion of DNA inactive.
Epigenetic researchers are careful to point out that the identifica-
tion of mechanisms that transmit signals from social environments exter-
nal and internal to the body resulting in DNA methylation have yet to be 
fully worked out. But it is incontrovertibly demonstrated that methyla-
tion functions so that any given genome is able to code for diversely stable 
phenotypes. In other words, although every cell at the time of formation 
is ‘pluripotent’, that is, it has the potential to become any kind of mature 
cell, methylation brings about so-called ‘cell differentiation’ resulting in 
liver, neuronal cells, or skin cells, for example. Methylation also deter-
mines whether an embryo bee will become a drone or a queen bee, and 
many other such examples exist. Furthermore, methylation does not take 
place only in utero and early postpartum years, as was formerly believed, 
but continues throughout the life span (Meaney 2010).
An additional hypothesis that attracts environmental epigeneticists 
posits that DNA methylation and other related mechanisms have a second 
very important function, namely that these processes are not solely the 
result of endogenous stimuli, but are also direct responses to environmen-
tal signals external to the body that modulate patterns of cellular activity; 
a substantial body of research of this kind now exists (Cortessis et al. 2012; 
Feil and Freger 2012). In recent years, it has been recognised that such 
environmental exposures bring about changes to the three-dimensional 
chromatin fibre that compacts DNA inside cells. The idea of an epigenome 
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as a distinct layer over and enveloping the genome is no longer acceptable. 
The genome and epigenome is a flexible, commingled entity, orchestrated 
by shape-shifting chromatin that may result in hereditable changes (Lappé 
and Landecker 2015). In addition, strips of DNA can be damaged, often 
during replication, some of which changes result in mutations that may or 
may not be hereditable. Epigenetic mechanisms other than methylation, 
such as histone modifications of various kinds, also regulate gene expres-
sion, but these are as yet poorly understood. A comprehensive Wikipedia 
article summarises the incredible complexity and uncertainties involved in 
the unfolding field of epigenetics.
In summary, it is clear that genes are ‘catalysts’ rather than ‘codes’ 
for development (Meloni 2014), and it is the structure of information 
rather than information itself that is transmitted. DNA is not changed 
directly by environmental exposures. Rather, whole genomes respond 
ceaselessly to a wide range of environments and exposures, and chro-
matin mediates many such responses that, in turn, modulate DNA 
expression. The methylation processes described above are manifest in 
several timescales – evolution; transgenerational inheritance; individual 
lifetimes; life-course transitions (including infancy, adolescence, men-
opause, and old age), in addition to which are seasonal change modi-
fications. The effects of these passages of time become miniaturised in 
individual bodies, making them researchable at the molecular level. This 
was first demonstrated using rats, discussion of which is set out below 
following an account of the consolidation of the field of epigenetics.
The epigenetic explosion
The word epigenetics was first used in 1942 by C. H. Waddington, described 
in the Encyclopædia Britannica as an embryologist, geneticist and philoso-
pher of science. While teaching at Cambridge University, he taught himself 
palaeontology and eventually became known as the founder of systems 
biology. Waddington wrote that the Aristotelian word epigenesis, even 
though the term ‘was now more or less in disuse’, was the stimulus for him 
to coin epigenetics (Waddington 1942). He initially argued that the new 
field would be limited to ‘the causal interactions between genes and their 
products which bring the phenotype into being’ (a subject that Julian Hux-
ley had previously worked on), but broadened his argument very quickly.
Waddington’s position was influenced by the dawning realisa-
tion of several researchers of his day that development of the embryo 
must involve networks of interactions among genes that form a complex 
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integrated system, and that the completely bifurcated subjects of genet-
ics and embryology should be brought closer together, even though many 
embryologists feared that their field would be completely overtaken by 
genetics if such a move took place (Waddington 1940). Waddington 
was trained in both fields; he had worked in Germany with the Nobel 
Laureate embryologist, Hans Spemann, and with the geneticist Thomas 
Hunt Morgan in California, and made the very idea of ‘development’ 
central to his arguments specifically because of its double meaning: the 
growth of individuals and evolutionary change.
For Waddington, development denotes the set of conditions that 
enable so-called ‘multi-potent stem cells’ to become differentiated in tis-
sues that develop into cells with specific functions. He insisted that genes 
are responsible for guiding only ‘the mechanics of development’, and 
argued that genotypes and environments function together to produce 
phenotypes. An appreciation of what continues to be recognised as ‘criti-
cal periods’ in developmental processes is also embedded in Waddington’s 
thinking. He adamantly rejected reductionist neo- Darwinianism, and 
described himself expressly as a Darwinian.
In his book Organisers and Genes, published in 1940, Waddington 
topologically depicted ‘the epigenetic landscape’ as a symbolic rep-
resentation of embryonic development. The image is of a ball rolling 
down an undulating plateau in concert with other balls, in which one 
of several possible pathways is taken before it eventually comes to rest 
at a lowest point. In the case of a pathway or ‘creode’ which is deeply 
carved into the hillside, external disturbance is unlikely to prevent nor-
mal development. The balls depict developing eggs and the gradual 
transformation of their pluripotent cells into tissue types, the process of 
which is controlled by genes interacting with each other that modulate 
the manner in which the egg/ball descends the slopes and select specific 
intersections (Figure 1.1). Waddington’s point was that development is 
‘canalised’ – thus ‘buffering’ the outcome of natural selection, understood 
today as a measure of the ability of a population to produce replicable 
phenotypes regardless of variability in genotypes or the environment.
Waddington’s intention was to demonstrate that there is no 
straightforward relationship between a gene and its phenotypic effects, 
and furthermore that, should a mutation arise, its effects may well be 
moderated or buffered by other genes – a process he termed ‘genetic 
assimilation’ that he explicitly linked to Darwinian thinking. Waddington 
was emphatic that genetic variation and phenotypic expression are not 
coupled. He acknowledges that change can be random, but at the same 
time he argued that evolution occurs primarily as a result of mutations 
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that affect developmental anatomy. His theorising influenced debates of 
his day about both embryology and evolution. See Petryna, this volume, 
for influences on Waddington’s thinking by the Scottish biologist and 
mathematician, D’Arcy Thompson.
Waddington was clear that the metaphor of the epigenetic landscape 
had limitations (Waddington 1940, 92); nevertheless, this image is usually 
taken as the starting point for a genealogy of epigenetics. His argument that 
synchronic processes, both among genes and in the larger intra- cellular 
environment, must be incorporated into and modify linear unidirectional 
accounts of developmental processes and evolutionary change was in effect 
a paradigmatic shift. In the preface to the first edition of his book, Wadding-
ton notes that his greatest debt goes to the biochemist Joseph Needham, 
also an extraordinarily influential sinologist best known for his monumen-
tal seven-volume work on the history of science in China. It is reasonable 
to assume that the image of the epigenetic landscape was influenced to 
some extent by discussions with Needham who, in the 1940s, was teach-
ing himself Chinese, and would have been well acquainted with classical 
understanding of disease causation in China in which inductive thinking 
is dominant, and bodies are embedded in encapsulating spheres of the 
individual, society, environment and cosmos. This type of thinking persists 
in modified form to the present day in the practice of traditional Chinese 
 medicine (Farquhar 1994). Waddington was also well acquainted with 
Alexandrian Gnostics and the so-called Arabic alchemists, philosophers 
whose ideas may have contributed to his writing (Waddington 1975).
Although the majority of epigenetic researchers from Waddington’s 
time to the present day acknowledge that social, political and economic 
variables contribute to the epigenetic changes that they are investigating, 
nevertheless they set these variables to one side and create environments 
Figure 1.1 ‘The Epigenetic Landscape’. Source: Waddington, C. H. 
1966. Principles of Development and Differentiation. New York and 
London: Macmillan. Wellcome Collection. CC BY-NC 4.0. 
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that are deliberately ‘miniaturised’ for the purposes of research. But such 
miniaturisation, although it facilitates controlled scientific investigation, is 
problematic when it comes to seeking out other than proximal explanations 
for epigenetic changes. Exposures to environments external to individuals 
can have profound, lasting effects on wellbeing that, if ignored, may well 
result in inappropriate victim blaming, as we will see in what follows.
Jablonka and Lamb, both geneticists and epigeneticists, note that 
Waddington’s work essentially languished for the first three decades of 
its existence and one or two scientists argued that it should be aban-
doned, but it nevertheless survived to become molecularised in form. In 
the post-genomic era, from the early years of the twenty-first century, the 
field has been thoroughly revitalised and focuses on ‘alternative develop-
mental pathways, on developmental networks underlying stability and 
flexibility, and on the influence of environmental conditions on what 
happens in cells and organisms’ (Jablonka and Lamb 2002, 89) – at both 
individual and population levels, one might add.
Epigenetics has expanded into an enormous field of inquiry that 
includes stem cell biology, cancer biology, investigations into genome 
instability, DNA repair, epigenetic epidemiology, and so on. The concept 
of environment, having been rendered essentially of no importance in 
hard-line deterministic genetics, is resuscitated in the post-genomic era 
to take on singular importance in the formation of reactive genomes 
and hence with DNA activity and cell functioning. It follows that delin-
eating environment is crucial to understanding the biological embed-
ding of individuals, their families and communities in specific contexts 
(Hertzman 1999). Of greatest interest to anthropologists is the sub-field 
of environmental epigenetics, a term used to cover investigations into 
topics as wide ranging as toxic exposures, malnutrition and abuse.
Disagreements among practitioners of this sub-discipline are evi-
dent, and the presumption that one or more teams of researchers repre-
sent the entire field would be a mistake (Landecker and Panofsky 2013; 
Lock 2015).
The embodiment of trauma
An article published in the mid-1990s by the epigeneticist Michael 
Meaney and colleagues has become iconic in the field of epigenetics. This 
research made use of a model of maternal deprivation created in rats by 
removing young pups from their mothers shortly after birth, thus termi-
nating maternal licking and grooming crucial to their development. The 
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deprivation altered the expression of genes that regulate behavioural and 
endocrine responses to stress, and hence, indirectly, hippocampal synaptic 
development (Meaney et al. 1996). It was found that these changes could 
be reversed if pups were returned in a matter of days to their mothers.
Furthermore, when the birth mother was a poor nurturer, place-
ment of her deprived pups with a surrogate mother who licks and grooms 
them enabled the pups to flourish. Crucially, it was shown that pups or 
foster pups left to mature with low-licking mothers not only exhibited 
a chronically increased stress response but also passed on to their own 
pups this heightened sensitivity to stress. Hence, variation in maternal 
behaviour results in biological pathways causing significantly different 
infant phenotypes that can persist into adulthood, and are potentially 
transmitted to the next generation.
A sizeable body of work based largely on animal models, but in -
creasingly in humans, substantiates these findings and broadens their 
significance. Since the 1990s, a literature has accrued showing a strong 
relationship between ‘childhood maltreatment’ and negative mental 
health outcomes ranging from aggressive and violent behaviour to suicide. 
Current investigations are gradually exposing how the ‘biological embed-
ding’ of childhood maltreatment comes about (Jaffee and Christian 2014). 
The overall conclusion drawn from this research is that the ‘epigenome is 
responsive to developmental, physiological and environmental cues’ that 
bring about so-called ‘epigenetic marks’.
In 2011 Moshe Szyf titled a presentation he gave at a Montreal gath-
ering ‘DNA methylation: A molecular link between nurture and nature’. 
At the time this talk was given, evidence for such a link had accrued 
primarily from animal research and from one human study based on a 
sample of 25 individuals who had suffered severe abuse as children and 
later committed suicide. At autopsy, the donated brains of these individ-
uals showed a significantly different pattern of DNA methylation than 
did those of a control group of 16 ‘normal’ individuals. A second con-
trol group of 20 individuals who had committed suicide but where no 
known abuse had taken place was also included in the study. The findings 
are presumed to substantiate a mechanism whereby nature and nurture 
meld as one. In this particular case, childhood adversity is associated with 
sustained modifications in DNA methylation across the genome, among 
which are epigenetic alterations in hippocampal neurons that may well 
interfere with processes of neuroplasticity (McGowan et al. 2009).
The researchers acknowledge that the sample was small, and that 
the study cannot be validated. The absence of a control group that expe-
rienced early life abuse and did not die by suicide is another shortcoming. 
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Furthermore, the abuse that the subjects experienced was exceptionally 
severe. Szyf and colleagues readily agree that understanding of these 
processes remains rudimentary. Even so, given that epigenetic markers 
have been shown to play important roles in learning and memory that 
may be transmitted intergenerationally, these findings suggest how the 
effects of trauma associated with events such as colonisation, slavery, 
war, displacement, abuse and neglect may be transmitted through time. 
It is also the case that they bring about insights into resilience in connec-
tion with such events (Hughes 2012).
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the epigenetic effects 
brought about by the impact of stress, malnutrition, environmental tox-
ins and social isolation on human wellbeing. Certain populations and 
individuals are of course more pervasively exposed to such variables than 
are others. The concept of local biologies posits that the material body is 
everywhere inseparably entangled with specific historical, economic and 
socio/political variables that are deeply implicated in bringing about epi-
genetic changes in individual bodies. However, it is also evident, given 
the extent of human migration today, voluntary or forced, that local biol-
ogies must be subsumed under broader, inclusive concepts of ‘situated’ 
and/or ‘emerging’ biologies and that epigenetic changes can be widely 
distributed across vast swaths of people.
Epigenetics and miniaturised environments
It has been demonstrated repeatedly that prenatal exposure to ‘mater-
nal stress, anxiety, and depression’ can have lasting effects on infant 
development associated with the appearance of psychopathology 
later in life. A  review of 176 articles, based on findings from both 
animal and, to a lesser extent, human research, notes: ‘the in utero 
environment is regulated by placental function and there is emerging 
evidence that the placenta is highly susceptible to maternal distress 
and is a target of epigenetic dysregulation’ (Monk et al. 2012, 1361). 
In addition to which a large body of research suggests that postna-
tal maternal care can induce further disruptions. Such findings are 
based largely on correlations, but researchers are beginning to map 
segments of the pathways whereby environmentally induced epige-
netic marks are apparently associated with behavioural outcomes 
pre- and postnatally (Monk et al. 2012). Antenatal depression and 
anxiety symptoms are picked out for particular attention as signs of an 
in utero environment that brings about dysregulation. In other words, 
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the environment is effectively scaled down to molecular activity inside 
a single organ of the body – the uterus and its fetal contents.
In an article published in BioSocieties, Ilina Singh (2012) com-
ments on a warning sent out to its members by the American Academy of 
Paediatrics in 2011 cautioning about the harm caused to children by ‘toxic 
stress’. Singh interprets this warning as a move towards increased moni-
toring of families, notably pregnant women and young mothers who, she 
suggests, are likely to be targeted for observation – their behaviour sub-
jected to surveillance designed to avoid fetal and infant stress. Medical 
and social support for young childbearing women is to be lauded but, as 
Singh states, the possibility that home visits to pregnant women, such as 
those being carried out through a partnership of nurses and family practi-
tioners in New York, might well become, in effect, ‘womb visits’ (as seems 
likely to be the case in the many other cities in North America where home 
visits during pregnancy are the practice). The poverty and often violent 
living conditions of many mothers-to-be may well be virtually ignored, 
and attention light almost exclusively on the pregnant belly and its con-
tents (Singh 2012). Research findings from the Mapping of the Human 
Brain project are providing remarkable insights into the singularity and 
complexity of genes that appear to put a fetus at risk for autism following 
birth, and it appears that epigenetic changes in utero are implicated.
As this research unfolds, the womb and its environments will be 
monitored yet more closely (Semeniuk 2014). It is clear that if molecular-
ised findings are not systematically embedded in broader socio/political 
contexts, there is a distinct danger that accounting for epigenetic changes 
will be reduced to the presumed habitual behaviours of named popula-
tions, social groups and parents – notably mothers – who disproportion-
ally fall into disadvantaged, impoverished and stigmatised populations.
Agent Orange: Lasting effects in time and space
Based on many years of fieldwork that commenced in 2003 in Hanoi, 
Vietnam, the Danish anthropologist Tine Gammeltoft has documented 
the devastating effects on reproduction caused by the chemical defoliant 
Agent Orange that persist more than 40 years after the war (Gammeltoft 
2014). The US military conducted an aerial defoliation programme 
throughout the war that was part of a ‘forced urbanisation’ strategy 
designed to force peasants to leave the countryside where they helped 
sustain the guerrillas, and move to the cities dominated by US forces. 
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Nearly 20 million gallons of chemical herbicides and defoliants was 
sprayed onto Vietnam, eastern Laos, and parts of Cambodia, destroying 
all plant material in 2 days. In some areas, toxic concentrations in soil 
and water became hundreds of times greater than the levels considered 
safe in the US (Schmidt 2016).
Agent Orange contains the highly toxic chemical dioxin, known 
to have long-lasting effects on the environment and human tissue. 
Gammeltoft documents a widespread fear about the so-called ‘dioxin 
gene’, widely believed by many people living in Vietnam today to be 
increasing in the population. It is estimated that at least 3 million 
Vietnamese citizens suffer from serious health problems due to expo-
sure to defoliants, and the rate of severe congenital abnormalities in 
 herbicide-exposed people is reckoned at 2.95 per cent higher than unex-
posed individuals. The media has reported cases of third-generation 
Agent Orange victims, in which individuals exposed during the war have 
produced apparently healthy children whose children are born severely 
disabled. Animal research has shown that, following fetal exposure, 
dioxin reprogrammes epigenetic developmental processes, the effects of 
which may become manifest throughout life and intergenerationally.
Vietnam was given membership in the World Trade Organization 
in 2007, one result of which was heightened concern by the Vietnamese 
government about the international visibility of the health of the popu-
lation as a whole. It was at this juncture that extensive use of ultrasonog-
raphy was introduced – a political tool designed to ensure the birth of 
healthy children. Ultrasound is now used repeatedly during pregnancy as 
part of antenatal care, even though the Vietnam Ministry of Health does 
not recommend this practice. Reaching a decision to have an abortion 
if a deformity is detected by ultrasound is not easy, particularly because 
many affected families think that abortion is an evil act. Everyone 
involved knows that it can be difficult to assess the extent of a deformity 
from ultrasound images, although it is equally the case that frequently 
it is all too evident. Some families, opposed to abortion, and longing 
for a healthy child, are raising three or four children with deformities, 
the most common of which is hydrocephalus (‘water on the brain’) that 
causes severe retardation. A few women discover very late in a pregnancy 
that their fetus is not normal, and some opt then for a late termination, to 
the great discomfort of their doctors.
Gammeltoft’s interviews with affected families make clear that 
many people choose not to entertain the idea that an anomalous fetus 
or the birth of a horribly deformed child is due to Agent Orange. They 
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are all too well aware that the stigma attached to Agent Orange families 
ensures that finding marriage partners for healthy members of the family 
becomes virtually impossible. Better to claim publicly that the anomaly 
resulted from a common cold that the mother had, or the heavy work she 
did while pregnant (Gammeltoft 2014, 47–50).
A range of severe illnesses are associated with dioxin exposure, 
including deadly cancers, Parkinson’s disease, and spina bifida, in 
addition to those associated specifically with pregnancy. Vietnamese 
researchers have reported these findings, but the official US position is 
that there is no conclusive evidence that herbicide spraying caused health 
problems among exposed civilians and their children. However, follow-
ing extensive lobbying over many years, in 2014 the US Congress passed 
a five-year aid package of $21 million that amounted to a modest sum 
for each US veteran of the Vietnam War. These cases were settled out of 
court and no legal liability has ever been admitted. The official position to 
this day is that the government was in effect prodded into settling these 
legal suits and that no evidence exists that Agent Orange caused harm, 
and this position is supported by its principle makers, Monsanto and Dow 
Chemical companies. Children born to Vietnam War veterans who have 
birth defects may be eligible for compensation that varies according to 
the perceived level of disability.1
In Vietnam, officials were reluctant to press complaints about Agent 
Orange because uppermost were concerns about the economy as a whole, 
notably a desire not to damage the marketing of numerous agricultural 
and aquacultural products made in Vietnam today. In the mid-1990s, 
Vietnamese writers and artists began to express concern about Agent 
Orange, and eventually Vietnamese citizens filed a class action suit in 
the US District Court in New York that was abruptly dismissed. However, 
belated demands for responsibility are increasingly being heard, spear-
headed by non-governmental organisations. In summary, local biologies 
not only persist across generations; they also travel through space.
Food as environment
Globally, nearly 2 million children die from malnutrition each year. 
Research has revealed significant findings about biological differences 
between infants who suffer from marasmus as opposed to kwashiorkor2 
(Forrester et al. 2012). This impressive study carried out in Jamaica 
commenced in 1962 and continued for 30 years; during this time over 
1,100 infants with severe acute malnutrition were admitted to University 
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Hospital, Kingston. It was found that those infants diagnosed with kwash-
iorkor had considerably higher birth weights than did infants diagnosed 
with marasmus. The authors concluded that mechanisms associated 
with physiological ‘plasticity’ are operative in utero and that these chil-
dren have distinctively different types of metabolism. Of the two condi-
tions, children more often die from kwashiorkor, associated with edema, 
although less wasting takes place as compared to marasmus. Children 
diagnosed with marasmus do not become edematous, but endure much 
greater wasting of their flesh, although their survival rates are better 
than those of children with kwashiorkor.
Researchers characterise marasmus as ‘metabolically thrifty’, and 
kwashiorkor as ‘metabolically profligate’. They propose that in the case 
of children with marasmus, when the maternal diet is low in nutrition, 
fetal metabolism in utero in effect ‘anticipates’ a postnatal environment of 
scarcity, and low birth weights are assumed to be evidence of this process 
designed for survival. The authors argue that this finding provides the 
first direct evidence in humans in support of the fitness-enhancing effects 
in childhood of ‘anticipatory responses’ in utero. Hence, the distinctly 
different phenotypes of children with kwashiorkor and marasmus are 
understood as the endpoints of epigenetic activity on genotypes in utero.
Nutritional epigenetics is a field attracting a great deal of attention 
in part because it is hoped that it will throw light on the so-called obesity 
epidemic currently affecting many countries, whether affluent or not. 
The same team that carried out the research reported above argues that 
growing evidence exists of ‘developmentally plastic processes’ that, in 
addition to lifestyle and individual genotypes, contribute significantly to 
obesity (Forrester et al. 2012). No claim is being made that such devel-
opmental pathways in which methylation processes are involved cause 
obesity directly, but that the risk of individuals genetically predisposed 
for developing obesity in later life is increased.
Based on a hypothesis known as the ‘mismatch pathway’, it is pos-
ited that ‘evolved adaptive responses of a developing organism to antici-
pate future adverse environments’ can have maladaptive consequences if 
the environment is not what has been ‘biologically anticipated’. In other 
words, if fetuses and young infants are exposed to nutritionally deprived 
diets, their bodies may be epigenetically prepared to deal with depriva-
tion as they mature, as the marasmus study suggests, a situation that can 
cause havoc in energy-rich environments. In addition, maternal diabetes, 
maternal obesity and infant overfeeding are associated with increased risk 
of obesity in adult life (Gluckman and Hanson 2006). Clearly this account 
resembles the thrifty gene hypothesis put forward in 1962 by James Neel, 
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an argument now outmoded in the post-genomic era; discussion about 
thrifty phenotypes has superseded it (Watve and Yajnik 2007).
Hannah Landecker argues that researchers presently understand 
food as an ‘epigenetic’ factor that functions in the regulation of gene 
expression, in turn, linked to several medical conditions including cancer, 
metabolic syndrome, obesity and diabetes. In other words, food is a form 
of ‘environmental exposure’ (Landecker 2011, 167) in which the environ-
ment is molecularised as food chemistry so that ‘the body’s molecules [are] 
hung in the same network of interactions as environmental molecules, a 
network anchored and organised through the temporarily sensitive inter-
face of metabolism’ (Landecker 2011, 176). Landecker argues that this 
is a model ‘for how social things (food, in particular) enter the body, are 
digested, and in shaping metabolism, become part of the body-in-time, not 
by building bones and tissues, but by leaving an imprint on a dynamic bod-
ily process’, namely, the expression of genes (Landecker 2011, 177).
Eliminating stunting
The President of the World Bank, Jim Yong Kim, a physician/anthropologist, 
has announced that he will ‘name and shame’ countries that fail to tackle 
the malnourishment and poor growth of their children (Boseley 2016, 1). 
Kim is clear that ‘stunting’, that is, children with height considerably below 
the average for their age, is not only a humanitarian disaster but also an 
economic one. His position is that fetal malnutrition during pregnancy 
and early childhood leads to serious neurological deficits, particularly in 
toxic environments, where recurrent infections are common, and when 
infants are given little or no stimulation. Kim stresses that stunted women 
frequently give birth to children who become stunted, with the result that 
‘Inequality is baked into the brains of 25 per cent of all children before the 
age of five’ (Boseley 2016, 1). Crude estimates suggest that stunted children 
in India approach 40 per cent, in Pakistan 45 per cent, and in DR Congo 
43 per cent; hence, Kim insists, ‘the most important infrastructure we can 
invest in is grey matter’. He seeks to rid the world of stunted children by 
2030 by donating conditional cash transfers to mothers of stunted children, 
thus enabling them to feed and stimulate their children through play. It is 
reported that a trial run in Peru worked well (Boseley 2016, 2).
Jim Yong Kim plans to repeatedly bring up ‘this stain in our collective 
conscience’ at World Economic Forums in the coming years. Clearly inter-
ventions to eliminate stunting are of enormous importance, but key socio/
economic variables noted by Kim have been set to one side in his Peruvian 
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project, including unremitting poverty, unequal distribution of land and 
other resources, and increasingly toxic environments. In addition to which 
is the violence and counterinsurgency so evident in that country, ably doc-
umented by the anthropologist Kimberley Theidon (2013). The horrendous 
effects of climate change must now be added to this list.
Toxic living
For a decade or more, researchers have been working to elucidate the 
effects on neurodevelopment of exposure to neurotoxins in utero and 
during early life. Recent work has highlighted epigenetic effects and an 
apparent intergenerational aftermath of such exposures. A 2006 review 
of an array of 201 neurotoxins, ranging from arsenic to benzene and 
PCBs, concluded that exposure to hundreds of industrial chemicals is 
potentially damaging to the developing brains of children worldwide, 
although it is noted that both timing and the amount of exposure are 
significant (Grandjean and Landrigan 2006). Evidence links environ-
mental pollutants to epigenetic marks associated with a range of disease 
endpoints, although it is emphasised that many of these changes have 
been shown to be reversible and hence preventive measures are feasible 
(Senut et al. 2012). Lead is the most closely researched toxin to date; it 
has been shown repeatedly that there is no safe level of exposure during 
the early years of development and that it causes many epigenetic effects. 
Decreased brain volume is recognised as lead-related brain atrophy, and 
is most pronounced in males (Cecil et al. 2008). Research has also shown 
negative effects of lead exposure on language function (Yuan et al. 2009).
Markowitz and Rosner graphically describe the ongoing lead paint 
scandal in the US that has steadily unfolded for more than a half- century 
(Markowitz and Rosner 2013). Over the years, millions of children have 
been exposed in their homes to potential lead poisoning, although reli-
able numbers are not available. It is estimated that today over 500,000 
children between 1 and 5 years old have lead levels above that which 
 policymakers currently regard as a safe level. Reminiscent of the infa-
mous Tuskegee experiments conducted on African-Americans, 100 chil-
dren, mostly African-American, some less than a year old, living in poor 
family dwellings where lead paint had been used, have been systemat-
ically studied for the effects of lead exposure on their development. A 
judge who presided over a lawsuit described these young research sub-
jects as ‘canaries in the coalmine’ (Fowler 2013).
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It has been shown that lead released from a woman’s bones during 
pregnancy can increase risk for preterm deliveries and low birth weight 
and, further, affect gene expression in infants involving changes to DNA 
methylation that may well have lifelong effects. One researcher is quoted 
as stating: ‘lead exposure, rather than a poor social environment, is a 
key contributor to […] subsequent cognitive and behaviour problems’ 
(Radiological Society of North America 2009). Such a claim prioritises 
one variable over another, causing a distortion. It is highly likely that lead 
exposure does irreparable harm to all humans, but those individuals who 
are at the greatest risk of being exposed are almost exclusively econom-
ically deprived. In 2014, in the impoverished town of Flint, Michigan, 
with a population of 100,000, nearly 60 per cent of whom are African-
American, a water crisis exploded. It became clear that between 6,000 
and 12,000 children had been extensively exposed to lead contamina-
tion when, in order to save money, the Flint water source was changed 
from a safe source, to one involving use of ageing pipes linked to the Flint 
river that leached lead into the water supply. As one commentator stated, 
‘some of the darkest chapters in American industrialisation are written in 
lead’ (El Akkad 2016) and we learnt recently that ‘Dozens of California 
communities have seen recent rates of childhood lead poisoning that 
exceeds those of Flint, Michigan’ (Schneyer and Pell 2017).
Thanks to the intrepid battle fought by Rachel Carson, dichlo-
rodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) was banned in the early 1970s, first 
in the US and then worldwide, although it continues to be used in cer-
tain malarial regions. Furthermore, the use of polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs) is banned or severely restricted in most countries today, but about 
10 per cent of the PCBs produced since the late 1920s remain in the envi-
ronment today. They are released into the environment primarily from 
incinerators and build up in the fatty tissues of animals living in water 
or on land and are passed along the food chain to humans. Dioxins are 
found throughout the world and accumulate in the food chain, mainly 
in the fatty tissue of animals. They are highly toxic and cause reproduc-
tive and developmental problems, damage the immune system, interfere 
with hormones and cause cancer. Dioxin enters the environment primar-
ily from incinerators; of the 419 types of dioxin-related compounds, 30 
have significant toxicity (WHO 2016, 2).
The effects of PCBs, dioxin and other toxins in the Arctic are more 
devastating than elsewhere. Legislation against these chemicals is 
not effective in the extreme north as yet because toxic residues slowly 
drift toward the Arctic and accumulate there, making it one of the 
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most contaminated places on earth. The body fat of seals, whales and 
walruses hunted for food is highly contaminated, as is the breast milk 
of many Inuit women. An Inuit grandmother, politically active in cir-
cumpolar meetings, is quoted as stating: ‘When women have to think 
twice about breast feeding their babies, surely that must be a wake-up 
call to the world’ (Johansen 2003, 479). The situation is exacerbated 
because the cost of store-bought food is beyond the reach of many 
Arctic residents.
The intergenerational transmission of toxins
An illustration of toxic local biologies is furnished by the mercury- 
contaminated Grassy Narrows’ Wabigoon River system in Ontario, Can-
ada. The government claims that defilement of the river stopped 40 years 
ago when the paper mill was forcibly shut down, after dumping about 
9,000 kilograms of mercury into the downstream river. Today mercury 
levels in the fish near Grassy Narrows are 15 times the safe consumption 
limit, and 40 times the limit for children, pregnant women and women of 
child-bearing age (Mosa and Duffin 2016). The Grassy Narrows people 
have fought for 45 years for a clean-up of the river, but the Ontario Min-
ister of Environment reiterated in May 2016 that there is no need for this. 
Further pressure apparently made the government temporarily change 
its position, but in late 2016, once again, the provincial government 
backed down, claiming a lack of funding, despite an official report by 
mercury experts stating that the river remains badly contaminated. Two 
generations of people from Grassy Narrows and Wabaseemoong  First 
Nations today exhibit symptoms of mercury poisoning, including loss 
of muscle coordination, numbness in the hands and feet, hearing loss, 
speech damage and tunnel vision. Fetuses are particularly vulnerable to 
cognitive damage. Extreme cases result in paralysis, insanity, coma and 
death (Mosa and Duffin 2016).
In the mid-1950s, mercury poisoning was detected in Japan. First, 
the local cats appeared to go crazy and some ‘committed suicide’ by ‘fall-
ing’ into the sea. Thereafter, humans started to report numbness in their 
extremities; tremors; difficulty walking; and some appeared to be seri-
ously mentally ill (Kugler 2016). By 1959 it had been established that 
mercury poisoning was causing the symptoms, and the condition was 
labelled Minamata disease, drawing on the name of the fishing village 
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where it had first occurred. A large petrochemical plant in Minamata, 
Chisso Corporation, was immediately suspect. Chisso denied involve-
ment, even though it was clear that an estimated 27 tonnes of mercury 
compounds were present in Minamata Bay. Protests began in 1959, 
but it was 1968 before the company finally stopped dumping. Close to 
3,000 people contracted Minamata disease, more than half of whom 
have died. Japanese scientists have been summoned to Grassy Narrows, 
and state that up to 90 per cent of the people show signs of mercury 
poisoning that may well be intergenerationally transmitted (Mosa and 
Duffin 2016).
Social isolation
Research carried out with Romanian children living in orphanages has 
made clear that a paucity of social relations can bring about signifi-
cant lifelong harm that may well have intergenerational effects (Nel-
son et al. 2013). A randomised clinical trial was carried out in which 
over 60 orphans aged between eight and nine were moved into good 
 foster-care homes, at the expense of the involved researchers from the 
US, while a control group of similar size was left to languish in the 
orphanage. The study demonstrated, perhaps not surprisingly, that fos-
ter care was much more effective for the wellbeing and development, 
mental and physical, of these young children than was the orphanage 
setting in which a single adult may be responsible for 12 to 15 chil-
dren. But of particular interest were findings that, as compared with 
never- institutionalised children, the orphaned children exhibited less 
development in both the grey and white matter in their brains. Foster 
placement quickly improved development of white matter, although 
grey matter development did not recover. Furthermore, the major-
ity of institutionalised children showed shorter telomere lengths. As 
Elizabeth Blackburn, who has worked her whole life on telomeres, has 
argued, short telomeres ‘powerfully quantify life’s insults’ (Blackburn 
and Epel 2012, 170). These findings were communicated to the Roma-
nian government. Efforts to map the molecular epigenetics pathways 
of these findings, and those obtained from other orphanages, are now 
underway with some success (Naumova et al. 2012). Longitudinal eth-
nographic research could enrich these findings greatly, and has the 
potential to influence policy making.
Charles Nelson, a cognitive neuroscientist, has carried out research 
in Bangladesh and reports that ‘the level of poverty is mind-boggling’ 
 PERMEABLE BODIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEL INEATION 37
(Hamzelou 2016). He notes that a family of five often lives in a single 
room; kitchens and bathrooms are communal for an entire compound; 
latrines flood during the long monsoon season; people cook with wood 
or coal and the pollution is, as Nelson puts it, ‘unbelievable’. What is 
more, dirt blows everywhere from unpaved tracks, and the sewers are 
open. Nelson states emphatically, ‘the polite way to put it is that stool 
gets into everything … virtually all the children have chronic diarrhoea, 
which leads to malnourishment and stunting; up to 30 per cent of the 
mothers are visibly depressed, and high levels of domestic violence exist’. 
Nelson made a rule that his team must not cry in front of the children. 
They witnessed tiny babies left to cry in their sodden cribs, and were 
informed that they were rarely picked up and held (Hamzelou 2016). 
Neuroimaging research is now underway in a new centre constructed 
at great expense in Dhaka designed to track the brain development of 
these children.
Colonisation and historical trauma
This final example makes clear how lasting the impact can be on individu-
als and groups when systematic efforts are made by invasive forces to over-
take and transform groups of people en masse. Canada is home to roughly 
1.2 million individuals who endorsed the category ‘Aboriginal’ in the 2006 
Canadian census. The majority of these people live in communities that 
continue to contend with the devastating legacy of settler colonialism, 
including entrenched poverty and invidious discrimination manifested in 
so-called ‘mental health’ problems of many kinds. These include substance 
dependence, depression, violence, and extraordinarily high rates of sui-
cide, especially among young people, estimated in some Inuit communi-
ties to be six times the rate in other parts of Canada (Kral 2012).
Independently, mental health professionals and individuals living 
in First Nations communities have consistently associated these high 
rates of pathology with the experiences of colonisation that commenced 
five centuries ago. A concept of ‘historical trauma’ has been adopted to 
call attention to the collective, cumulative, and intergenerational psycho-
social effects that resulted from past colonial subjugation and persist in 
abated form to the present day (Niezen 2013).
Among the early travesties was the introduction of infectious dis-
ease. The mortality rate from infectious disease as a whole was extraordi-
narily high – on Haida Gwaii, for example, it is documented that between 
1700 and 1900, smallpox, measles, dysentery, TB, influenza, and other 
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communicable diseases wiped out many thousands of people. The Haida 
Nation, with whom Franz Boas worked for some time, went from an esti-
mated population of 20,000 prior to 1770 to less than 600 by the end of 
the nineteenth century (Kil’iljuss (Barb Wilson) 2009). The full effects 
of population decimation are rarely fully appreciated: given the climate 
and an economy based on hunting, the ability of those that survived 
to procure food is in effect destroyed, and hence individuals ‘with the 
dubious good fortune of living through the initial sickness die of hunger’ 
(Daschuk 2013, 12).
This massive population destruction was followed by extensive 
efforts to ‘whiten’ the Indians, among which was the establishment of 
residential schools created expressly to ‘kill the Indian and save the child’. 
Young children were rounded up by school administrators, members of 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and agents attached to the despised 
Bureau of Indian Affairs to be sent great distances from their homes, in 
order to be housed in institutions where they were not permitted to speak 
their own languages or participate in anything regarded as cultural prac-
tice (Carr 2013). Today, the residential schools, the last of which were 
closed down only in the 1990s, are regarded among First Nations and 
Inuit communities as the primary source of their current malaise. It 
recently came to light as part of the ongoing Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, that repeated sexual abuse took place in these 
schools, one of which was characterised by an investigating Supreme 
Court Justice as practising ‘institutionalised paedophilia’ (Carr 2013, 
19). Systematic nutritional medical experimentation was also practised 
on some of the students resulting in malnutrition in many, and death for 
many more. TB was rampant, and few attempts were made to curb it. In 
one notorious school, the death rate of children was apparently 75 per 
cent in the first 16 years of the school’s operation (Carr 2013; Niezen 
2013). The majority of individuals who grew up in these conditions, now 
middle-aged and older, have until very recently been unwilling to rumi-
nate about their younger lives, but many freely admit to being unable to 
adequately parent their own children.
Despite major changes for the better in recent years, racism and 
discrimination continue to be blatantly evident against First Nations. 
Shocking poverty persists on many reservations, a good number of which 
have no running water and where toxic contamination is frequently 
present; schools on reservations are poorly provided for compared with 
schools elsewhere in Canada, the education gap has increased in recent 
years between First Nations children and other Canadians (Friesen 
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2013), and alcohol and drug abuse and violence against women and 
children is extraordinarily high.
Not all reservations exhibit high rates of illness and suicide. Some 
survivors report that they enjoyed school, and others became devout 
Christians – a conversion that apparently assisted in their survival. 
Clearly, differences among First Nations are of the utmost importance 
when attempting to account for malaise. Also, ongoing land claim set-
tlements have improved the lot of some First Nation communities, but 
settlements have not been made with the majority of communities. 
Furthermore, the establishment of healing programmes and suicide pre-
vention gatherings conducted by First Nations themselves, that make use 
of indigenous healing practices together with biomedicine, exist in cer-
tain communities and receive some government support. Such changes 
are regarded as a positive form of empowerment by many First Nations 
leaders, but are not as yet broadly entrenched (Niezen 2013).
First Nations received a formal apology from the Prime Minister of 
Canada two years ago but since that time the budgets of 12  government- 
funded programmes for First Nations have been cut, and nine of these 
programmes are now closed (Bennett 2013). And suicide rates, substance 
abuse, and the disappearance and death of young First Nation women 
continue to be extraordinarily high (Leblanc 2014). If the concept of 
‘historical trauma’ is to be taken seriously, then a great deal more than 
an apology and a reconciliation commission are needed to counter the 
crudely racist attempts to obliterate the Indian – the effects of which are 
being played out among third and fourth post-colonial generations. It is 
not known if intergenerational transmission of DNA modifications has 
contributed to this situation. Very understandably, First Nations individu-
als are reluctant to donate tissue for post-mortem analysis; but obviously 
demonstration of epigenetic changes are not required to verify the extent 
and depth of this ongoing abuse that a good number of survivors of res-
idential schools and their offspring describe as genocide (Niezen 2013).
Conclusions
The concept of ‘environment’ has taken centre stage in the era of the 
Anthropocene. It is recognised that genes rarely determine who we are, as 
was formerly believed to be the case but, rather, that the human genome 
ceaselessly responds to environmental stimuli that impinge on it, with a 
lifelong influence on individual development, health and wellbeing. This 
recognition is designated as the post-genomic era, and the molecular 
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mechanisms that facilitate interactions among environments external 
and internal to the human body are steadily being elucidated in the bur-
geoning field of epigenetics. These molecular insights are of enormous 
significance, but the majority of epigeneticists, although they acknowl-
edge the contributory effects of environment writ large on human bod-
ies, nevertheless deliberately miniaturise the environment and delineate 
the target of investigation as proximal and/or internal to the body. This 
practice of scaling down the environment has been described by social 
scientists as neo-reductionistic.
The illustrative examples set out above make clear how social, polit-
ical and economic variables impinge on the lived experience of individu-
als, families and communities, with profound effects on the incidence and 
distribution of health and illness. The effects of social isolation, extreme 
unremitting poverty and forced migration have particularly devastating 
effects on wellbeing, often with lasting intergenerational effects. The 
findings set out above suggest that investigative collaborations of epi-
geneticists working with social scientists, epidemiologists, public health 
researchers and historians could be very fruitful. In recent years, certain 
epidemiologists have entered into such collaborations (see, for example, 
Relton and Davey Smith 2012), and anthropologists are also becoming 
involved in both the design of research projects and the collection of data 
(Roberts 2016). The most effective of these projects are those in which 
‘environment’ is explicitly delineated or contoured for the purposes of 
any given investigation, with full awareness that doing so is a device, 
with unavoidable limitations. Deductive thinking is not abandoned, 
but is greatly supplemented by attention given to interrelated, overlap-
ping orbits that contain dense webs of partial knowledge, on the basis 
of which interpretive accounts can be readily discerned and explicated.
Notes
1. https: //www.benefits.va.gov/compensation/claims-special-birth_defects.asp.
2. Marasmus and kwashiorkor are two common forms of serious protein-energy malnutrition.
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Chapter 2
Situating Biologies: Studying Human 
Differentiation as Material-Semiotic 
Practice
Jörg Niewöhner
Introduction: Differences in anthropology and biology
How can anthropology and biology conceptualise and study human dif-
ferentiation beyond biodeterminism as a material-semiotic practice? Dif-
ferences that make a difference have always been of central concern to 
social inquiry. Such differences matter on at least two distinct levels: As 
differences ‘out there’ in the world, and as differences in the analytical cat-
egories that social inquiry employs and develops. The two levels are inter-
dependent, i.e. they are connected through manifold and often messy 
looping effects (Hacking 2007). One such form of  difference-making is 
commonly referred to in the social sciences as ‘social differentiation’. Peo-
ple living in groups, so the argument goes, differentiate into subgroups. 
The complex processes driving and shaping social differentiation are 
fundamental to social life. They can be discerned, for example, as inter-
actional and situational markers of distinction or as structural or disposi-
tional factors implicating power, knowledge and distributional matters. 
Social differentiation becomes of particular concern to the social sciences 
where patterns of significantly unequal distribution of means and types 
of capital within a group emerge, manifest and reproduce over time. 
Such patterns raise important political and ethical questions – not least, 
because epidemiological research persistently shows that people within 
the relatively disadvantaged sections of these distributional patterns dis-
play a significant tendency to fall ill more often and die earlier compared 
to those in the relatively better-off sections (Marmot et al. 2001). The 
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analysis of differentiation processes has typically followed established 
modern distinctions between nature and culture: social differentiation 
is a matter of people interacting studied by the social sciences; the bio-
logical consequences are suffered by humans whose biology is investi-
gated by the natural sciences and biomedicine. The great divide may be 
bridged briefly by statistical correlation. Yet the majority of attempts to 
explain or interpret differentiation have assumed that it is either matter 
or history ‘all the way down’ (Haraway 2008). Those favouring matter 
have clearly dominated research since the end of the last century.
This volume is now suggesting that such biodeterministic thought 
styles are being troubled in productive ways; that the relations between 
nature and culture are being reconfigured; and that an opening may 
be emerging to study and think through environment/human entan-
glements differently. In this chapter, I want to contribute to this line of 
thought by investigating social differentiation as a biosocial phenome-
non in the sense that the introduction to this volume is putting forward. 
I am arguing that the social sciences benefit from taking seriously the 
material dimensions of social differentiation and that the biological 
sciences benefit from reflecting on their understanding and operation-
alisation of social practice. Both disciplines, I suggest, need to find ways 
of ‘staying with the trouble’ (Haraway 2016), i.e. of engaging with those 
thought styles, findings and methods, which they so easily consider the 
respective ‘other’ to their own everyday knowledge practices; not in 
order to build a comprehensive theory of biosocial differentiation, but to 
foster new forms of reflexivity within the respective disciplines and move 
beyond unproductive modern and ultimately determinist dichotomies. I 
build my argument by presenting two examples of studies of ‘social’ dif-
ferentiation. One is anthropological and gleaned from the literature, the 
other taken from my own ethnographic laboratory study of epigenetic 
research. I then diffract these cases, i.e. read them through each other to 
reveal their respective blindsidedness as well as opportunities for mutual 
engagement. Drawing on Margaret Lock’s notion of local biologies (Lock 
1993a, 1993b and this volume), I argue in favour of ‘situating biologies’ 
as a research agenda capable of addressing – as this volume has it – ‘bio-
social becomings’. Situating biologies is a collaborative agenda between 
anthropology and biology that focuses on bodies-in-action as the basic 
unit of analysis (see Lock and Napier, this volume) and that understands 
differentiation as a patterning of material-semiotic practices (Roepstorff 
et al. 2010).
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Empirical sketch I: Inscribing difference into the body – an 
anthropological perspective
Northern England: Picture a 30-year-old man, unemployed, who ekes 
out a living by boxing on the local fight circuit. In an interview with the 
anthropologist Simon Charlesworth, he describes what happened to him 
as he entered the social security office’s waiting area with a seat available 
next to what he perceived to be a middle-class woman: 
‘… it’s all arahnd us, Ah went in’t social (Social Security Office) 
other day … there was like this chairs an’ a space next to this 
stuck up cow, yer know, slim, attractive, middle class, an’ Ah din’t 
wanna sit wi’y ‘er, yer feel yer shun’t, Ah become all conscious, of 
ma weight, Ah felt overweight, Ah start swettin’, Ah start bunglin’, 
shufflin’, Ah just thought “no, Ah’m not gunna sit there, Ah don’t 
wanna put her aht”, Ah dun’t wanna feel that shi’s put aht, yer dun’t 
wanna bother them … yer know you insult them … way thi’ look 
at yer like the’re disgusted … thi’ look at yer like yer invadin’ their 
area … yer know, Straight away, way yer tret … yer feel “Ah shun’t 
bi there” … it meks yer not want to gu aht … What it is, it’s a form of 
violence, … right, it’s like a barrier sayin’ “listen low life don’t even 
[voice rises with pain and anger] come near me! … What the fuck 
yer doin’ in ma space? … Wi’ pay to get away from scum like you” … 
It fuckin’ stresses you, yer get exhausted … It’s everywhere … Ah 
mean, Ah clocked her like they clock us, right, … an’ thought “fuck 
me, Ah ain’t even sittin’ there”. She would be uncomfortable, an’ it’ll 
embarrass me, yer know, [voice rises in anger/pain.] Wi’ wo’ just 
sittin’ there, yer know what Ah’m tranna say? … It’s like a common 
understandin’, yer know ahr they feel, yer feel it, Ah’m telling yer … 
They are fuck all, thi’ got nothin’, but it’s that air abaht ‘em, yer 
know, thi’ve got the right, the body the clothes, an’ everythin’, the 
confidence, thi’ attitude, know what Ah mean … We [sadly, voice 
drops] an’t got it, wi can’t ‘ave it. Wi’ walk in like wi’ been beaten, … 
draggin’ ahr feet when wi’ walkin’ in, … yer like feel like yer want to 
hide …’ (Charlesworth et al. 2004, 51ff.)
This is an intense statement. It gives an almost painful insight into ‘liv-
ing inferiority’ as lead author Charlesworth calls it, i.e. an insight into 
the manifold effects of the daily workings of social differentiation within 
societies. Many aspects from this quote could be discussed. I want to pick 
out two of them: 
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1. What this man experiences is not triggered by any problematic 
action as such. He does not witness or is not subject to an openly 
discriminatory act. There is neither open aggression in this situ-
ation nor any verbal or physical violence. He is not excluded or 
marked in any active way by an in-group. Nothing really happens 
in this situation at all. Rather, the man is positioned within social 
space or, perhaps more accurately, positioned within what has 
been called kairotic space to emphasise the often informal nature 
of power and discrimination operating within material and social 
space (Price 2011). The social situation affords an awareness of 
the particular social stratification of the society within which it 
takes place.1 The social situation ‘in the waiting room’ forces two 
very different people next to each other and thus affords a compar-
ing and differentiating experience of this particular constellation. 
Needless to say, this experience necessarily draws on wider dis-
courses of social class and also extends the specific situation into 
social history, biography and milieu. I use the notion of affordance 
to emphasise that the social situation does not determine personal 
experience. Other responses would have been possible: for exam-
ple, a proud feeling of superiority based in a sense of working class 
belonging. Yet it is not the individual’s free choosing that deter-
mines his experience either. The material and semiotic environ-
ment of this social situation, for example, the waiting room with 
its chairs, the specific availability of narrations of class in English 
public discourse, the established markers of appearance and dis-
tinction materialised in clothes and carried in style, all of these 
characteristics of the situation afford a certain response, interpre-
tation and experience. My point here is that social differentiation is 
an ever-present and unavoidable phenomenon in human societies. 
Yet its specific experience by individuals in everyday life situations 
is always mediated and open to interpretation. It is contingent.
2. The quote illustrates perfectly why it often seems so meaningless 
or at least artificial to separate ‘the body’ from ‘the social’ and 
‘the environment’. It is obvious here that this man’s body is impli-
cated in the situation in multiple ways: the body carries signs of 
distinction (overweight, hair cut, etc.), hence contributes to the 
affordance of the situation. The body also appears to bear the 
consequences of this situation as experienced by the man as a 
social being: sweating and feeling overweight are two signs that 
the man verbalises. A biomarker measurement in this situation 
would probably indicate an acute stress response with an activated 
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hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, increased glucocorticoids 
and circulatory activity, etc. The paper’s authors draw heavily on 
Pierre Bourdieu to emphasise this moment of inscription of social 
phenomena into the material body: 
We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through 
this permanent confrontation, which may be more or less dramatic 
but is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by 
affective transactions with the environment … it would be wrong 
to underestimate the pressure of oppression, continuous and 
often unnoticed, of the ordinary order of things, the conditionings 
imposed by the material conditions of existence, by the insidious 
injunctions and ‘inert violence’ (as Sartre puts it) of economic and 
social structures and of the mechanisms through which they are 
reproduced. The most serious social injunctions are addressed not 
to the intellect but to the body, treated as a memory pad. (Bourdieu 
2000, 141, cited in Charlesworth et al. 2004, 57)
The material body is thus part of the cause and the consequence of this 
social situation. In fact, it is very hard to even speak of the material body 
without emphasising its social aspects. Yet while the social sciences have 
pointed to inscription, i.e. the material manifestation of social processes, 
they did not follow through to study the fate of these material manifesta-
tions and their continued role in social practices.
Empirical sketch II: Inscribing difference – a molecular biological 
perspective
Environmental epigenetics is a research field within molecular biology 
concerned with biochemical and structural changes of DNA molecules 
that do not involve DNA sequence change, but that have an effect on gene 
expression (for example, Tost 2008). The two most commonly studied 
changes are methylation and histone modification. In methylation, a 
methyl group binds to a section of the DNA sequence blocking its transcrip-
tion. In histone modification, the folding of the DNA molecule is changed 
such that the transcription machinery cannot attach and move along the 
sequence properly. In both cases, the altered gene (or DNA sequence) 
is not expressed. Epigenetic changes occur ‘naturally’ in plants and ani-
mals during organismic development. They are commonly thought of as 
a switch-like mechanism to regulate genes up or down depending on the 
need for particular proteins during particular developmental stages and 
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processes. Environmental epigenetics, sometimes also called behavioural 
epigenetics, is an emerging subfield of epigenetics concerned with epige-
netic changes that occur in response to changes in an organism’s environ-
ment (for example, Jirtle and Skinner 2007). Environment in this context 
includes the material (for example, food or toxins) as well as the social 
environment (for example, behaviour or stress) if one cares to analytically 
distinguish the two clearly. Epigenetic changes are commonly tissue- and 
even cell-specific and they are thought to be ‘metastable’, i.e. they occur 
in response to a particular event and then track through mitotic and mei-
otic reproduction. They can be passed on to future generations without 
altering the germ line.2 Research demonstrates that epigenetic changes 
acquired during adulthood can be passed on to at least the grandchildren 
generation. In summary, epigenetic research presents a set of molecular 
mechanisms that link environment to gene regulation within an organ-
ism. The implications of such a reactive genome (Keller 2014) for evolu-
tionary theory have been discussed in detail (Jablonka and Lamb 1998); 
as have the social scientific implications and politico-historical contexts 
within which this research is set (Lock 2015; Landecker and Panofsky 
2013; Meloni 2016, 2019; Niewöhner 2011).
Environmental epigenetics is a relatively small but rapidly expand-
ing field of research. Recent proof of concept experimental work that 
was published high profile in Nature, Neuroscience and PLoS One has 
placed the field on the molecular biological map and also attracted ini-
tial interest from the social sciences (see Waterland 2003; Weaver et al. 
2004; McGowan et al. 2009; for social science discussion of studies, see 
Niewöhner 2011). As Maurizio Meloni has shown, environmental epi-
genetics is joined by efforts such as sociogenomics or social and cultural 
neurosciences in trying to experimentally understand the functional 
and mechanistic links between biological matter and the wider (social) 
organismic environment (Meloni 2014). Environmental epigenetics then 
is a field of interest when trying to redress the boundary work between 
nature and culture, society and the body, performed by the biological 
and social sciences.
Molecular biology of social position
The preceding paragraphs have outlined current research priorities in 
epigenetics and situated the subfield of environmental epigenetics in a 
wider life scientific trend. To understand how environmental epigenet-
ics produces the entanglement of nature and culture in practice and 
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how this may be good to think with in social science, it is necessary to 
leave this macro level of analysis and turn to a specific case: the molec-
ular biology of social position. To illustrate this case, I will draw on pub-
lished material as well as ethnographic findings from a four-month lab 
ethnography with the lab of cancer biologist and epigenetics researcher 
Moshe Szyf at McGill University, Montreal in 2009. The study on which 
I will focus has been published in the International Journal of Epidemi-
ology in 2012 (Borghol et al. 2012). It is concerned with the impact of 
an individual’s socio-economic status (SES) on his or her epigenetic pro-
file. It tries to answer a question very similar to the one pursued in the 
first empirical sketch: given that society is socially stratified, what marks 
does this leave on the body? Rephrased in the group’s epigenetic terms: 
how does social position impact upon methylation patterns? To conduct 
this study, the group links up with a well-defined, long-term epidemio-
logical cohort study in the UK, the 1958 birth cohort study (see Power 
et al. 2008). This cohort was set up in 1958 to include all people born in 
one week in March of that year in the UK. It has gathered data on many 
aspects of public health, including the link between cardiovascular risk 
factors and measures of socio-economic status or social position as epi-
demiology often refers to this indicator. In one of the latest follow-ups 
in 2003, blood samples were taken from the then 45-year-old partici-
pants. This availability of epidemiological data and blood samples has 
opened up the opportunity for an experimental design that connects 
social variables with biological markers. This is not only of interest to 
epigenetic researchers. It is also important for the gatekeepers of the 
epidemiological cohort. If their hypotheses are confirmed, epigenet-
ics could underpin the well-established ‘social determinants of health’ 
theory with a molecular mechanism (for example, Brunner et al. 1997; 
Marmot et al. 2001). In collaboration with the epidemiological cohort, 
Szyf’s group sets up a study with samples from 40 people of maximally 
different social positions at birth and age 45 respectively. Their aim is 
to detect how changes in social position correlate with methylation pat-
terns. Rooted in the above discussions on social status as relational and 
further underpinned by theorising on evolutionary and developmental 
adaptation (Gluckman et al. 2005, 2009), the group’s initial hypothesis is 
that methylation patterns might correspond to changes in social position 
independent of the direction of change, i.e. towards better or worse posi-
tions. The idea is that any departure from the initial social position, i.e. 
the social position to which a newborn’s biology is adapted, will require 
biological adjustments, which in turn will leave measurable traces in the 
body. This hypothesis cannot be confirmed by experimental findings as 
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such. The study in the end shows that social position during childhood – 
measured as parental occupation and access to household amenities – is 
a better predictor of adult methylation pattern than social position at the 
time of methylation measurement – measured as current occupation and 
housing tenure (Borghol et al. 2012). This finding is interpreted as evi-
dence for the fact that early life social position writes itself into biology 
in ways that are at least semi-stable. Early life effects ‘track’ into adult-
hood, as epidemiologists often call it. While tracking is well known, this 
study points to a possibly relevant molecular mechanism underpinning 
this process. It suggests a mechanism that links the social environment 
directly with physiology. This effect and pathway is known from research 
on rats (Weaver et al. 2004) and has been further supported by research 
on human suicide completers (Labonté et al. 2012, 2013; McGowan et al. 
2009, 2011). Many of these studies have been discussed at some length 
in the social science literature (Meloni 2014; Landecker 2011; Landecker 
and Panofsky 2013; Niewöhner 2011; 2014; Pickersgill et al. 2013). As 
such, this study is part of a development towards epigenetic epidemiol-
ogy, which is likely to thrive over the next few years (Davey Smith 2011, 
2012). The study is not uncontroversial. Particularly the statistical anal-
ysis and peripheral blood as the biological basis for methylation meas-
urement are discussed critically, yet similar studies support the initial 
findings (Lam et al. 2012, 2013; Suderman et al. 2013). They are inter-
preted as confirming the idea that ‘early life adversity’ writes itself into 
the methylation pattern in a metastable manner.
From my ethnographic work in and with the group, I would like 
to point out four aspects about this study that do not appear in the pub-
lished literature, but that are worth considering when trying to better 
understand how the natural sciences construe processes of differentia-
tion and thus questions of the link between nature and culture: 
(1) Social position is conceptualised in relational terms
In the group’s morning journal and data clubs many discussions evolve 
around social stratification and how this may affect the body. Part of 
social stratification is understood in material terms, i.e. measurable 
aspects of deprivation such as housing or nutrition. Yet many discus-
sions establish a consensus within the group that social position is also 
about experiencing oneself in relation to other members of society. It is 
the perception of one’s own position in relation to the overall spread of 
socio-economic means in society that is expected to matter physiolog-
ically. The main concern lies with those who suffer from experiencing 
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that they are positioned towards the lower end of the spread. This is a 
relational understanding of difference rather than an absolute under-
standing. The group is not interested in measuring social environments 
against a normatively or naturally grounded absolute scale. It is about 
the experience of difference in any given society.
(2) ‘The social’ does not exist
While the group is interested in the effects of social position on human 
biology, they do not really have a notion of ‘the social’. The discussions 
are – unsurprisingly perhaps – social-theoretically naïve. They reveal an 
understanding of society as macro structure (socio-economic, politically 
shaped) that impacts more or less directly on bio-cognitive individu-
als. ‘The social’ as an emergent phenomenon sui generis in the sense of 
Durkheim does not feature in internal debate. Instead, socio- economic 
structures are experienced by individuals and, if anything, social support 
through family or friends is important as a coping strategy. This is not to 
say that the individual researchers have no appreciation for lived soci-
ality. Yet they do not operate with theoretical concepts that would give 
them a handle on different ways of thinking about social processes as 
part of ‘their science’.
(3) Social position is a pragmatic and insufficient reduction
The group is very much aware that social position as measured through 
indicators such as housing and employment status is too simple a meas-
ure of processes of differentiation. As indicated above, this does not pri-
marily stem from a thick, social-scientifically informed understanding of 
lived sociality. Rather it stems from their knowledge about the sensitiv-
ity of epigenetic mechanisms. As they discuss repeatedly, even handling 
the animals during experimentation, i.e. placing them in different cages 
or allocating them to different mothers in cross-fostering experiments, 
seems to leave methylation marks sometimes more profound than the 
actual stressor used in the experiment to demonstrate a particular effect. 
It is this knowledge about sensitivity, which makes them appreciate that 
everyday life will produce a constant stream of ‘stressors’. The reduction 
of such complexity to very simple measures of socio- economic status is 
appreciated as problematic. Yet while they are not necessarily ontological 
reductionists, who believe that everything starts from and comes down 
to matter as others in the natural sciences may suggest, they are prag-
matic reductionists (Beck and Niewöhner 2006). They are opportunisti-
cally scanning the literature and their lifeworlds for useable measures of 
social differentiation. Epidemiology is the obvious port of call and hence 
they work with the composite indicator social position. Of course, these 
 S ITUATING BIOLOGIES 53
difficulties and debates of translation disappear in publications, when 
housing and education are treated as pars pro toto for social difference.
(4) Human biology may be local
When I presented some findings from my lab ethnography back to the 
group, a discussion around the anthropological notion of local biologies 
(Lock 1993a, 1993b) arose. It is worth noting that this has been the first 
group of molecular biologists that I have come across in my work, which 
appreciated that research on human biology might not only be a matter 
of going deeper and finer into molecular structures, but might also entail 
a thicker appreciation of the local contexts within which bodies dwell. I 
will return to this point in more detail in the final section.
I am not making these points in some detail to paint a somewhat 
idealised picture of ‘my’ lab group as particularly enlightened biologists. 
Neither am I naïve about the dynamics of science funding and practice. 
Instead I am trying to show how the group grapples with a human biology 
becoming embedded in social environments – before they purify a narra-
tive for peer-review and publication. The point I am trying to make is that 
much social science critique approaches such research from a critical dis-
tance focusing on illegitimate reductions and biologistic determinisms. 
Of particular concern have been the biopolitical implications that may 
be set off by a molecularisation of the social and material environment, 
effects of mechanistic knowledge of the transmissibility of the manifes-
tations of social difference, a different notion of the body as embedded 
in multiple spatial and temporal contexts, as well as the consequences 
for social theory itself. This critique is justified. When concerned with 
the effects of hegemonic biological discourses on everyday life, it does 
not make any significant difference what a single lab group is trying to 
do. What matters is the field of epigenetics’ contribution to a specific dis-
positive and its interpellating consequences for possible and actual sub-
ject positions (Epstein 2008). Hence I am not trying to argue that the 
personal views within the lab group and their ‘good intentions’ should 
keep us from criticising knowledge production in epigenetic biology. Yet I 
want to point out to a presumably largely social scientific readership that 
this lab group is very much aware of the complicatedness of the issue at 
hand and that people are willing to enter into discussions about it. They 
recognise that their research throws up questions that are not easily 
answered within the existing experimental system. Again: They are prag-
matic reductionists, not ontological reductionists (Beck and Niewöhner 
2006). Hence, they are prepared to explore new avenues; an opening 
for collaboration arises. To better understand what this may entail, I will 
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diffract the life and social scientific perspective, i.e. read them through 
each other. I begin by exploring some of the established barriers (and 
their porosity) between life and social sciences against a more produc-
tive mutual engagement before outlining ‘situating biologies’ as a col-
laborative research programme aimed at addressing material- semiotic 
differentiation.
Life scientific perspectives: Treating culture as nature
In an increasing number of life scientific research fields, researchers 
recognise that they must understand social and cultural phenomena in 
order to advance their molecular research. Epigenetics is among the most 
visible, but the social and cultural neurosciences struggle with similar 
problems (Meloni 2014). Many researchers in the life sciences appreciate 
that their understanding and use of data on social and cultural phenom-
ena is necessarily limited as the sketch above has shown. The problem 
is not that biologists imagine society to be simple or that they are prag-
matic reductionists. The problem lies in the epistemological and ontolog-
ical commitments underpinning these life scientific attempts to bridge 
the great divide. A recent editorial3 in the journal Nature on research on 
environmental stressors expresses these concerns: ‘Many sociologists, 
however, are still immured in their fortress, struggling to catch up with a 
debate that has shifted from nature-or-nurture to nature-and-nurture, or 
are unable to shake off their distrust of scientists, worrying that scientists 
will force them to play second fiddle in their own territory: the environ-
ment’ (Nature 2012, 143). From this point of view, the issue of nature 
and culture is a data problem. The asymmetry of detailed molecular and 
simplistic social markers arises, because the social sciences do not deliver 
their share of the data. The editorial seems to suggest that if only the 
social sciences were up to speed on these matters, questions of the mate-
rial effects of differentiation could be solved quickly. The epistemological 
differences between the different epistemic cultures are neither appreci-
ated in this argument nor are they negotiable. It is an implicit assumption 
that representations of ‘the social’ will be added to natural scientific rep-
resentations of the material world – perhaps an unsurprising stance in a 
natural science journal.
To be fair, the natural sciences do not operate within a singular 
epistemological framework concerning the link between nature and 
culture. Bio- and specifically gene-centric approaches are today joined 
by developmental systems theory, evolutionary developmental biology, 
 S ITUATING BIOLOGIES 55
gene culture co-evolution, niche construction theory, research on pheno-
typical and developmental plasticity and parental effects and, of course, 
epigenetic inheritance as a matter of transmission of traits through var-
ious material, behavioural and environmental routes (see Stotz 2008; 
Lux and Richter 2014). Yet the vast majority of these frameworks share 
a belief in a single reality, i.e. an ontological commitment that there 
is a reality out there that can be represented more or less adequately. 
Objectifying representations of this reality compete against each other on 
the basis of their explanatory power derived from a theoretical frame-
work or empirical data or a combination of the two. Nature and culture 
are operationalised into measurable (quanti- or typifiable) variables. 
Researchers strive to maximise ecological validity of these variables and 
the experimental systems with which they are gathered. From a natural 
science perspective, then, advances in studying phenomena with mate-
rial and social dimensions are difficult to achieve, because (1) experimen-
tal systems that control the increased number of variables are difficult 
to design; (2) some of the social variables are difficult to control and to 
reproduce in experiments, i.e. biography; (3) human beings are ‘moving 
targets’ (Hacking 2007), that is, they respond (self-)reflexively to new 
knowledge about them, making modelling human-environment systems 
a major challenge; (4) the social sciences are not cooperating in studies 
to deliver sophisticated representations of social phenomena that can be 
used in biological studies of human/gene environment interaction. The 
debates in the natural sciences do not appreciate that nature and culture 
may not be additive. By and large, they treat culture as nature.
Social scientific perspectives: Narrating the body
The anonymous author of the Nature editorial has obviously missed some 
crucial developments in the social sciences and anthropology. It is true, of 
course, that biology was declared the enemy of critical thought to defend 
social and historical analyses against undue tendencies of naturalisation 
and biological reification (see Tsing 2000). This has been critical par-
ticularly as part of the ‘academisation’ of feminist critique. For radical 
constructivists, nature has for a long time been text, i.e. the result of his-
torically contingent social, symbolic and discursive practices shaped by 
the hegemony of specific power/knowledges. It is also true that many 
areas of the social sciences still understand their research object in purely 
semiotic or social terms. Yet particularly at the intersections of feminist 
critique, social and cultural anthropology and science and technology 
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studies, research over the last 25 years has addressed the body (for 
example, Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987), the entanglement of nature 
and culture in material-semiotic practice (for example, Haraway 1991), 
the life sciences and molecular biology (for example, Rabinow 1992), 
and has developed a relational materialism (for example, Barad 1999) 
that includes a reconceptualisation of ‘the social’ as in continuous and 
symmetrical assembly through heterogeneous material-semiotic agen-
cies (for example, Latour 2005). To speak of the social sciences as being 
immured in their fortresses is missing the point. Yet the editorial hints at 
a crucial issue that has so far not been addressed in the social sciences 
and that comes to the fore when discussing the tensions between the 
two accounts of differentiation as I am doing here: The social sciences 
continue to narrate the material body. They look at it, they ask people 
how they feel in and with it and they talk and write about it. This is, of 
course, what social science is all about. Yet if bodies are not only tex-
tual performances, but constituted of material and semiotic agencies, do 
the social sciences need not do more than narrate the body and carefully 
deconstruct positivist accounts of the material dimensions of the body 
(Niewöhner and Beck 2017)?
The starting point of this chapter has been the obviousness of the 
material effects of social differentiation: The man in Northern England 
sweats. In fact, he says he sweats in an interview after the fact. The 
study does not address whether he actually sweated, what else changed 
in his body and whether any of these effects persisted after the event. 
Few studies in the social sciences do. Bourdieu himself has made the 
point that the habitus has an important embodied and inert compo-
nent, which he referred to as hexis after Marcel Mauss’ analyses of body 
techniques (Mauss 1973). So can the social sciences really claim that 
hexis can be understood by studying it through language and sight only, 
i.e. interview and direct observation? Or the well-established hysteresis 
effect, that is, the lingering of an effect after the cause ceases to exist 
(Bourdieu 1990). Can the social sciences be sure that the social situ-
ation in Northern England described above does not set off a hystere-
sis effect shaped predominantly by somatic continuity in the form of a 
change in methylation pattern? Praxioscopic methodological regimes 
are often limited to literally superficial investigations of the body and 
the narrations of their owners. Material contributions cannot be differ-
entiated, but are reduced to their experiential component as accessi-
ble to language (see Niewöhner and Beck 2017). The calls within the 
social sciences and anthropology are getting louder that this may not 
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be adequate empirical and analytical treatment for many phenom-
ena involving the human body (Beck and Niewöhner 2006; Lock and 
Kaufert 2001; Timmermans and Haas 2008).
Situating biologies: Differentiation as material-semiotic 
practice
To summarise: I have reported on two cases of studying differentiation in 
social and material terms. Both cases demonstrate how their approaches 
point towards the entanglement of material and social dynamics. Yet 
both cases also demonstrate the inadequacy of engaging the respec-
tive ‘other’ dynamic. In this last section, I want to briefly outline three 
aspects that need to be addressed when trying to study differentiation as 
a  material-semiotic practice.
First, the starting point of such endeavours should be ontogra-
phy (Lynch 2013) and an acknowledgement of multiplicity and process 
ontology. Social and life sciences disagree about the ontological status of 
the object of research. For the social sciences it is ultimately history and 
text, for the biologists it is ultimately matter. Common ground needs to 
be worked out and this work finds a suitable starting point in ontography 
(Lynch 2013), that is, the ethnographic analysis of the ontological status 
of the object of research. Here the social sciences have recently produced 
excellent work, which has culminated in debates about the ontological 
turn (see Woolgar and Lezaun 2013). At its heart lies the assumption that 
entities such as diseases or bodies are multiple (for example, Mol 2002). 
Rather than assuming that entities are singular and stable, various lines 
of thought within the so-called new materialisms assume practices to be 
the basic unit of analysis (Dolphijn and Tuin 2012). Entities are made 
in practices. There is no essence that pre-exists practices. Rather, enti-
ties are always how they are being produced in a specific situated set of 
practices shaped by the material, political, social, ethical and epistemic 
dimensions of these practices. The body that is done in a waiting room in 
Northern England as stressed, sweating and overweight is different from 
the body that is done in a British epidemiological cohort or a Canadian 
epigenetic experiment. There is no underlying universal body that is 
pluralised through different perspectives. Rather, this practice theoret-
ical line of thought always considers knowledge practices world-making 
practices (Tsing 2010). The boxer’s body in Northern England is thus 
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radically particularised within the specific set of practices in the waiting 
room where he experiences class differences. It is not a universal body 
moving into a local social setting. The practice of waiting in a social ser-
vice waiting room in Northern England in the late twentieth century 
enacts a particular body.
This turn in the social sciences marks a profound shift from a univer-
sal human biology to a radically particularised human biology. It begins 
to take seriously the material body and its role in social differentiation. 
It offers an ontological shift that potentially enables a different engage-
ment with the natural sciences. Most research in this vein, however, has 
focused on demonstrating how in sets of practices bodies are made mul-
tiple, i.e. particular. Little research has focused on the question whether 
and how the material body may resist this radical particularisation. What 
if this experience of social difference materialises in metastable epige-
netic changes? The differentially methylated material body may carry 
significant continuities through widely different sets of practices. This 
does not challenge ‘the body multiple’ in principle. Yet in practice, ‘reality 
may kick back’ in contributing to a very stable body across practices. For 
example, sweating in situations perceived as stressful – ‘caused’ in mate-
rial terms by a sensitive biological stress axis – can quickly attain sym-
bolic qualities and carry social meaning, for example, signal insecurity 
and non-belonging. Bourdieu discusses in speculative theoretical terms 
how people are unable to become habituated to very different milieux; 
an experience he himself certainly made countless times during his mete-
oric rise through the French academic intelligentsia. He does not explore 
the role of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis in this context – but 
he should have. The point here is not to naturalise the effects of social dif-
ferentiation and introduce biodeterminism through the backdoor. Social 
differentiation does not determine methylation patterns thus reifying 
them. Rather, human practices of differentiation (see Hirschauer 2014) 
entangle material and social dimensions. The question what is local and 
particular and what is universal about the body in practice has not been 
addressed properly by the social sciences (see Lock, this volume). The 
question has become a legitimate question for social inquiry through 
recent theoretical advances. Yet this newly found theoretical space needs 
to be explored empirically and with open minds on all sides.
The epigenetics researchers in the lab investigated in this study appar-
ently appreciate that bodies may be particularised through their embed-
ding in local practices. They appreciate ‘local biologies’ in principle (Lock 
1993a, 1993b and this volume). Essentially, they argue for a pragmatic 
approach. If everything is locally specific, the right level of understanding 
 S ITUATING BIOLOGIES 59
to intervene into the body needs to be determined. Ontologically, this 
position entails a body with a universal material core and increasingly 
locally specific epiphenomena draped around it. It is a position more akin 
to gene–environment interaction than to the body multiple or local biol-
ogies. Within the philosophy of biology, however, recent work has pro-
posed a process ontology for biology (Dupré 2014). Rather than starting 
from an essentially Aristotelian perspective wondering about the essence 
of biological entities, biology ought to consider its object of research in 
process terms, asking what organises continuity and operational closure 
over time. Epigenetics research with its analytical sensitivity for different 
temporal and spatial contexts is very open to such a process ontology; after 
all the question of transgenerational inheritance is fundamentally one of 
process and continuity; so are questions about de novo (de)methylation 
in reaction to environmental changes. Yet epigenetic research in practice 
is driven by experimental design and does not spend much time thinking 
about the ontological status of its object of research. It therefore misses 
the opening offered by a process ontology and the opportunity to integrate 
social dynamics into the study of material phenomena.
Secondly, biologies need to be considered as situated. The intro-
duction to this volume sets out the notion of the biosocial as a recent 
social scientific and anthropological concept that enables the search for 
a reconfiguration of nature–culture relations. Combined with Deleuzian 
thinking about ‘becoming’ as the rhizomatic dynamic of human life and 
personhood, the editors propose a very productive notion of biosocial 
becomings as a way of thinking about trajectories of growth, movement 
and learning rather than interacting entities with stable and fixed iden-
tities (Ingold 2010). Affinities with a process ontology and also with the 
multiplicity of bodies are strong. I am very sympathetic to this position, 
but I fear that it is rather inaccessible. Its language is difficult to under-
stand for non-social scientists and it is not easily operationalised, particu-
larly not in cooperation with biologists.
Also, in response to anonymous reviewers of this chapter, I want 
to try and stay away from unnecessary terminology and outline two 
approaches that I believe could facilitate an empirical and analytical 
attentiveness to biosocial becomings, i.e. the continuous entanglement 
of matter and meaning in practices of human differentiation.
A first approach is offered by ecosocial theory and the notion 
of the emergent embodied phenotype (Krieger 2012). Public health 
scholar Krieger argues that bodies express the ecology within which 
they dwell over time. Specific phenotypes emerge in reaction to ecolog-
ical conditions, a complex process of embodiment itself situated within 
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evolutionary, social, biographical and cellular time or history; sometimes 
referred to as eco-evo-devo (Gilbert et al. 2015). Compared to standard 
measures of socio-economic position as used within environmental epi-
genetics, ecosocial theory offers a more fine-grained set of indicators and 
it embeds these indicators in social contexts, for example, community or 
neighbourhood effects, as well as historical developments and political 
contexts. Particularly in the area of social inequality and health, this is 
a very promising approach that has also begun to explore the relevance 
of epigenetic findings (Davey Smith 2011, 2012). The emergent embod-
ied phenotype appreciates the processual nature of material and social 
entanglement. Yet it remains true to a quantitative indicator-based 
approach that is epidemiological in kind and that is easily appreciated by 
molecular biology. For the Northern England case, an ecosocial approach 
would identify the middle-aged boxer as a member of a particular milieu 
and then try to describe and analyse the social and material dimen-
sions of this milieu that may have become embodied in the boxer’s phe-
notype over time – always also considering the political and economic 
circumstances that shape these environments as well as the dominant 
knowledge practices that shape risk factors, diagnostic tools and data 
availability (see also Aronowitz 2008). This approach would also include 
further biological samples and epigenetic analyses of members of the 
particular milieu, possibly comparatively against maximally different 
milieux or similar milieux in different settings.
This approach offers a high use value in the field. Yet it works best 
where milieux or social groups in general can be defined in a reasonably 
straightforward manner at a meso-level based on appropriate sampling 
techniques. For the US context, as the Chicago School already showed for 
cities in the first half of the twentieth century, group divisions between 
race and class tend to correspond with living conditions and location 
within urban spaces. This means that housing conditions and access to 
infrastructure and amenities tend to correlate highly with social milieu. 
Also, a health and welfare system that – compared to Western European 
countries – values private contributions highly, also stratifies access to 
healthcare and welfare along socio-economic lines, including its conse-
quences for health outcomes. In other contexts, particularly within cities, 
milieux or other meso-scale groupings are much more difficult to discern.
A second approach would start from the micro-level. We started 
to develop this approach in the context of the cultural neurosciences, 
where simple notions of culture (for example, Western versus Chinese 
or Arabic) were leading to problematic ascriptions of difference. Rather 
than starting with preconceived notions of difference or indicator-based 
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groups, we thus suggested to start from long-term ethnographic research 
aimed at discerning patterns of differentiating practices (Roepstorff et al. 
2010). I have discussed the notion of customary biology elsewhere, i.e. 
a biology based on regularities of everyday practice rather than natural 
laws (Niewöhner 2011). The basic idea here is that people use their bod-
ies in particular, habituated ways and that in twenty-first-century urban 
contexts, these ‘customary’ ways of conducting the body are not neces-
sarily tied to traditional socio-economic milieu or class. Human differ-
entiation in, for example, Western European cities has become highly 
dynamic both situationally and biographically, and often a matter of per-
formance and style. The balance between situational and dispositional 
factors in shaping urban everyday life has shifted towards the situational, 
challenging established sets of indicators and sampling techniques in epi-
demiology and quantitative social science. Hence the second approach 
starts from the thick ethnographic record of social differentiation in dif-
ferent locales, its political, historical and economic drivers, and its stabil-
ities and discontinuities, to identify contexts that would warrant closer 
attention. A first inductive ethnographic approach to understanding dif-
ferentiation in everyday practice in a particular set of people would lead 
to an identification of patterns that could be correlated with biomarkers 
in order to generalise and compare: an abductive inference. Biomarkers 
should attend to stress response on different levels of analysis: from 
situational markers such as cortisol in saliva or skin conductance to 
methylation state for metastable, i.e. rather more dispositional, effects. 
Longitudinal designs are paramount. Finding valid proxies and mini-
mally invasive and mobile methods for measuring these markers will be 
a challenge. Such an approach (see Timmermans and Haas 2008) would 
not only situate biological bodies (bios) within very specific patterns of 
everyday practice. It would also need to situate its own knowledge prac-
tices (bio-logos) to be able to systematically reflect reductions inherent in 
any such studies. Experiences with such inductive-abductive approaches 
including biomarkers are as yet absent, largely because longitudinal 
studies in the qualitative social sciences are rare and the expertise for 
biomarker measurement is absent, necessitating cooperation.
A third approach, which sits somewhere in between the two 
approaches sketched here, might draw on field sites that exhibit char-
acteristics close to a natural experiment, i.e. clearly defined exposure 
of a population to a well-known ‘stressor’. Examples of such approaches 
include malnutrition during the Dutch Hunger Winter in the 1940s, 
the use of Agent Orange in the Vietnam War, or early-life adversity in 
Romanian orphanages towards the end of the Ceausescu regime (see 
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Lock, this volume; Niewöhner and Lock 2018). Yet whether such ret-
rospective analyses lead to thin simplifications or are able to produce a 
thick analysis of material-semiotic differentiation depends first and fore-
most on the analytical lens and data availability.
Third and lastly, different forms of collaborative research are 
needed to situate biologies. Biology needs to be situated in two ways. 
Firstly, and this has hopefully become clear in this chapter, bodies-in- 
action become situated, i.e. particularised through specific practices that 
are in themselves shaped by history, politics and ethics. The dynamics of 
use and particularisation may be very local, for example, in cases of war 
or environmental catastrophe. Yet increasingly they are dispersed across 
the globe, marked by phenomena such as migration or the distribution of 
infectious disease agents (Niewöhner and Lock 2018). Secondly, biolo-
gies are shaped by the way they are known and produced through knowl-
edge practices. Knowledge practices are, of course, always situated in 
particular epistemic cultures and broader societal contexts. As Haraway 
has pointed out, knowledge practices are also always partial, both in the 
sense of biased and incompletely related (Haraway 1988). These two 
dimensions of situating biologies need to be studied as interdependent.
Situating biologies is a co-laborative agenda (Niewöhner 2015, 
2016). It is about temporary joint epistemic work between anthropology 
and biology: Reading together, designing studies together, conducting 
experiments and fieldwork together, writing together. Anthropologists 
and biologists need to treat each other in a parasici manner, i.e. in a 
mode of ‘doing theory in continuous relation to the distinctly non-“meta” 
immersive quality of thinking during fieldwork’ (Deeb and Marcus 2011, 
68; Marcus 2000, 2001), as technicians of general ideas (Rabinow et al. 
2008) rather than as observer and informant. The aim is not a shared, 
collaborative goal or objective of explaining differentiation more fully. 
The aim is to produce epistemic momentum and different kinds of reflex-
ivity in order to make participants think differently (Boyer 2015). Des 
Fitzgerald and Felicity Callard speak of experimental entanglement. 
‘Experimental entanglements are modest, often awkward, typically une-
qual encounters that work to mobilise specific and often serendipitous 
moments of potential novelty in and outside the laboratory’. They ‘refuse 
preliminary decisions about the shape or outcome of such an interac-
tion […], denote an ad hoc process of shuffling histories, methods, and 
assumptions [and] are thus never not temporary, local assemblages of 
motivation, interest, people and machinery – in which we, and our col-
laborators, are able momentarily to think something exterior to both 
the conventions of experimental practice, and the taken-for-granted 
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dynamics of epistemic power that underwrite its conduct’ (Fitzgerald 
and Callard 2014, 18).
One might follow Roepstorff and colleagues in understanding exper-
imentation as a particular aesthetic of research practice, i.e. a commitment 
to working together while retaining epistemic openness and the willingness 
to pursue emerging trajectories (Roepstorff and Frith 2012). In this broader 
sense, situating biologies is not only about lab work, but it is also about other 
kinds of fieldwork that might bring biologists into situations that they find 
good to think with. Hence successful co- laboration on material- semiotic 
 differentiation will not result in comprehensive theory or the ultimate 
experimental study. It could produce findings that anthropologists might 
take back into the disciplinary heart of anthropology to ask questions about 
the treatment of materiality in social inquiry, about the sources of stability 
in the reproduction of social inequalities, and about the conceptualisation 
of the relations in bodies-in-environments. It might also produce findings 
that biologists will take back to their discussions about the embeddedness of 
gene regulation in different contexts, about the organism as a unit of analysis 
in evolution and development, or about the human body as usefully thought 
of as something always in use.
In conclusion: Appreciating biological regularities
Situating biologies is a research agenda concerned with the analysis of prac-
tices of human differentiation, or, more generally, practices that promote 
human differentiation in interesting or problematic ways. It questions the 
stability (or not) of material-semiotic practices without privileging mate-
rial or semiotic aspects a priori. It inquires into the human body in action 
and asks how it might usefully be considered local or universal and with 
what kind of consequences. Situating biologies asks of anthropology to 
stop considering biology the enemy of critical thought. And it asks of biol-
ogy to be open to the idea that bodies in action may be more productively 
described, analysed and indeed interpreted in terms of regularities rather 
than laws. As historian of science Lorraine Daston demonstrates, natu-
ral and moral orders shift from custom- to law-based systems during the 
Enlightenment and the rise of the nation state in early modern Europe 
(Daston 2002). Until then, knowledge about natural processes and moral 
orders is largely based on regularities. Processes of habituation, of custom 
formation and of patterning of everyday practices are deeply embodied 
processes. Or: Bodies are being used in social action, meaning-making 
and everyday life. Such usage forms patterns and regularities. While 
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natural laws ‘naturally’ also apply to these patterns, they may not be the 
most useful language of description and analysis. The social and historical 
contingencies and the reflexivities of material-semiotic practices produce 
complexities that are hard to model in law-based approaches. Situating 
biologies offers the opportunity to appreciate regularities.
A word of caution in closing: In advocating situating biologies as 
an agenda for anthropology and biology together, I may have given the 
impression that the two may join in new comprehensive theories of 
embodied social action and human differentiation. This may be the case. 
More likely, however, is a scenario where anthropologists and biologists 
working on situating biologies will not readily come together, but instead 
find joint research intensely irritating. It is likely that their analytical 
sensitivities will not readily match onto each other, but rather produce 
Widerstandsaviso (Fleck 1935) for the respective ‘other’. Such thought 
constraints could be highly productive and generative even if they do not 
lead to a grand synthesis of biological and social theory.
Notes
1. I use the term ‘affords’ or ‘affordance’ (Gibson 1977) deliberately. This environmental psychological 
notion suggests that the environment contains clues or suggestions, so called affordances, to social 
actors how to act with that environment. A frying pan is fry-withable. It does not suggest itself to 
be used for knitting.
2. The phenomenon of transmission of epigenetic states is well known in plants as well as animals. 
Yet studies that have tried to show chemical stability through the germ line, i.e. transgenerational 
inheritance as conceived in genetics, have failed to produce positive findings. In controlled 
environments, the first generation that has not been exposed to the experimental stressor reverts 
back to the original epigenetic patterning (Waterland et al. 2007). Other paths and modes of trans-
generational transmission of epigenetic patterns, also involving gametes, have been discussed 
and shown experimentally (see Daxinger and Whitelaw 2010, 2012). More recently, paternal 
routes have also received attention after research had focused almost exclusively on maternal 
lines (Soubry et al. 2014). Yet the mechanisms that may transport epigenetic patterns through 
the re-setting machinery of meiotic division remain elusive to date. Recent research is beginning 
to focus on RNA biology and on cis/trans effects, i.e. effects that are mediated via extra-nuclear 
routes and agents. While not new in principle, this adds another layer of complexity to the field and 
it is entirely unclear whether the puzzle of transgenerational stability will be solved at the level of 
mechanism any time soon. Most likely, perhaps, the question will shift from a dichotomous ‘yes/no’ 
to a more differentiated ‘how important’ is what form of transgenerational epigenetic transmission 
in what contexts (for example, Grossniklaus et al. 2013).
3. Following a reviewer comment, I attempted to find out the name of the author(s) responsible for 
the editorial, but failed to do so. It is published in the journal anonymously.
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Chapter 3
Pig–Human Relations in Neonatology: 
Knowing and Unknowing in a  
Multi-Species Collaborative
Mette N. Svendsen
Translating pigs into human health
‘Okay, so we are your piglets?’ some of the researchers in a pig facility 
at the University of Copenhagen teasingly asked my graduate student 
Mie S. Dam and me in 2014. Since 2009, I had followed them in their 
experimental practices of making piglets into models of human infants to 
advance nutrition and health for prematurely born infants in the neona-
tal intensive care unit (NICU). I conducted fieldwork in their pig labora-
tory, at scientific seminars and conferences, and in the human NICU at the 
University Hospital. The comments about the researchers being ‘our pigs’ 
put on equal footings the researchers as resources in our knowledge pro-
duction and the piglets as resources in theirs. To me, it raised questions 
about how something or someone becomes a resource and it brought into 
view the ways in which resource-imagining and resource-making were at 
the heart of both social science and natural science. In this chapter, I crit-
ically assess the conditions that facilitate the appropriation of the pig as a 
resource for human health and the foregrounding and backgrounding of 
what is acknowledged about this appropriation when the bench and the 
bedside are brought together within the same research framework. I end 
with a short discussion of the cultural knowledge made possible in the 
multi-species and multi-disciplinary collaborative in which the research-
ers could jokingly figure as ‘our pigs’.
In the introduction to their edited volume, Timely Assets, Elizabeth E. 
Ferry and Mandana E. Limbert state that although we may see stone, forest 
or livestock as obvious resources, nothing is intrinsically or self-evidently 
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a resource (Ferry and Limbert 2008a). Rather, the concept of resource 
entails ‘ideas of the world as available for human use, and of that use as 
the basis of proper human society’ (Ferry and Limbert 2008b, 8). This also 
implies that the Euro-American notion of resource presupposes a separa-
tion between human exploiters and the ‘nature’ exploited (Ferry 2008, 
52). Anthropological scholarship from different parts of the world illu-
minates that resources are not conceived in the same way everywhere. 
In  hunter-gatherer societies in different parts of the world, relationships 
between humans and hunted animals are lived as long-term social relation-
ships and forms of kinship (Conklin 2001; Nadasdy 2008; Willerslev 2007).
In the following text, I am particularly interested in how 
resource-making is practised in the administration of life and death 
in Danish translational medicine and what notions of the ‘proper’ 
human society come to the fore. How does resource-making, which in 
the laboratory is closely linked to making (pig) life and death, carry 
moral reasoning and future orientations? How is the pig as a proxy for 
the human presented when bringing the animal resource out of the 
laboratory? How is the value of life negotiated in managing limited 
resources in the neonatal intensive care unit?
To answer these questions I draw on my fieldwork in three sites that 
are part of the infrastructure of translating pigs into human health: The 
pig laboratory in which premature piglets are put in incubators, taken 
care of and eventually killed to become valuable samples in paediatric 
gastroenterology research; the semi-public spaces of scientific confer-
ences in which pig-based research is presented to various actors in the 
field of translational medicine; and the human NICU where preterm 
infants or seriously ill term infants are treated and where resource scar-
city and resource imagination also enter into life-and-death decisions. I 
investigate the various forms of unknowing that, for good reasons, the 
researchers and clinicians engage in, and argue that such unknowing 
is part of a complex boundary work that upholds existential inequali-
ties between human and pig, and existential equalities between human 
infants. I begin with a short introduction to the broader landscape of 
appropriating the pig in Denmark.
Imagining and claiming pigs as resources for health
For centuries, the welfare of the Danish population has largely relied on 
claiming the pig and other livestock as a resource for humans and breed-
ing it for food. Breeding practices have been based on systematic selection 
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and have resulted in the ‘local biology’ (Lock 2001) of the famous Dan-
ish pig with leaner meat, an extra rib and large litters. While the Danish 
population is less than 6 million people, the number of pigs produced 
per year amounts to approximately 26 million. This number is the result 
of a huge scaling-up of pig production in the mid-twentieth century and 
illuminates the pig as a ‘world-defining creature’ (Blanchette 2015, 648) 
shaping the Danish landscape and its economy as agribusiness, providing 
a sizeable portion of the state’s income, and thereby contributing consid-
erably to the welfare of the general population. Put differently, a shaping 
of pig lives and bodies on the one hand and the creation of welfare and 
health of Danes on the other has continuously taken place. While many 
Danes are ambivalent about the precarious pig lives in pig production 
and the pollution of Danish waters due to discharge of slurry from pig 
farms, pork is still a staple diet of most Danes and pigs are considered 
mundane production animals that contribute to a familiar fabric of liv-
ing. In many ways, the pig occupies the same role in the Danish cultural 
and political economy as the sheep in the UK (Franklin 2007), salmon in 
Norway (Lien 2015) and cows in the Netherlands (Taussig 2004).
Within the Danish agricultural field, the Danish pig breeding pro-
gramme is seen as a national achievement and a treasure to be protected, 
yet the large litters of the Danish sows have also resulted in rearing prob-
lems. Often the sow does not have enough teats to accommodate the 
entire litter and piglets are born less mature, a circumstance that might 
be related to the lean tissue growth and the large litter size (Sangild 
et al. 2013). The litter hierarchy, which is established within the first day 
after birth, leaves the weaker piglets either without access to colostrum, 
the highly nutrient-rich first milk after birth, or with access to only the 
low-quality colostrum of the back teats (Bollen et al. 2010, 9). Due to 
their weak condition, hypothermia and poor access to milk, 25,000 new-
born piglets die every day in Denmark (9 million every year). The high 
mortality in the farrow stables, which is a general problem of intensified 
pig production, has been frequently discussed in both the agricultural 
field and the daily press in Denmark, and research has been initiated 
and solutions developed such as better feed products and heating for the 
newborn piglets. One of the feeding solutions comes from a small com-
pany in Southwest Denmark that has developed a milk product consist-
ing of whole bovine colostrum. The bovine colostrum is collected from 
dairy farms in Denmark and subsequently homogenised, pasteurised, 
spray-dried and turned into a powder easily dissolvable in water, and 
administered at the pig farms.
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At the other end of Denmark, at the University of Copenhagen, the 
immature piglets of the large litters and the bovine colostrum product 
have become central in imagining and claiming Danish pigs as resources 
for infant health globally. At the University of Copenhagen, the research-
ers I collaborate with have studied paediatric gastroenterology for the 
last 20 years using the Danish pig as a model. They find the local biol-
ogy of the immature piglets from Danish food-production to be excellent 
models of weak infants at risk of the devastating and life-threatening 
inflammation of the gut, necrotising enterocolitis (NEC), which is said 
to occur in 7 per cent of infants with a birth weight between 500 and 
1500 g (Neu and Walker 2011). During their studies of the etiology and 
prevention of NEC, the group has developed a laboratory procedure in 
which piglets are removed prematurely by surgery (C-section), put in 
incubators, and provided with different forms of nutrition (for example, 
infant formula, bovine colostrum, human donor milk). The piglets come 
to develop NEC during the first 5 days, after which they are killed and 
their organs, especially the intestines, sampled and analysed. Some of 
the group’s most promising experiments show that the bovine colostrum 
product from the Danish company is as effective as human donor milk in 
protecting against NEC and is superior to both human donor milk and 
infant formula in stimulating growth, gut immunity and digestive func-
tions in premature piglets (Jensen et al. 2013; Rasmussen et al. 2016).
To the researchers, their studies also indicate that the bovine colos-
trum product will have a positive effect on infants deprived of moth-
er’s milk, a situation common in NICUs where premature birth makes 
it difficult to stimulate milk production and where breast-feeding often 
becomes challenging, leading to premature infants depending on formula 
or human donor milk. Thus, their hypothesis is that in premature infant 
feeding, bovine colostrum may be superior to infant formula, and maybe 
also to human donor milk. Based on similarities between preterm piglets 
and preterm infants with respect to size and the impaired respiratory, 
nutritional, immunological and metabolic responses after preterm birth, 
they envision a translational process in which the piglet literally stands 
in for the infant. The group in Copenhagen does not stand alone in their 
preference for pigs. Within the global scientific community, the recogni-
tion of important phenotypic and genotypic traits between humans and 
pigs has been central to the increasing use of pigs in biomedical research 
and the great interest in pig-to-human transplantation (Gutierrez et al. 
2015). While such cross-species transplantations still prove difficult, the 
pig continues to provide a highly useful model of the human organism in 
a broad range of biomedical research (Groenen et al. 2012; Kuzmuk and 
Schook 2011; Swindle et al. 2012).
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To realise the translational potential of using preterm pigs in gas-
troenterology research, the professor in charge of the pig laboratory 
received a prestigious grant from the Danish state in 2012 to establish 
a research platform, NEOMUNE, in which studies in piglets and mice 
are to be coupled with observational and clinical studies in NICUs in a 
number of countries. The vision of NEOMUNE is to develop new diet and 
microbiota treatments for normal and compromised newborn infants; 
and to establish adequate universally accepted clinical care procedures 
for infants with limited maternal care – an objective that embodies the 
idea of a universal infant biology to be administered by universal clini-
cal care procedures. By collaborating with scientific and clinical partners 
from different countries as well as dairy companies, NEOMUNE incorpo-
rates the whole process from laboratory studies through clinical studies 
to marketable nutrition products commercially sold to NICUs/parents 
globally. NEOMUNE also includes a small social science study which 
examines the ethical, social and cultural aspects of translating across 
bench (the experimental pig studies) and bedside (clinical practices in 
the NICU). Heading this study, I – together with graduate student Mie 
S. Dam – have become part of the NEOMUNE team following and col-
laborating with the researchers and clinicians involved in taking care of 
piglets, data and infants.
In the clinical studies which are being initiated, clinicians in NICUs 
in China and in Denmark will ask parents to consent to feeding their pre-
term infants a refined bovine colostrum product approved for humans 
from the Danish company as part of investigating and documenting the 
efficacy of this nutrition in infants devoid of breast-feeding. Thereby the 
Danish piglets are seen as a central actor in paving the way for bovine 
colostrum to reach the stomachs of infants worldwide, and in bringing 
together scientists, industrial partners and clinicians from around the 
world. A powerful vision of optimising infant health globally through 
crossing geographical, cultural, disciplinary and species-related bound-
aries is at the core of articulating the pig as a resource for human infant 
health.
The realisation of this vision is highly dependent on connecting the 
locally produced colostrum product to the Danish piglets in the laboratory, 
and to clinicians, parents and infants in NICUs in China and Denmark. As 
the research director explained in an interview with my graduate stu-
dent Mie S. Dam and myself in 2013: ‘If one day the Danish company is 
not here, the colostrum project will end, because I need to have some-
one to make the irradiation [of the colostrum] and do the testing and so 
on […] and to know how to pack the substance and to secure a sterile 
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product [for the clinical studies].’ In other words, a long local tradition 
of appropriating Danish pigs and cows and turning their substances and 
lives into human welfare is inseparable from claiming pigs as resources 
for infant health globally. The history of the local biology of the Danish 
pigs (large litters, lean tissue growth) and the locally developed solutions 
to prevent the high death-toll in the farrowing stables (the administer-
ing of bovine colostrum), are hardly visible in the research objectives of 
‘identifying milk and microbiota treatments through infant and animal 
studies’. However, Danish pig history and local solutions to piglet deaths 
are pivotal to imagining the piglet as a resource for infant health, and 
transmuting it into something completely other than a production ani-
mal – namely into a platform for developing scientific breakthroughs that 
will put NEOMUNE on the map of prestigious science, optimise infant 
health, and create promising business for dairy companies. To follow 
how the local is woven into promises of global connections and universal 
knowledge, I now turn to the first step of the research process: enrolling 
Danish piglets into the laboratory.
Making resources in the laboratory
It is early Monday morning and the sow, from a farm outside Copenha-
gen, lies anaesthetised on the table in the operating theatre surrounded 
by professors, graduate students, animal technicians and master’s stu-
dents who each have specific tasks to do in relation to the C-section that 
is about to take place.1 The atmosphere is relaxed. Some of the students 
talk about the parties from the weekend just passed, and a graduate stu-
dent asks everyone to take part in a guessing game about the number 
of piglets to be delivered. The quantity of the resource is of interest to 
everyone. For the master’s students, the C-section is part of their surgical 
training and hence the sow an educational resource. Standing next to 
them I follow how one piglet after the other is carefully lifted out of the 
large body and handed over to the graduate students who start ventilat-
ing the piglets and then moving them to a separate room where they are 
placed in heated, ventilated, humidified and oxygenated individual incu-
bators. Twenty piglets in total are taken out of the womb. A group of both 
senior and junior researchers begin the work of providing each piglet 
with an identifying letter, determining their sex, weighing them, taking 
their temperatures, and putting all the data into the computer. They also 
insert catheters into the piglets and connect them to individual nutrition 
machines by which they will be fed during the study. The researchers’ 
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determined and routinised work on connecting the nutrition machines 
to the anaesthetised piglets’ limp bodies underlines the piglets as unspec-
ified ‘gut units’ to be turned into scientific tools for creating viable lives 
in the NICU. In other words, biological (and killable) pig bodies are pro-
jected onto biographical and (liveable) infant futures. The first step of 
this process is accomplished by enclosing the piglets in the laboratory, 
carefully following the protocol that is patterned after procedures in the 
NICU; and on the last day of the experiment by turning them into sam-
ples to be processed and analysed with the aim of gaining new insights 
into the critical neonatal period.
Daily laboratory practices in the following days, however, illumi-
nate a much greater complexity. When the piglets wake up from the 
anaesthesia, they gradually gain individuality and in the days follow-
ing the C-section, some of them become sick and suffer (for example, 
from respiratory distress). A team of four or five graduate students 
attend to the piglets with meticulous care day and night. Such care 
work in animal laboratories plays a constitutive role in the organisa-
tion of the experimental practice and shapes the animal bodies and the 
findings that result from them (Friese 2013). In the Danish laboratory, 
the piglets are not only enacted as unspecified guts that react to micro-
biota, but as sentient lives placed in relationships to the research-
ers who feed them individually, change their nappy-like cloths, and 
demonstrate great efforts to reduce their sufferings (Svendsen and 
Koch 2013). These exchanges between human researcher and research 
animal take place in small and ordinary interactions, as when the ani-
mal technician attends to a piglet that is not thriving and unwittingly 
pats her own stomach, saying, ‘Its stomach-ache sure must be painful.’ 
In such situations a kind of existential affinity – even kinship (see Dam 
et al. 2017) – between human and animal appears, thus contesting a 
strict separation between ‘human exploiters’ and ‘exploited resources’. 
Similarity and difference cannot be neatly determined, but go together 
(see Mol and Law 1994).
In the autumn of 2013, the group initiated a set of new studies 
that investigated how nutrition affects brain development. The cog-
nitive development of the pigs was tested through 26 days. While the 
standard preterm model runs 5 days, it was a huge expansion to let the 
sometimes severely compromised piglets live for more than 20 days in 
the laboratory. In these experiments, the individual monitoring of the 
piglets had become essential to ensure the survival of as many as possi-
ble until day 26. While euthanasia sometimes, perhaps, seemed the most 
benevolent act towards the individual suffering piglet, the researchers 
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were painfully aware of the dilemmas of this act as they opted for statis-
tically significant results and hence needed a certain number of piglets to 
survive to day 26. As I have heard numerous times in conversations in the 
lab, ‘a euthanised piglet costs a piglet at the other end’ (det koster en gris i 
den anden ende). ‘The other end’ refers to the monetary costs of enrolling 
one more litter into the laboratory, the laborious and time- consuming 
work of running the study, and the suffering of these future piglets that 
substitute the euthanised ones. Thereby ‘the other end’ points to the 
landscape of knowledge production of which the researchers are part, 
and the pressure on them to reach scientific results, to stick to the project 
plan and to complete graduate studies within timeframes settled by the 
grant proposals. Here the issue of scarcity, so integral to conceptualising 
something as a resource (Ferry and Limbert 2008b, 7), was not imagined 
as a possible depletion of pigs in Denmark, but experienced as a limit in 
terms of money, work and suffering.
In a group conversation about this issue that graduate student Mie 
S. Dam and I set up in June 2013, one postdoctoral researcher said: ‘The 
pig is a valuable resource. We don’t want it to die [before the scheduled 
time]. But [on the other hand] our individual treatment may also prolong 
suffering. So what is ethics here?’ It is important to note that ‘ethics here’ 
does not refer to animal ethics as understood within a bioethical frame-
work of institutionalised rules and guidelines of professional conduct. 
In all their practices, the researchers carefully follow bioethical codes of 
conduct. By asking the question ‘what is ethics here?’ the postdoctoral 
researcher alluded to the ‘ethics’ that in spite of numerous guidelines 
will always have to be lived through one’s own body and sensations and 
is situated ‘here’ in specific spaces and interactions that are unique. In 
other words, she hinted at the moral peril (Mattingly 2014, 15) that each 
experiment holds.
Her question also highlights that claims about resources are not only 
acts that engage morality, but also time (Ferry and Limbert 2008a; Sharp 
2014). As Ferry and Limbert state, ‘to define something as a resource 
is to suspend it between a past “source” and a future “product”’ (Ferry 
and Limbert 2008b, 6). In handling highly compromised piglets and in 
the end killing them to create samples for their research, the research-
ers invested their working lives in transforming the source of production 
pigs in Denmark into the future product of ‘optimal care and diet for new-
born infants’. To the researchers in the laboratory, this work continuously 
raised questions about what is ‘good’. The same postdoctoral researcher 
explained in the group conversation.
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This morning I saw a poster that said: ‘Most mice die because of 
wrinkles’. It was an ad against using mice in the cosmetics industry. 
Thinking about this ad I realised that to me it makes a huge differ-
ence that I work with animals for the sake of the clinic. I can’t say 
that I will never work for the cosmetics industry, but I would defi-
nitely have great difficulties working with animals for cosmetics.
While her story hinted at the presence of moral questions and vulnera-
bilities in the laboratory, her statement about doing it ‘for the sake of the 
clinic’ placed the hard work of appropriating the piglets’ lives and death 
in a temporal horizon and imbued it with the value of human becoming 
and notions of generativity. In the context of the NEOMUNE research 
platform, this future-making of optimising infant health was inextricably 
linked to creating knowledge in collaboration with NICUs in the global 
field, generating continuous funding for research, and promoting eco-
nomic growth to the nation through collaborating with small as well as 
giant players in agribusiness. In bioscience, such scale-up through indus-
try collaboration and clinical trials has proved increasingly challenging, 
illustrating that moving an invention into therapeutic use is much harder 
than making the discovery (Fischer 2010). In the following text, I trace 
the work it takes to bring the pig studies out of the lab, connect them to 
numerous actors in the field of translational neonatology research and 
thereby have the Danish pigs tie together science, health and capital.
Bringing the pig-based resources out of the laboratory
At the end of every experiment, the researchers began the work of ana-
lysing samples and turning them into written papers. Simultaneously 
with writing up papers, they presented their results at research seminars 
in which the various partners of the research platform were brought 
together. Here laboratory researchers, clinicians from NICUs in the Neth-
erlands, England, New Zealand, Australia, China and Denmark, and 
researchers and representatives from the industry, discussed how to con-
nect and align experimental animal studies and clinical studies and how 
the various studies may be of interest to the industrial partners. In partic-
ipating in these meetings, I noticed that the presenters of the pig studies 
sometimes started out with a statement like: ‘We can do things on ani-
mals that we cannot do on human beings.’ Such introductory comments 
situated the experiments in the moral economy of animal-based science 
according to which the management of the animal’s life and death (‘do 
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things on animals’) was legitimised by the moral difference between 
human and animal (‘that we cannot do on humans’). Apart from such 
comments, the presentations were usually silent about the hard work of 
caring for individual animals on a day-to-day basis, which shaped in pro-
found ways the experimental practice. The piglets appeared in the form 
of precious graphs and numbers, and were discussed in the language of 
medical categories such as ‘gut microbiota’, ‘neuro-endocrine signalling’, 
or simply ‘metabolism’. The overall framework of these presentations 
was the enthusiasm of creating path-breaking knowledge and new infant 
diets and microbiota treatments for the NICU. The piglets constituted 
‘evidence’, and the caregiving and death through which this evidence 
was produced was not considered relevant to be included in the limited 
time of scientific presentations, and thus remained untold and unknown.
In her book on moral thinking in the experimental worlds of 
xenotransplantation and mechanical hearts, L. Sharp argues that  erasing 
subjective properties of individual animal or human bodies silences 
moral questions related to experimentation (Sharp 2014, 44–6). 
Similarly, S. Lochlann Jain’s study of the mortality effect in randomised 
control trials (RCTs) in oncology powerfully illuminates that the RCTs’ 
future thinking, hope, and strong notion of progress result in the obfus-
cation of suffering and death, to which she refers as the ‘ghosting of lives’ 
(Jain 2010, 90). Among social scientists, such ignorance or unknowing 
of, for instance, suffering and death does not represent a lack of knowl-
edge, but rather constitutes a form of knowledge that is out of place and 
therefore may pollute organisational principles and make it difficult for 
organisations to function and pursue their goals (Geissler 2013; Marris 
et al. 2014; Rayner 2012; Mathews 2011). For example, in his study of 
the production of medical knowledge in transnational clinical trials in 
an African city, Wenzel Geissler (2013) illuminates how research staff’s 
knowledge of research subjects’ hunger and lack of healthcare was cen-
tral to making the clinical trial function on a daily basis (sharing food 
with research subjects, convincing them to join and stay in a trial), yet all 
this knowledge did not constitute ‘data’ and was excluded from scientific 
reports. This exclusion also contributed to upholding research partici-
pation as based on voluntary participation and equal relations between 
research staff and trial subjects and adhering to scientific conventions 
according to which hunger belonged to a background factor outside 
the focus of research (Geissler 2013, 18–20). In drawing attention to 
the dynamics of constructing knowledge and ignorance differently over 
time and across various arenas, Geissler’s study points to the ways in 
which professionals’ oscillation between knowing and unknowing 
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productively links bodies, lives and institutions in scientific knowledge 
production, thereby creating the much- valued biomedical knowledge 
that may improve health.
While the unknowing that Geissler identifies pertains to material 
inequalities between research subjects and researchers, and between 
institutions involved in transnational clinical trials, the unknowing pres-
ent in experimental animal-based science pertains to the animals as sen-
tient and qualified lives, what we may think of as existential equalities 
between human and animal. Consequently, what the researchers in the 
animal facility seem to engage in when moving between different spaces 
in translational medicine is a sophisticated switching between knowing 
the piglet as a sentient being in the experimental practice and excluding 
this dimension at scientific meetings, in scientific papers and in reports 
to the media. This differentiation between places may be approached as 
not simply an exclusion of particular aspects of practice so as to maintain 
boundaries of legitimate knowledge, but also as an inclusion of important 
aspects of practice (see Geissler 2013, 15) as part of scaling up. The inclu-
sion of treating piglets as unspecific biology in scientific presentations 
makes the researchers adhere to ideals of standardisation, detachment 
and reproducibility in the biological and biomedical sciences, thereby 
paving the way for the clinical studies by creating easily exchangeable 
and recognisable knowledge within the scientific community. The simul-
taneous exclusion or erasure of the specificity of the local pig biology and 
the local practices in the laboratory facilitated the piglets’ attachment to 
new (complex) phenomena such as clinical studies and future clinical 
trials. We might see the research presentations as a way by which the 
interdisciplinary research group made their work accountable to each 
other and grounded it in a promise of future translation (see Brosnan 
and Michael 2014, 695). They took responsibility for realising the aim 
of translation by making their studies understandable within collective 
discussions of identifying the optimal time, amount and composition of 
nutrition to neonatal infants at risk of NEC. In these discussions, the sci-
entists simply did not see their interactions with the piglets and all the 
care work as crucial for the scientific quality of their research. As much 
as they depended on this non-scalable care practice to create good data, 
they also relied on ignoring it as part of scaling up their studies and pur-
suing the next step of clinical studies and the future step of clinical trials.
On several occasions I discussed with the director of NEOMUNE the 
question of what can be known publicly. In an interview with myself and 
graduate student Mie S. Dam, he reflected upon the possibility of using 
photographs when informing non-scientific audiences of their research.
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NEOMUNE director: Photos are part of the reality, yes, but only a 
small part. It is a bit like, I don’t know if this comparison will work, 
but it is a bit like exposing [human] bodies, naked bodies. This is a 
way of exposing a human being, but we don’t think that this [expo-
sition] is the human being […]. In the same way, if we expose the 
newborn piglets too much … there are many feelings connected 
to the newborn and especially there are many feelings connected 
to suffering and illness. I think it is a little similar to the photos of 
hungry children from the developing world. We usually sense that 
there is something almost damaging in exposing [such photos] too 
much, because you flatten what you want to show. Also because you 
become immune to it. There are some things in life which are impor-
tant, which are central, we should be careful not to expose them too 
much in pictures and films because then they will lose their …
Mette: Almost their dignity?
Director: Yes. Their dignity, and this is why I’m a little worried 
about giving the public a wrong and twisted impression of what we 
are working with, but there is no part of our research which is secret 
[…]. The way I may best explain it is to say that it is very sensitive 
and dignified and you shouldn’t expose it too much.
This conversation about respecting the dignity and worth of the piglet 
and the research practice it is part of, provides a glimpse into the world of 
many publics that the research director and his team navigate. His con-
siderations are not necessarily different from those of clinical scientists 
who are also careful about how they talk about research subjects who 
may also be terminally ill patients. In both cases, scientists balance the 
multiple identities of their research resources. In front of a scientific audi-
ence, it makes perfect sense to state the moral difference between human 
and animal with statements like, ‘We do things on animals that we can-
not do on human beings.’ In talking about a more general public in the 
interview situation, the animal turns into a sentient being and enters the 
category of precarious life together with starving children from another 
part of the world. Why is it the piglet in the situation of the conference is 
stressed as an animal less worthy than the human, and in the situation 
of the interview with the social scientists is stressed as morally equal to 
a human life?
I only slowly began to understand what was at stake in confer-
ence presentations and in the research director’s appeal to life ethics 
when I was less strictly focused on what was being said, but more on the 
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distinctions made. In the conference presentations and in our interview 
with the research director, the moral question about worth and dignity 
operated as a kind of boundary work (Gieryn 1983) that set up bound-
aries between what can be known by the scientists who take part in the 
experimental work and what can be known by scientific and non- scientific 
publics. In the conference situation this happened by highlighting the 
animal as simply data (excluding its sentience). In the interview situa-
tion, this happened by highlighting its moral worth (including its sen-
tience). That is, when moving the animal resource out of the laboratory, 
its moral worth was continually redrawn to facilitate its appearance as 
a legitimate resource upon its arrival in the spaces of translational med-
icine (conferences) and public communication (reports to the media).
To simply interpret these practices as a deliberate way of avoiding 
critique and resistance would miss what was at stake for the researchers 
in performing this boundary work. To understand the research direc-
tor’s urge to place his research in relation to life ethics, I will turn to 
Didier Fassin’s analysis of the deployment of moral sentiments in con-
temporary governmental and non-governmental initiatives directed 
towards the most unfortunate, suffering and vulnerable individuals, 
such as helping AIDS orphans or disaster victims (Fassin 2012). Fassin 
argues that these initiatives, what he calls ‘humanitarian government’, 
are characterised by a paradox. On the one hand, humanitarian govern-
ment is based on the universal recognition of other individuals as fel-
low human beings (a relation of assistance and solidarity) and on the 
other hand humanitarian government does not change the inequality 
that causes the disasters of war or illness (a relation of domination and 
inequality) (Fassin 2012, 3).
Although the research piglets are not humans and the practices in 
the laboratory far from the humanitarian interventions of assisting AIDS 
orphans, the research director himself compares research piglets to dis-
aster victims (‘I think it is a little similar to the photos of hungry children 
from the developing world’), and present in our conversation is both the 
articulated compassion towards the piglets (solidarity) and the silenced 
killing of them at the end of the experiment (domination). He mentions 
the moral sentiments towards precarious lives (‘there are many feelings 
connected to the newborn and especially there are many feelings con-
nected to suffering and illness’), and in the course of the conversation I 
myself provide him with the keyword ‘dignity’. That is, humanitarian gov-
ernment designates positions in the conversation and unwittingly I come 
to represent these moral sentiments along with public concerns about 
responsible conduct and public engagement. In facing these sentiments 
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and concerns in the interview situation, we may see his boundary work 
as a way of caring for the ‘bigger picture’ (Law 2010, 64–6), that is, not 
losing track of the explicitly articulated promissory statements of infant 
health which the researchers strive to realise, yet do not know how and 
when will happen. He fears that the public may forget about this aim if the 
precarious piglet bodies are rendered visible. Moreover, in his statement 
about ‘not becoming immune’ we sense that establishing the boundary 
between what can be known by the public and what can be known by the 
researchers also serves to maintain his own sensitivity towards precari-
ous lives so essential to running the experiments.
The double identity of the piglets as resources for human health 
and in themselves sentient beings came to the fore in a full-page article 
about NEOMUNE in the national Danish newspaper Politiken. Under the 
heading ‘Incubator pigs are to support preterm infants’ (Bach Madsen 
2015), the article printed short interviews with several researchers 
from the NEOMUNE research platform and included a close-up pho-
tograph of a preterm piglet wrapped in a cloth in the hands of the 
researchers wearing laboratory gloves. In showing the newborn piglet, 
not the newly killed piglet at the end of the experiment, the article ech-
oes the paradox of humanitarian reasoning described by Fassin: The 
photograph communicates the piglet as sentient life (morally like the 
human), yet the whole framework of the article pictures the piglet as 
a resource for human becoming (morally unlike the human) indirectly 
made known through the laboratory gloves, but not through showing 
its suffering and death. Taken together, the various ways of configuring 
the piglets in scientific presentations, in interviews with the social sci-
entists and in reports to the media, illuminate how actors within trans-
lational research continuously strive to keep the right balance between 
knowing and unknowing to let the animal resource arrive safely in the 
Research and Development departments of industrial players and in 
clinics located in a global field.
Managing resources in the NICU
I wish to end this chapter by providing a short excursion into life-and-
death decision-making practices in the NICU in Copenhagen; the site 
inhabited by the infants whose health is seen as the ultimate goal of the 
life, suffering and death of the research piglets. My aim with this excur-
sion is not to describe how feeding bovine colostrum to piglets has been 
translated into new dietary regimes in NICUs as this is still in the process 
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of being realised. Rather, my short description aims at exploring how 
also in this site unknowing is at work in managing resources and turning 
infants into viable lives.
The NICU in Copenhagen is the most advanced in Denmark and 
treats infants born as early as gestation week 23. In Denmark, health-
care services (i.e. treatment in the NICU) and social services (i.e. special 
education and rehabilitation of disabled children) are tax-financed and 
thus fully paid for by the Danish welfare state. The NICU has an explic-
itly family-based approach to the treatment of preterm infants. From the 
very moment a newborn child is rushed to the clinic, the parents will be 
offered a bed next to the incubator. They will be taught to take part in 
the daily care of their infant and be involved in all the difficult decisions 
about continuing or withdrawing treatment. In this setting, coming to 
belong in the Danish welfare state is closely related to becoming part of a 
family (see Navne and Svendsen 2019).
In the same way as it is important for the researchers in the pig lab-
oratory to maintain the hope that the pain and death of the piglets in 
the here-and-now experimental practices contribute to creating life and 
health for infants in the future, it is also important for the clinicians in 
the NICU to be convinced that the treatments which the infants undergo 
and the suffering involved may in the end turn into a life worth living for 
these infants. To the clinicians, intubation and complicated and painful 
heart or gut operations are meaningful as long as there is a hope that 
these interventions in the end will result in a viable infant. By far the 
majority of the admitted infants are successfully treated and safely taken 
home by parents. However, when it happens that infants are so seriously 
ill that a graduation towards death within the near future can be pre-
dicted, the clinicians tend to see continued treatment as futile and argue 
in favour of withdrawing treatment.
In most of these cases, the parents share the clinicians’ experience 
of futility and are ready to withdraw treatment, which means extubating 
the infant and letting him or her lie body-to-body with the parents until 
death occurs. Although rare, once in a while it happens that the parents 
insist on continued treatment and maintain the hope that a miracle might 
happen and that death is not the only possible future. In following such 
contested situations of decision making, my graduate student Laura E. 
Navne and I noticed how issues of limited resources found their way into 
discussions among clinicians. As the head of clinic expressed in an inter-
view with us about one such specific situation, ‘Overall, resources are not 
unlimited. Shall we continue with a very care-intensive treatment, which 
is futile and painful for the patient?’ He and his staff did not think so 
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as such an infant would take up a space in the NICU from other infants 
who with care and technology may become viable babies. Also, a futile 
infant would exhaust his staff who were already working at full stretch 
doing their utmost to make infants viable, and for whom the experience 
of creating worthy lives was essential for them to maintain faith in their 
work so as not to resign from their job. Hence, the doctors did not blindly 
aim for continued treatment and prolonged life. Rather, they engaged in 
a difficult task when they balanced the expected life’s worth of the infant 
with the situation of the family and the resources of the clinic and the 
welfare society (see Navne and Svendsen 2018 for a detailed analysis of 
such a case). Thereby the clinicians were not only treating the infant as 
an end in itself to be saved no matter the costs, but also saw the infant as 
part of a family and a welfare state and hence, we might say, as a resource 
for these collectivities. Consequently, the rare cases where clinicians and 
parents did not reach agreement on withdrawing treatment from infants 
who could not recover spelled out the central role in the clinic of man-
aging resources (ensuring that some infants did not take up resources 
from other infants with greater needs; keeping staff by ensuring work 
conditions in which they were able to see their work as meaningful) and 
thereby facilitating the future human resources for society (investing work 
efforts and technology in infants who may become lives worth living).
At the same time as economics and prioritisations of resources are 
inevitable in the daily life of treating infants – every treatment is priced, 
the clinic has a budget to comply with, there are prices on items in the 
medicine room of the clinic, only the most premature infants are allowed 
to be fed the costly human donor milk – the clinicians did not consider 
it right to bring up the issue of resource management when talking to 
the parents. Also when parents were not willing to withdraw treatment 
in spite of the clinicians’ advice to do so, the clinicians did not introduce 
to the parents the question of resources so pivotal in this situation. As 
the head of the clinic said to Laura E. Navne and me, ‘I think that it is 
unethical [to mention money to the parents] … they are in the deepest 
imaginable crisis in their lives … money is of no relevance in comparison 
to life and death. How can the two of them [money and life/death] come 
together?’ While these two cannot be separated in the daily management 
of the clinic and prioritisations between lives as the contested case spells 
out, the clinicians put efforts into separating money and life when talk-
ing to the parents as part of caring for them in their grief. Thereby the 
inescapable question of which lives to treat with societal resources and 
which lives not to treat constituted a specific geography – a ‘careography’ 
(Navne and Svendsen 2018) we might say – that separated the spaces in 
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which resource questions could be known and discussed (daily rounds, 
interviews with anthropologists) from the spaces in which resource ques-
tions were actively unknown (conversations with parents). This separa-
tion echoes the common view that the value of the human body should 
be kept separate from monetary transactions (Felt et al. 2009; Hoeyer 
2005; Svendsen 2007) and illuminates a shift in ‘money talk’ between the 
laboratory and the NICU. In the laboratory, the researchers’ articulations 
of a connection between economic value and pig life (‘it costs another 
pig at the other end’) constitutes the pig as a valuable resource; in the 
NICU, the clinicians’ absence of such articulations of the calculability of 
life in front of the parents underlines the human infant as non- calculable, 
that is, as holding intrinsic worth. Hence, by unknowing and not expos-
ing the inescapable prioritisations present in daily clinical practice, the 
clinicians separated money from human life and in so doing cared for 
the parents and maintained a high degree of understanding and empathy 
in their interactions with them, thereby upholding trusting relationships 
between healthcare institutions and citizens. Like the researchers when 
presenting their studies, the clinicians cared for the ‘bigger picture’ (see 
Law 2010; Navne and Svendsen 2018). They strived for the right balance 
between resource prioritisations and ways of helping parents through 
the grieving process and back to an everyday life outside the NICU.
Knowing and unknowing in translational medicine
My movement across central sites in the infrastructure of translational 
medicine illustrates how aspects of the work of imagining, claiming, mak-
ing and administering resources in the field of neonatology are open to 
experience yet actively unknown or silenced in specific contexts. In facil-
itating translation between bench and bedside, the possible existential 
equality between piglet and human researcher is unknown; in decision 
making in the NICU what is unknown concerns the inevitable selection 
of the worthy and the less worthy lives, what we may think of as the ines-
capable existential inequality between infants.
My study of this foregrounding and backgrounding of what is 
acknowledged points to the ways in which administering the boundary 
and moral tension between knowing and unknowing is part and par-
cel of making and managing resources for human health. Reflected in 
these activities is a notion of the ‘proper human society’ (see Ferry and 
Limbert 2008b) as one that frames the animal as a valuable tool for 
human health, sees the infant as an icon of life and potentiality, and 
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upholds the imaginary of infinite resources to treat every newborn life 
within the Danish welfare collectivity. In other words, the practices of 
claiming, making and managing resources are suffused with a notion of a 
‘we’, which is closely linked to the welfare state society that regulates and 
subsidises pig farming, finances the NEOMUNE research platform, and 
finances and runs the public healthcare system. The researchers’ and cli-
nicians’ sophisticated boundary work demonstrates a deep commitment 
to this ‘we’ in their striving for good science, in their commitment to col-
laborate in ways outlined by national research policies, in their engage-
ment in securing a fair use of public funds, and in their care for infants 
and parents in the clinic.
While it may be that human exceptionalism and the boundaries 
between the species have been increasingly contested in both natural sci-
ence (for example, De Waal 2001; Kohler et al. 2002; Oswath and Martin-
Ordas 2014) and in social science (for example, Despret 2008; Haraway 
2008; Buller 2014), my ethnography of the daily practices in transla-
tional medicine muddles this picture. These practices demonstrate that 
within a scientific framework in which the pig has moved closer to the 
human, asymmetries and disconnections between species and spaces are 
essential when bringing the pig into the clinic and managing resources in 
the clinic. At the same time as daily biosocial dynamics of animal-based 
translational science momentarily dissolve a clear distinction between 
the killable biological life of the animal and the liveable biographical 
life of the human, articulating and upholding this distinction is crucial 
to practices of translation. The pig and the human, sentient life and gen-
eralised knowledge, money and life worthiness, local dairy farms and 
global nutrition products are deeply entangled, yet actively separated or 
silenced in reaching the promise of human health, capital and science in 
translational medicine and in managing human health in the NICU.
Coda
In jokingly describing themselves as ‘our pigs’, the researchers hinted 
at the ways in which they were both colleagues (of equal standing) 
of Mie S. Dam and me and our resources (of unequal standing) in the 
 multi-species collaborative we all participated in. If it is so that the 
notion of resource presupposes ‘a particular relation between humans as 
exploiters of resources and “nature” as the ground from which resources 
are exploited’ (Ferry 2008, 52), this insight raises questions to the 
anthropologist about the right relationship between the anthropological 
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endeavour of producing knowledge about the boundary between know-
ing and unknowing (making resources in the form of ethnography) and 
the lives of the people who take care of this boundary on a daily basis 
(the ground from which data and analyses are made).
While including a social science study in a basic science/biomedi-
cal research platform surely holds the potential for engaging more ethi-
cal discussion without disengaging from the advancement of biological 
knowledge, this collaborative endeavour also cracks open conceptions of 
resource-making easily taken for granted in different epistemic practices. 
Hence, the question ‘What is ethics here?’ raised by the postdoctoral 
researcher applies equally to the anthropologist continuously trying to 
figure out the ethically right relationship between her informants and the 
anthropological knowledge production to which these informants con-
tributed. In the same way as entanglements and separations are pivotal 
in making piglets into resources and managing resources in the clinic, 
entanglement and separations penetrate the anthropological scholar-
ship. I know the worlds of experimental animal science and clinical neo-
natology from the inside through engaged solidary relationships with the 
professionals who with meticulous care and commitment handle piglets 
and infants. And I examine these fields by separating myself from their 
logics, thereby making it possible to question the common sense of the 
human–animal divide and explore the worlds that this common-sense 
divide produces. This is not without tensions. In literally moving between 
animal and human, laboratory and clinic, my ethnography is grounded 
in the daily interactions of people who think, feel, act, doubt, negotiate, 
at the same as it seeks to explore these worlds by examining the logics 
that not only belong to them, but encompass all of us. From this puzzled 
position we may begin to understand how human and animal lives are 
conditions of possibility for one another and how the strong notion of 
human potential and human uniqueness is woven into the practices of 
appropriating the pigs as resources for human health.
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Chapter 4
Anthropology’s End to Biodeterminism: 
A New Sociobiology
A. David Napier
Do new concepts in epigenetics and their implications for organic symbi-
osis demonstrate that sociobiology as it is commonly defined is actually a 
form of biosociology? After all, the sociobiology we have come to know 
is largely a product of the genetic fundamentalism promoted by E.O. Wil-
son and others in the 1970s – a fundamentalism now at odds both with 
contemporary epigenetics and with social neuroscience. Today these new 
fields open a number of routes for exploring how social life can influence 
biology in profound ways, merging more directly with new anthropologi-
cal studies of science and technology (see also Lock, this volume). In this 
sense sociobiology’s causal assumptions now seem not only premature, but 
also at odds with earlier and more ecologically-focused work in theoretical 
biology itself (for example, Ludwig Fleck and Georges Canguilhem).
Sociobiology reconsidered
Redefining sociobiology in this volume as the impact of social practices 
on biological mechanisms, then, not only reorientates how we define 
‘biosocial’ as the relationship between what we do and what we inherit 
(Napier 2013), it also helps us clarify the syndemic and symbiotic nature 
of human practices and their transformation over time (Singer 2009). In 
so doing, epigenetics realigns social anthropology with emerging trends 
in science, raising new and exciting opportunities for a ‘new sociobiology’.
In this chapter, therefore, I develop an argument for rethinking soci-
obiology by demonstrating the utility of epigenetics in both theory and 
practice. This I do in the final section by examining the profound and 
92 BIOSOCIAL WORLDS
largely understudied effects of social practices on type-2 diabetes. I claim 
that not only is the illness primarily a consequence of social forces, but that 
our failure to attend to it successfully is in large measure the result of our 
previous prejudicing regarding biological causes as illness determinants.
Darwin and stable change
In an era when scientific knowledge itself becomes a fetish (or factish as 
Latour [2010] would have it), many have seen in science a candid image 
of inescapable societal values. However, that awareness, too, is anything 
if not old: Marx, for instance, blamed Darwin for seeing the concept of 
nature itself as a reflection of English society: Marx’s analogy is less a cri-
tique of Darwin’s science than an expression of how deeply any concept 
of nature is itself a form of cultural allegory – a belief that nature, as it 
were, embodies culture.
Here, the science of developmental biology emerges as a deep com-
mitment to core British cultural principles of Darwin’s day. Dangerous 
biological transformation and upward advancement are, the English for-
tunately discover, ruled by a safer gradualism – allowing a great and stable 
chain of being to prevail within a prevailing and stable system of social 
class (Napier 2003). Scientific agnosticism replaces the Church of England 
as convictions about hierarchy and gradualism become reified within social 
Darwinism and eventually through a new eugenics. After initial  protests, 
evolution emerges as a wonderfully safe religious allegory.
Indeed, religion was actually much more a part of evolution than 
many would like to think. In spite of the common juxtaposition of evolu-
tion and the Church (to this day), Darwin was heavily motivated by reli-
gion. It is well known, for example, that Darwin’s hesitance in publishing 
his work on evolution was the result of his respect for his wife’s Christian 
beliefs and his desire not to upset outstanding social hierarchies. Darwin 
was as much a participant in the hierarchies of the society he inhabited 
as he was a disbeliever in their merits. It was T.H. Huxley, after all, who 
saw in Darwinism an opportunity for meritorious scientists to challenge 
the class system by arguing for intellectual status – for an upward mobil-
ity based on a hard-working mind. Though evolution challenged bibli-
cal dogma, it also, in other words, comforted those who did well in life 
by allowing them to think themselves fit. While Darwin was vexed by 
Spencer’s notion that charity got in the way of nature, it emerges from 
Darwin’s correspondence with Spencer that he, if uncomfortably, shared 
some of Spencer’s views (correspondence of Charles Darwin, 1985).
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Since intelligence was also subjected to fitness, class and progress 
after Darwin emerged as no longer circumscribed by religion. They now 
also could be demonstrated scientifically. Eventually, ‘fitness’ would 
allow a world of intellectuals to appropriate a system of class, to main-
tain its hierarchies, and to embed those hierarchies yet more deeply in 
a hyper-individuated society of autonomous, achieving selves. Social 
Darwinism, in other words, evolves as a natural outcome of evolution, 
with genetic privilege (now, inherited intelligence rather than social 
class) being proof of deservedness. Hence began the long road of eugen-
ics and, today, genetic selection for intelligence, the bell curve, and so on.
In this view, science succeeded in replacing religion not because 
science and religion actually differ, but because they both applaud a sim-
ilar cultural ontology. For inherited status, gradualism, and hierarchy 
all transcend the distinction between religion and science, confirming 
that each of us has a stable place in a stable world of more and less fit 
selves and others. Status – that is to say, ‘fitness to rule’ in politics, aca-
demics and the arts – would remain resilient against rapid change, and 
also resilient against the principal fear of the inherited classes of the era: 
this being the equation of status with power and the consequent upward 
mobility of the newly emerging social climbers – the so-called ‘bounders’ 
of the Industrial Revolution that populated Dickens’ novels – the tainted 
and infected enemy within the landed gentry.
Readily, there is a blue-blooded message in the survival of the fittest 
that is every bit as powerful as the concepts of God, country and inherited 
social estate. The major difference for Darwin’s era was that those privileged 
by class would now be obliged to compete with successful industrialists and 
intellectuals who also wanted to prove themselves more ‘fit’ (to rule).
Darwin’s science of nature, in other words, may have emerged as the 
result of carefully observed science, but it also emerged as a comforting 
reflection on established cultural values that reinforce the ontological place-
ment of selves versus others in a prior, persistent and enduring world of win-
ners and losers. The world is not static; but change remains a comfortably 
slow process. One can see such a master myth quite blatantly, for instance, in 
immunology – where a solipsistic Cartesian ‘self’ becomes not only the basic 
premise of biomedicine, but more generally, a kind of subliminal ontology 
that underscores its power as a valued cultural category. Selves survive by 
eliminating outsiders. Indeed, ‘recognition and elimination of non-self’ is 
the key premise of immunology to the degree that even when immunology 
rethinks the contingent nature of survival, it still does so on the grounds that 
any new theory involving the amelioration of self and other emerges out of 
an outstanding dichotomy between a self and its external environment.
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Mark Johnson has said much on the social power of such shared forms 
of subliminal meaning (Johnson 1987); but the important point here is to 
mark the ethical and religious force of evolution and its nod towards deter-
minism and hierarchy. For these very Enlightenment categories of achieve-
ment have also been adopted without examination by religion and science 
alike – not only as that devotion to personal achievement which is the pre-
requisite for academic success, but in its survival focus on a prior, persis-
tent, and autonomous self. Indeed, even modern efforts to decentralise the 
ego, from Latour to Deleuze, only make sense if we accept the resilience of 
an egocentric Enlightenment platform in the first place. The merging of a 
self and its environment, in other words, cannot be conceptualised without 
first acknowledging the two categories as distinct. Theory (in that a theory 
is either mine or yours) is itself an Enlightenment ontology.
To put it simply, any trope by which a self merges with its envi-
ronment carries with it the presumption of a previously autonomous, 
prior and persistent ‘self’. For this reason, Western philosophy will never 
escape its Cartesian foundations, which is why the philosophy of science 
can add little in the way of reshaping epigenetic paradigms. Such reshap-
ing, if it can occur at all, will more likely emerge from anthropology 
(with its focus on non-Cartesian categories of self) than from philosophy 
(wherein innovation builds on outstanding categories of thought).
In conclusion, philosophy of science – in which Cartesian-like Martians 
represent exotic ontologies – stands as a poor substitute for the countless 
non-Cartesian ontologies evidenced in the diverse cultural traditions that 
anthropologists have done their best to understand. Were we not so wed-
ded to the survival of the self at all cost, one might easily envision other 
forms of relations that bring all of us closer to the environments we inhabit.
Nonetheless, we cling to the idea that genes can be selfish (Dawkins 
1976) even though (like viruses) they have no mobility or indeed any 
capacity for action. Genes, in fact, are just information – that is, they 
possess no capacity for action or self-interest, which is to say that our 
ascribing behaviours to them constitutes a form of animism no different 
than the religiosity that Dawkins himself so boldly critiques (Cossu et al. 
2017; Napier 2012, 2013). What epigenetics shows us, in other words, is 
just how fundamentally wrong both the social Darwinists and the biode-
terminists are about our autonomy.
Selfish genes?
There is a common word in Latin that long ago found its way to the centre 
of genetic debate. The word is saltus. It is a noun meaning ‘jump’, or ‘leap’. 
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It was the one thing, according to Charles Darwin, that nature just does 
not do. For Darwin, evolution works because it happens over a very long 
period of time. Natura non facit saltum: ‘Nature does not make a leap’ 
(Darwin 1859, 194). If change happened too quickly, random mutations 
would, as so many science fiction novels and movies claim, transform 
destiny overnight. Humans could not evolve from other primate forms 
if changes happened suddenly. Random mutations would prevail, and 
change would occur in a wholly unsystematic manner (Napier 1996).
Probably more than any other, this key idea is what led to social 
Darwinism, Herbert Spencer’s own take on evolution, which (their corre-
spondence shows [Darwin Correspondence project]) Darwin by and large 
agreed with. In Spencer’s view, nature should be left to carry out its des-
tiny and over time to eliminate its weaker forms (Spencer 1864). We only 
interfere to produce advantage for those who already rule. Let nature, that 
is, eliminate the weak, the aberrant, and the deformed; and let humans 
assist nature by making decisions that allow the fittest to do better in what 
they have been selected to do. Hitler may not have adopted a coherent or 
scholarly view of Darwin (Richards 2013), but he loved the idea of natural 
selection and its social implications (Sherratt 2014). So did a number of 
respectable thinkers we wish more to defend, even if Darwin came to find 
some of what Spencer wrote unacceptable if not outrageous.
But in the 1960s, after a decade of work, a set of experiments 
focusing on the domestication of animals began to show the profound 
symbiotic impact of social environments on inheritance (Trut 1999). In 
the 1950s, Dmitry Belyaev, a Russian geneticist, decided to see if tamer 
foxes could be bred for the fur industry. Selecting animals that were less 
aggressive (an undesirable trait in caged animals competing for food), 
Belyaev began both the selective breeding of foxes that showed toler-
ance for humans, and socialising those selected cubs to the presence of 
humans. Not only did he soon produce domesticated foxes, but some-
thing else quite unexpected happened: the foxes began to bark, their ears 
dropped, and the colour of their fur changed. They became playful and 
unafraid of humans. They even responded to being called by their names. 
Within a decade, highly domesticated behaviours appeared, but so did a 
different sort of animal.
What was notable in Belyaev’s work were two things: first, his dis-
covery that a cascade of other genetic changes was expressed simply by 
selecting for tameness; and, second, that controlled social conditions – the 
laboratory in which the social encounters of foxes, and their breeding 
habits, were determined by particular rules – very quickly influenced 
these genetic changes. As adrenal functions (the fight-or-flight syndrome) 
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changed, so did skin colour; so did dopamine and noradrenaline, which 
influences response behaviour. In short, the social activity of selective 
breeding led to a cascade of remarkable and surprising biological changes.
Nearly everyone who has shown an interest in these experiments 
focuses on the strong impact of inheritance on domestication – on dogs 
in particular, and how quickly domestication can occur. Control dogs by 
selecting for compatibility with humans, and what you get is a rapid change 
in gene expression, even creating a new kind of organism. Indeed, some 
form of this socialising experiment must have happened long ago that led 
to our having the remarkable variety of domesticated dogs we now enjoy. 
What Belyaev demonstrated was not only the importance of phylogeny but 
a strong example of the deep significance of what we now call epigenetics.
However interesting this experiment may be for explaining why 
domestic dogs exist (and why they so little resemble their wild cousins), 
what is perhaps more telling (though largely neglected) is what can be 
learned about the effects of controlled environments on the behaviours of 
the fox, and on what actually gets expressed genetically. Giving rather more 
trusting foxes a chance to reproduce – foxes that did not fight or flee when 
approached – led to a wide range of genetic expressions that were latent.
Looked at in this way, we realise that social exposure (engagement 
with ‘the other’) is really the key variable that allows many genes to func-
tion, or to shut off. Leave the fox to one set of interactions in the wild 
(an environment ‘controlled’ by nature) and what happens is that certain 
traits are expressed; put the fox in another controlled setting (one con-
trolled by humans) and you rapidly alter the fox’s capacity to change and 
the ways that it changes. It is here our lesson resides; for Belyaev’s exper-
iments show not only the influence of gene selection, but also the dra-
matic effects of controlled social environments, of engaging complexly in 
specific social ways, on that process.
In other words, human selection for tameness is not ‘natural selec-
tion’; it is ‘human selection’ – a social process about creating social envi-
ronments in which certain genetic traits emerge. As such, it has quite a bit 
to do with evolution, but as much, or more, with the effects of social envi-
ronments – which experimental settings also undeniably are – on genetics.
Might the same be true for other complex genetic changes, like the 
proliferation of mysterious allergies, or adult-onset diabetes? We will 
explore this possibility at the end of this chapter.
However, now fast-forward to 2006 and the awarding of the Nobel 
Prize to Andy Fire and Craig Mello for their 1998 work on genetic interfer-
ence, on so-called gene silencing. Genetic interference takes place when 
RNA molecules cause a biochemical interference with cells responsible 
 ANTHROPOLOGY’S END TO BIODETERMINISM : A NEW SOCIOBIOLOGY 97
for transmitting genetic codes. In effect, what this interference causes is 
the degradation and eventual disappearance of those molecules. In other 
words, what we are witnessing is the expression of viral information that 
makes the ‘selfishness’ of evolution a questionable idea to say the least. 
Here, a bit of information (which one’s own supposedly ‘selfish’ cells 
bring life to) completely alters a line of inherited information otherwise 
considered wholly genetic.
But Fire and Mello did not discover this idea; their experiments only 
showed its reality. The ‘discovery’ of Fire and Mello was to understand 
how this disappearance (the gene ‘silencing’) could become permanent. 
Because the necessary proteins are no longer manufactured, the genetic 
information they otherwise transmit can no longer be expressed. In short, 
genes may be permanently silenced by the presence of random viruses 
from the environment – viruses carried through social encounters. Life 
(perhaps to Watson and Crick’s lament) is not just a function of the deter-
mining powers of DNA. It is a function of how an organism relates, or fails 
to relate, to its social environment. In fact, the DNA story will become 
increasingly less stunning as we learn more about how the ‘phylogenetic’ 
encounters of socially engaged organisms reshape our destiny.
As biologist Michael Skinner and his colleagues have recently 
shown in their work at Washington State University, epigenetic factors 
in mice can now be traced as far as the fifth generation and even beyond 
(Skinner 2014, 49). Yet, despite the mounting evidence, many biologists 
still recoil from the idea that environmentally induced epimutations can 
settle into the germ line. ‘The hypothesis seems to contradict a long- 
established belief that nearly all epigenetic marks are erased from the 
DNA and then rewritten during the reproductive process – not just once 
but twice. These processes, the reasoning goes, should wipe clean any 
acquired epimutations before they can cause trouble in the next genera-
tion’ (Skinner 2014, 51).
While some may object, arguing that the effects of genetic inter-
ference are not profound, in fact many viruses possess the necessary 
 double-stranded RNA capable of triggering the permanent silencing of 
genes if they have the environmental opportunity to do that. What this 
means is that organisms are not wholly fated by their ‘selfish’ genetic 
makeup. In fact, many can be profoundly transformed by extending 
themselves, like the foxes in Belyaev’s experiments, beyond their other-
wise defined boundaries and engaging in new and novel forms of social-
ity – whether those new environments are chosen or forced upon them, 
and whether those forms of exposure enhance the expression of genes or 
shut those genes down entirely (Napier 2013, 33). What this work tells 
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us, in other words, is that sociobiology – the impact of the environment 
on the biological – is just as important, perhaps more important in terms 
of big changes, than biosociology, the impact of biology on our social 
makeup.
The genetic notion of biodeterminism, then, is not only based upon 
Enlightenment notions concerning prior, persistent, and self-interested 
selves, but also upon a deep skewing of the effects of biology over social 
environment on future biological makeup. What the science of epigenet-
ics makes clear is that biodeterminism is not only a kind of teleology, but 
an ontology rapidly being undermined by science itself (Napier 2012). 
New knowledge within biology, in other words, exposes modern-day 
Darwinism as a kind of religious dogma – an acceptance of fate without 
acknowledging the profound consequences of human intervention on 
our collective destiny.
By contrast, biology increasingly suggests how engaging with the 
‘other’ profoundly alters what we once assumed to be immutable; for evo-
lution is not a theory in the sense of having predictive value; it is a form 
of explanation – a making sense of the past, a teleology, if you will – that 
offers us explanations in the form of stories about why things happened 
as they did. It has, we are forced to accept, only limited (if any) predictive 
value. Radical genetic expression – true transformation – occurs, as our 
foxes and genetic silencers show, when novel social events facilitate the 
release of certain forms of biological expression.
Looked at this way, the events that change the course of human his-
tory all make the biggest impact when they are at odds with our empirical 
practices and the inductive assumptions that rule our expectations and 
our sense of the normal. One might even argue, as does Nassim Taleb 
(2007), that the relevance of such events is inversely proportionate to 
human understanding – that is, to knowledge. And the problem is, if any-
thing, made worse by those who think they can predict the unexpected, 
leading us to believe we can control what we do not yet see. Nature is 
nothing if not unpredictable and risky.
Take the fight-or-flight syndrome, a phenomenon I studied some 30 
years ago (Napier 1986) and is still central to the problem of prediction. 
We do not know if the frightened lion will run or attack; and, indeed, its 
facial ‘expression of arrest’ is the only one it makes that is wholly unread-
able outside of its social context (Figure 4.1). While evolution may argue 
that its aggressive attack or the strong legs on which it flees are what 
make it ‘fittest’, we cannot in any way determine in advance what the lion 
will do, or if its doing so was selective. We do not know, that is, if it attacks 
or flees, or if in fleeing it survives or falls prey to another lion waiting in 
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ambush. Unless we begin to think epigenetically about the social context 
of the confrontation itself, we have only the presumed cause to proclaim 
in retrospect once the outcome is evidenced. Nature, in other words, is 
much more complex and merciless (and indeed beautiful) than any labo-
ratory experimenter could ever show!
While E.O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) may, therefore, supply a 
mythic ‘master narrative’ of biologically determined development, today 
that reality seems much less determined. Harsher though reality may be, 
evolution’s lack of predictive value means that social events have significant 
consequences that are not only unknown, but also unknowable in advance.
Bio-prejudice and biodeterminism: The diabetes example
While anthropology has called for work that describes, assesses, and 
even measures synergies amongst complex illness drivers, both the evi-
dence based on complexity as well as measurable evidence regarding the 
effects of social practices and lived experience on biology remain under-
developed if not non-existent.
Merrill Singer’s attempt to re-conceptualise diseases in their bio-
social contexts (syndemics) is a call to gain a better understanding of 
the complex social factors that influence mortality and morbidity. But 
the metrics for assessing how socially integrated individual responses 
affect health outcomes has yet to be established, even as Singer finds 
mathematical modelling relevant and promising (Singer 2009). Type-2 
Figure 4.1 ‘Expression of Arrest’. Source: GollgGForce. CC BY 2.0.
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diabetes provides a dramatic case in point: our prejudices about the bio-
logical determinants of health have clearly not only led to disastrous con-
sequences at the level of human misery, but have also cost us dearly in 
financial terms.
Though diabetes epigenetics is flourishing as a growing field of 
research, pulling apart social and cultural drivers in an individual’s life 
from genetic changes that are inheritable is difficult. We know, for exam-
ple, that rates are increased notably where antibiotic use is common 
(Mikkelsen et al. 2016), but without long-term longitudinal studies it 
is difficult to establish which effects are permanent in the germline and 
which are modifiable over generations. What is more, the alarming rise 
of the illness leaves little time for multi-generational research.
With the world’s population ageing, the growth of global food net-
works coupled with the consumption of high-energy low-nutritional 
foods, and a rise in sedentary lifestyles resulting from urbanisation and 
related constraints on exercise, much of the world finds itself unprepared 
for the scale of the diabetes threat. Diabetes may well bankrupt health-
care systems globally, as even in countries with comprehensive health 
care, non-adherence to treatment still runs high while diabetes co- 
morbidities proliferate. In the UK, for instance, only about 65 per cent of 
the diabetic population are able to adhere to treatment regimens, costing 
the country £10 billion annually for diabetes-related co-morbidities out 
of a direct healthcare expense of some £66 billion (Diabetes UK 2014) – 
that is, more than 1/6 of all health expenses lost to non-adherence in 
one hugely devastating illness, in a country where early detection and 
prevention (when the disease is reversible) are feasible.
That’s a ‘good’ picture from a nation thought to embrace the idea of 
integrated community care. The realities are much less edifying in places 
where no such care exists. Elsewhere, the situation gets much worse. On 
the opposite side we see developing economies struggling deeply with 
the diabetes epidemic. It is estimated, for instance, that by 2035 diabe-
tes will consume the entire health budget of Mexico. At the same time, 
wholly biomedical responses to diabetes produce desired outcomes for 
only 5 to 7 per cent of people suffering from the illness. As we will see 
below, the problem of diabetes is largely socially mediated, not only in 
93 to 95 per cent of sufferers in Mexico, but throughout the world. The 
cumulative consequences of this chronic illness in human and economic 
terms are world-changing.
Part of the problem is complexity itself – both at the level of lived 
experience, and at the level of research design. But at least complexity 
has finally been recognised by a number of governments and embraced, 
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for instance, by the European Commission in its ‘health in all policies’ 
approach (Ståhl et al. 2006). However, announcing the need for cross- 
sectoral action on illness (by asking all sectors to consider the health 
implications of policy decisions), still puts us a long way from under-
standing what actions will be required to reverse the progress of the 
illness, knowing which strategies are feasible, and determining how we 
prioritise limited resources to address this ‘silent’ epidemic.
Figure 4.2 provides one list of policy domains that allows us to 
understand what may be required if we are to rethink health promotion 
more generally. Indeed, taking the domains considered to constitute ‘all 
policies’ (shown in red below), and thinking about just one or two of the 
diabetes-related areas needing attention (parenthetical comments in 
black), allows us easily to see just how complex the problem of reversing 
the proliferation of diabetes actually is.
In that as little as 1 to 5 per cent of diabetes treatment in poorer 
countries is successfully accomplished through biomedical care alone 
(and in the wealthiest of countries the figure is still less than 40 per cent), 
the need to understand what makes individuals socially, psychologically 
and environmentally vulnerable to diabetes is not only urgent, but criti-
cal to the stability of healthcare systems worldwide.
Figure 4.2 Examples of challenges to diabetes care across policy 
domains. Provided by the author. 
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A graphic alarm regarding the damaging consequences of biodeter-
mined prejudices in the treatment of diabetes may be evidenced in what 
is called the ‘rule of halves’. Though this ‘rule’ was developed in order to 
get a better understanding regarding treatment failures in primary care 
(Hart 1992), it has now been adopted for describing the epigenetic, social 
and cultural determinants of health in non-communicable diseases, and 
in type-2 diabetes in particular.
According to this rule, of all of those suffering from diabetes glob-
ally, only about half have been diagnosed. Of those diagnosed, only about 
half are receiving appropriate medical care. Of those receiving appropri-
ate medical care, only about half achieve their treatment targets. And 
of those achieving their treatment targets, only about half achieve their 
desired outcomes and live their lives free of diabetes-related, co-morbid 
complications.
This ‘rule’, of course, varies widely from one social setting to the 
next – from city to city, and also from country to country. In the UK, for 
instance, 36.8 per cent of diabetics achieve their treatment outcomes. 
While in some economically struggling countries this figure can stand as 
low as 3 to 4 per cent, the relevance of social factors to biological out-
comes could not be more telling; for even in a country having a com-
prehensive national health service, still some 63 per cent of those living 
with diabetes fail to achieve treatment targets as the result of complex 
social, psychological, cultural and economic factors that influence the 
way people live their lives from day to day, and how their genetic makeup 
is reshaped by social factors. In countries lacking universal health cover-
age, this figure rises sharply from 63 per cent to as high as 97 per cent.
However, while complexity itself is discouraged in science – where 
randomised control trials (RCTs) eliminate, rather than compound var-
iables, and where high-impact scores for publication favour RCTs over 
field-orientated, social research – a review of adherence itself shows 
more dramatically why our evidence base for diabetes has been stalled 
by the way we favour biodeterminism as a mode of thought.
Indeed, the true impacts of our biodeterminist prejudices are only seen 
when we review the ‘rule of halves’ not as an expression of how many suffer-
ers fail to achieve treatment targets, but as an indictment of biodeterminism 
itself. For we can easily re-interpret this ‘rule’ to show just how much of what 
we consider biodetermined is socially determined and/or epigenetic.
The first proof is the fact that addiction to sugar is a largely social 
and cultural problem. An infant’s brain is far from fully developed. While 
the brain/body ratio of human infants and those of chimps are the same at 
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birth, that ratio rises two- and then three-fold in humans in the child’s first 
years of life. By the time we are adults, our brain-body ratio is 3.5 times 
that of a chimpanzee. The fact that the human brain is so under- developed 
at birth means that addictions (such as to sugar) can easily be created by 
social behaviours, setting aside the possible shutting off of genes by the 
previous generation’s own social behaviours. In other words, our social 
habits in infancy (food intake, decision about antibiotic use, etc.) are 
being made in an infant’s life at a time when its brain is developing quickly 
and the infant is yet to develop its acquired immunity. At the same time, 
acquired immunity in an infant takes a full 18 months to develop. Merging 
research on brain growth, sugar addiction, and acquired immunity, we 
can readily see how the first year and a half or so of social life not only 
will influence the life-long foundation of cellular health, but also how our 
social actions impact biology in foundational ways.
Second is the effect of poverty and what is now called the ‘nutri-
tion transition’. Cultures emerging from malnutrition are especially 
vulnerable to high-energy, low-nutrition foods. They not only cost less 
than healthy foods, but seeing someone overweight or even obese can 
be viewed as a state of good health when emerging from a life charac-
terised by extreme food shortages. Indeed, there is a growing anthropo-
logical literature on preferred large body sizes (Figure 4.3) that needs to 
be understood now if diabetes is to be reversed (for example, Popenoe 
2004; Harris 2016; Yates-Doerr 2016). Mexico, for instance, now leads 
the world in childhood obesity, even surpassing the US; and Mexicans, 
likewise, repeatedly choose unhealthy body shapes as ideal, well over the 
median of five and sometimes higher than six.
Third, and perhaps most telling, is the degree to which non- 
biodeterminist models of diabetes have been neglected in care and 
treatment. While the ‘health in all policies’ approach cited above has 
had considerable impact on the re-conceptualising of illness, it has vir-
tually no effect on our willingness to prioritise the social and cultural 
determinants of health and wellbeing. Social science studies of diabetes 
remain underrepresented and underfunded in spite of recommendations 
to the contrary. Even the very funders who promote such integration 
across sectors timidly revert to funding life science research when coffers 
diminish. The effects of the culture of biomedicine prevail, then, not only 
amongst bench scientists, but amongst funders (such as the European 
Commission) that profess publicly to have changed priorities.
Such facts can be clearly evidenced when we reframe the ‘rule of 
halves’, not as a ‘treatment problem’ but as a reflection of successes and 
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failures of biodeterminism. For once we reshape this ‘rule’ as an indicator 
of how much of diabetes is or is not biodetermined, we see also the true 
folly of our prejudices. Indeed, given what is lost to the medicalisation of 
diabetes and the fact that some 2.1 billion people (30 per cent of the world’s 
population) suffer from only one of its risk factors (obesity), it might be 
better and more fruitful to think less about the ‘rule of halves’ and what it 
indicates about non- adherence, than about those undiagnosed who have 
been ignored because the social origins of their illnesses have not been ade-
quately addressed. Here, we might rather speak not of the ‘rule of halves’, 
but of the ‘rule of have-nots’ – that is, the extraordinary level of risk that 
biodeterminism itself has created by ignoring the profound effects of social 
life on biology.
To say, that is, that biodeterminism is responsible for the rapid and 
devastating effects of diabetes may be too strong a judgment. However, 
the conclusion, nonetheless, begs to be drawn.
Figure 4.3 Variability of preferred body size. Source: Chukwunonso, 
E. E. 2015. ‘Body shape dissatisfaction is a “normative discontent” in 
a young-adult Nigerian population: A study of prevalence and effects 
on health-related quality of life’,  Journal of Epidemiology and Global 
Health 5 (4, Supplement 1): S19–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jegh.2015.07.003.CC BY NC-ND 4.0. 
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A new ontology
In The Age of Immunology (2003) and later in ‘Nonself help’ (2012) and 
‘A new sociobiology’  (2013), I argued that Enlightenment categories of 
selfhood have made us largely incapable of understanding the merits 
of seeing how a self is symbiotically influenced by its environment, and 
variably defined ontologically. I also have argued repeatedly that science 
itself is increasingly accepting the limitations of its insistence on defining 
survival in terms of a self that is prior, persistent and self-interested.
Today we stand at the threshold of understanding how new evidence 
demonstrates not only the limited utility of biodeterminism, but the degree 
to which selves are realised through symbiotic relations within diverse envi-
ronments that are affected not only by notions of the self, but of time and 
causation. Reverse transcription is one example; retroviruses another (Napier 
2003); for in these cases the effects of life are, as it were, recursively rewrit-
ten, defying the permanent determinism of genetic processes, and showing us 
clearly how much more readily an organism can succeed in life by adjusting to, 
rather than eliminating, the perceived ‘other’ in its environment.
But biodeterminism as a monolithic ideology dies hard, as we hold 
onto the idea that the fittest survive principally by the recognition and 
Figure 4.4 The ‘rule of have-nots’. Provided by the author. 
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elimination of non-self – immunology’s core trope. Indeed, even the late 
emergence of stem cell research and regenerative medicine in general 
can be traced specifically to modern science’s unwillingness to accept 
that genes and viruses are just information: they lack the capacity to act 
unless life is brought to them by living cells. Viruses cannot invade us 
on their own; and that little fact forces us to realise that our immune 
systems are as much symbiotic adaptation systems – search engines, as I 
have called them – as they are defence mechanisms.
So why have we clung so desperately to our deterministic models 
that see science and its randomised control trials as the gold standard? 
We live and breathe, survive or die out, by the information viruses and 
genes contain. But that information is useless unless socially contextu-
alised. We are invaded or directly affected by neither genes nor viruses, 
but we are profoundly affected by cells that bring their information to 
life. For viruses, viral proteins, and genetic data more generally are all 
just that – information that our cells bring life to. They have no motility, 
reproductive capacity, or agency in and of themselves. In fact, they can 
lie dormant for thousands of years awaiting one of us to assimilate their 
information and bring to life its effects on our cells.
Though the point may seem simple enough, it is nonetheless pro-
found at the level of redressing the mistakes of biodeterminism. Once we 
accept how culturally biased has been our use of invasive and defensive 
metaphors, we also open the door behind which can be found count-
less other notions of pathogenicity – some more ‘demonic’ than the little 
armies of viruses we popularise in explaining to children why they should 
wash their hands; some indeed much more symbiotic. Either way, if we 
continue to think of our local environments in ways that only reiterate 
tired categories, our ability to revision the future will be seriously medi-
ated by our own ignorance. And that goes for our views of healthcare 
too: if we continue to separate the social and the biological, and to define 
illness only in biological terms, we will surely fail in seeing life as anything 
other than medicalised.
While escaping our own cultural prejudices comes at a very high 
cost, there are remedies. As Mark Twain once famously said, ‘travel is fatal 
to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness’ (Twain, 1869). Myopia has 
a very high cost; but engaging other modes of thought can not only be 
refreshing but enlightening. For now, we must wonder about the steep 
gradient we must climb to transcend our obsession with biodeterminism. 
Are there metaphors from other cultures, other ways of seeing, that per-
haps can provide new and better models of how we not only define our 
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environments, but are defined by them? Let us hope that Twain’s ‘preju-
dice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness’ can be transcended by attending 
more authentically to those other voices.
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Chapter 5
Tribes without Rulers: Bacteria  
Life in the Human Holobiont1
Allan Young
[B]acterial information processing is … incredibly sophisticated at 
coordinating processes involving millions of individual events and 
at making them precise and reliable … [B]acteria display aston-
ishing versatility in managing the biosphere’s geochemical and 
thermodynamic transformations: processes more complex than 
the largest human-engineered systems. This mastery over the bio-
sphere indicates that we have a great deal to learn about chemistry, 
physics and evolution from our small, but very intelligent, prokary-
otic relatives. (Shapiro 2007, 816–17)
My subject is a ‘model organism’ referred to in these pages as ‘bacteria’ or 
‘bacterial society’. This model is an amalgam of a thousand or more spe-
cies of bacteria that live and die inside the human body. There are nota-
ble differences among these species, but they are irrelevant to my interest 
here: a contrast between real-life molecular autonomy and thoughtless 
biodeterminism.
A model organism is a well-studied species employed by researchers 
in order to get access to information about some other, less-understood 
species. The relation between the model and target species is generally 
homology: the two species have a shared origin and they preserve and 
therefore share certain features. In this special sense, we can think of 
model and target organisms as parallels. Biological researchers utilise 
many model organisms of course. Bacteria are considered especially use-
ful for studying gene regulation.
In unusual instances, the parallel species also intersect, in the sense 
that the model organism has a place in the life of the target organism. 
Bacteria are unusual in that the distinction between parallel and inter-
secting relations is perversely blurred – ‘perversely’ in that the relationship 
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deviates from what was formerly understood to be normal. In 1973, 
Francois Jacob, Nobel laureate and spokesman for what was the normal 
view at the time, wrote that: 
It is perfectly possible to imagine a rather boring Universe without 
sex, without hormones and without nervous systems peopled only 
by individual cells reproducing ad infinitum. This Universe in fact 
exists. It the one formed by a culture of bacteria. (Jacob 1993, 263)
Evidence accumulated over the next decades contradicts Jacob’s conclu-
sion. Bacteria are revealed to be social animals, not homogeneous masses 
of individual cells. Although it is true that they lack a nervous system 
in the conventional sense, the bacteria resident in the bodies of verte-
brate hosts produce and respond to neurotransmitters and regulators. 
Moreover, while bacteria are certainly mindless, it would be a mistake 
to conclude that they lack cognitive abilities, or that they are incapable 
of behaviour, such as spitefulness, that can be usefully compared with 
hormone-fuelled acts in higher animals.
Part One: The cell state
In 2007, the science journal Current Biology published a selection of 
articles on the theme that all life is social. More specifically: ‘Group liv-
ing intensifies two opposing forces. On one side, proximity exacerbates 
conflict for local resources. On the other side, cooperation with neigh-
bours may enhance group efficiency and aid in competition against 
other groups’ (Frank 2007, R648). This idea signals the revival of inter-
est in the social dimension of biological life – an idea that was popular 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries among naturalists, 
evolutionary biologists and their publics. In 1902, Peter Kropotkin, 
erstwhile Russian prince, economist, geographer, evolutionary thinker 
and proponent of anarcho-communism, published Mutual Aid: A factor 
of evolution. In this book, Kropotkin argues that humans are inclined 
to cooperate with people close to us, compete, sometimes aggressively, 
with outsiders, but these tendencies will be modified by environmental 
factors and other contingencies. The innateness of these tendencies is 
vouchsafed by  evidence of their evolutionary origins: 
As soon as we study animals – not in laboratories and muse-
ums only, but in the forest and the prairie, in the steppe and the 
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mountains – we at once perceive that though there is an immense 
amount of warfare and extermination going on amidst various spe-
cies, and especially amidst various classes of animals, there is, at 
the same time, as much, or perhaps even more, of mutual support, 
mutual aid, and mutual defence amidst animals belonging to the 
same species or, at least, to the same society. Sociability is as much 
a law of nature as mutual struggle. (Kropotkin 1902, 12)
Sociability is a characteristic of invertebrates as well as vertebrates, and is 
well established for ants, termites, and bees. ‘Mutual aid is met with even 
amidst the lowest animals, and we must be prepared to learn some day, 
from the students of microscopical pond-life, facts of unconscious mutual 
support, even from the life of microorganisms’ (Kropotkin 1902, 15).
The social life of microorganisms was a subject of interest among 
biologists during the second half of the nineteenth century. Debate 
focused on the so-called ‘cell theory’, according to which every organ-
ism, including humans, is comprised of smaller, self-reproducing organ-
isms. Biologists are concerned with relations between the superorganism 
and the constituent organisms: they want to know how the constituents 
are connected (generally via evolution, anatomy, physiology) and why 
constituents are connected. When constituents are sentient entities, the 
‘why’ answer will mention their drives, motives, or intentions. When con-
stituents are not sentient, why answers will explain that constituent parts 
enable the superorganism to perform – this is their function. Moreover, 
when there are no satisfactory answers to how or why questions, we have 
a puzzle – the puzzle of ‘the one and the many’, ‘the most central of all 
philosophic problem’, according to William James (1907, 51).
It is a century and a half since the cell theory was introduced, and 
biologists are still seeking answers to the how and why questions. A pop-
ular thesis in the nineteenth century traced the evolutionary origins to 
primitive, free-living cells, known as ‘protists’. In Ernst Haeckel’s narra-
tive of these events, protists preferring a sessile group life surrendered 
their independence, to create the first multicellular organisms. How and 
why questions were addressed via the metaphor of the ‘cell state’: an 
egalitarian ‘cell republic’, representing multicellular plants, and a hierar-
chical ‘cell monarchy’, representing multicellular animals, in which cells 
are subordinated to the central nervous system and the brain. Within 
the cell state, cooperation and coordination would prevail, and growth 
would proceed through cell division. Simple cell division would not 
explain embryonic development, however, and this difficulty remained 
unresolved.
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Ultimately, beginning in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
the metaphor of the cell as an autonomous citizen within a larger social 
body lost its allure. At this time biochemical and physiological investi-
gations began to replace morphological and evolutionary considerations 
of organisms and cells. As biochemistry matured as a professional dis-
cipline, another metaphor came to dominate, one more suited to the 
particular types of questions being pursued by the new breed of inves-
tigators, so that today one more commonly hears the cell described as a 
‘chemical factory’ (Reynolds 2007, 74).
Part Two: Bacterial society
This is where we left Kropotkin, the year is 1907 and he is thinking about 
pond life. A newly discovered free-living microorganism, the bacterium, 
is attracting attention. Koch and Pasteur have established the medi-
cal and industrial importance of bacteria, and significant technological 
developments have followed. However, misunderstandings about bacte-
ria persist. Some biologists believe that they are not true cells, since cells 
must have nuclei. If bacteria are cells, it is uncertain whether they belong 
among plants or animals. In either case, the bacterium is a primitive form 
of life: ‘a simple automaton, blindly following its genetic programming 
… [with no] personal idiosyncrasies, let alone a social life’ (Gardner and 
Kümmerli 2008, R1021). Kropotkin wisely excluded this ‘generic loner’ 
from his book on mutualism.
Today, experts know otherwise. Bacteria are biologically complex 
organisms, operating in unexpected ways. For instance, the bacterial 
cytoskeleton regulates and executes key cellular processes in a manner 
analogous to the operations of organelles in the nucleated (eukaryotic) 
cells that compose body tissues and organs. In addition, bacteria lead com-
plicated social lives, interacting with different species – bacterial and other-
wise – within multicellular communities. When describing bacterial social 
life, I will rely on the language employed by contemporary microbiologists.
Microbiologists write that, within these communities, bacteria ‘can 
glean information from the environment and from other organisms and 
interpret the information in an existential “meaningful” way, i.e. by building 
an appropriate colony structure … and [may even] learn from past experi-
ence’ (Ben-Jacob and Levine 2006, 198). Their chemical communication 
is said to be like linguistic communication, in giving contextual meaning 
to bits of information connected like words into sentences, and exchanged 
between individuals via a dialogical process through which these bacteria 
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assess local cell density: a procedure known to researchers as ‘quorum- 
sensing’. This arrangement tells bacteria when they are numerous enough 
to overwhelm the immune system defences of the host organism. Until this 
threshold is reached, bacteria modulate the expression of their virulence 
genes, thus forestalling the timely mobilisation of antibiotic defences by 
suppressing evidence that advertises their presence to ‘target cells’.
Some quorum-sensing systems are operated by a single spe-
cies (or genus), and their messages are unintelligible to outsiders. In 
 multi-species systems, outsiders are able to ‘eavesdrop’ on conversations 
(Schertzer et al. 2009). In the right circumstances, this crosstalk can 
benefit both senders and eavesdroppers, but in other communities cross-
talk provides opportunities for cheating, deception and exploitation. For 
example, the chemical signals or metabolites used for quorum sensing 
may be good to eat, and are valued by freeloaders belonging to other 
species, as nutriments. The free lunch ends when the target is attacked, 
and quorum-sensing is superfluous. Polyglot freeloaders prolong the 
 quorum-sensing phase by circulating disinformation – underestimates of 
the virulent population (Sandoz et al. 2007; Williams et al. 2007).
Disinformation is also employed defensively (Bjarnsholt and 
Givskov 2007; Popat et al. 2008). Suicide bombers provide one more 
example. Pulmonary strep infections are promoted by the release 
of a toxin via self-destructive bursting (lysis). This would be a one- 
generation solution if all of the bacteria possessing this trait in a given 
community or species were to self-destruct on the first opportunity. 
In practice, only some potential bombers self-destruct. Wholesale 
self-destruction is avoided by biological individuality, also known as 
‘phenotypic noise’: 
[Suicidal] microbes might be responding to differences in their 
personal quality: a moribund cell with nothing to lose will be 
more inclined towards committing suicide for the good of healthy 
neighbours. More sinister is the possibility that bacteria are 
manipulated into making the sacrifice … (Gardner and Kümmerli 
2008, R1023)
Part Three: Biofilms
Many bacterial species enclose their communities within ‘biofilms’. They 
are densely populated communities, growing on surfaces, protected from 
antibiotics and predation by a thick cover made of secreted polymers, 
114 BIOSOCIAL WORLDS
and structurally complex, with intricate channels for delivering nutri-
ment and disposing of waste. Biofilms are also ubiquitous: responsible 
for many acute and chronic infections, the degradation of implanted 
prosthetic devices, the contamination of drinking water distribution 
systems, and a multitude of industrial problems. Communal relations 
appear to be coordinated and cooperative, and an analogy is sometimes 
made between biofilms and multicellular organisms.
However, multicellular animals develop from a single cell that pro-
liferates, and constituent cells are siblings, so to speak. Most biofilms are 
composed of cells from different lineages or species, and many species 
are genotypically diverse – a consequence of spontaneous mutations and 
lateral transfer of DNA between species. In these heterogeneous popu-
lations, cheaters proliferate, reaping the benefits of indirect reciprocity 
and altruism without incurring the expenses. Strong conflicts and self- 
interest compromise the biofilm’s thickness and growth rate, and reduce 
resistance to antibiotics – a case of ‘the tragedy of the commons’, made 
familiar to us by neo-Darwinians (Claessen et al. 2014, 117–18; Nadell 
et al. 2009).
The structural and physiological complexity of biofilms gives the 
mistaken impression that they compose communities of coordinated and 
cooperative groups. ‘[Yet] biofilms can emerge without active coordina-
tion [and] species stratification and channel formation do not necessarily 
require that cells communicate with one another using specialised signal-
ling molecules’ (Nadell et al. 2009, 206). Biofilms and quorum-sensing 
systems seem impressive because bacteria were formerly misperceived 
as primitive and solitary. However, the systems operate over very short 
distances – just a few cell lengths – and, so, contrast with multicellular 
animals, ‘where many types of differentiated cells communicate across 
the whole architecture to produce a highly integrated functional unit’ 
(Nadell et al. 2007, 217).
Biofilms and multicellular organisms are certainly different from 
one another, but ‘different’ does not imply ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ or ‘sophis-
ticated’ versus ‘primitive’. Bacteria are not the progenitors of eukaryotic 
(nucleated) cells. Biofilms are not an early stage in a shared evolution-
ary pathway, but rather the product of a unique trajectory. ‘Different’ 
refers here to different vital economies – distinctive modes of production, 
distribution, exchange and consumption. Different means ‘strange’, not 
‘primitive’, when mode of exchange includes self-transformation via lat-
eral transfer of DNA, consumption includes predation, cannibalism, and 
self-sacrifice, and the biofilm economy incorporates an intercellular caste 
system: 
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[T]he chemical environment within a biofilm often differs greatly 
at different depths . ... [a] nutrient in the liquid surrounding a bio-
film may be consumed by cells in the outermost layers such that its 
concentration decreases deeper in the biofilm. Meanwhile, a prod-
uct secreted by the cells in the biofilm will often accumulate to its 
highest concentration within the biofilm’s interior. Given that many 
bacteria use multiple growth substrates and release numerous 
extracellular products, diffusion limitation can produce complex 
vertical and transverse chemical gradients, particularly when the 
secretions of some cells are consumed by others. ... These gradients, 
in turn, generate numerous microniches within the biofilm that can 
induce pronounced physiological heterogeneity simply because 
bacteria alter their behaviour according to local conditions. (Nadell 
et al. 2009, 211)
Neo-Darwinian theory argues that the proportion of cheaters in a com-
munity inevitably increases, from minority to majority, in the absence of 
regulatory mechanisms. Communal survival requires a modicum of cooper-
ation: once the proportion of cooperators drops beneath a critical thresh-
old, a community collapses. Biofilms have additional worries: starvation, 
desiccation, predation, viral infections (bacteriophages).
Yet death can be a pathway to resurrection, via a process called 
‘sporulation’, in which bacterial individuals are transformed into spores 
that are then dispersed from ‘towers’ into the ambient environment, to 
develop into free-living (plaktonic) cells, that will eventually aggregate 
on surfaces, and mature into biofilms. It is not a simple matter, though: 
life and death decisions must be made along the way.
Considerable research effort has been devoted to untangling the 
components of the signal transduction decision-making system that 
allows the individual cell to decide whether to wait, take a chance … 
or commit to sporulation. It is now understood that the cell decision 
follows careful sensing, advanced cell–cell communication using a 
variety of peptide pheromones … and elaborate information pro-
cessing to assess information about the colony density, the collec-
tive progression toward sporulation, and the inclination to escape 
into competence. (Schultz et al. 2009, 21027)
Sporulation is an energy-intensive process and takes several hours. It is 
initiated while enough nutrients are available to complete the process. If 
other bacteria within the same niche continue to grow, there is the risk 
116 BIOSOCIAL WORLDS
that nutrients will be exhausted before the cells committed to sporula-
tion have completed the process (Claverys and Håvarstein 2007, 225). 
The choice is further complicated by the need to set priorities. What is the 
best investment when voracious, bacteria-eating protozoa patrol the bio-
film’s periphery? Bacteria may respond by postponing sporulation, and 
divert the resources needed for building towers into the task of engorging 
the bacteria living on the biofilm periphery to create a cordon of bacte-
rial cells of inedible proportions, larger than the predators. The process 
of engorgement is routinely enhanced through cannibalising altruistic 
members of the community.
Schultz et al. write about a decision-making system that allows the 
individual cell to decide, while the processes described seem to be coor-
dinated collective activities (Claverys and Håvarstein 2007). About 
the same time, in an essay on ‘molecular autonomous agents’, Stuart 
Kaufman identified autonomous agents as systems capable of self- 
reproduction and necessarily self-organisation, and able to act on their 
own behalf, citing the example of ‘a bacterium swimming up a glucose 
gradient’ (Kaufman 2003, 1089). Kaufman’s additional interest concerns 
the question of fit between a presumably panbiotic tendency to self- 
organisation and the central dogma of evolutionary biology, i.e. the pri-
macy of selection. Moreover, these questions can be pushed still further, 
to consider how the emergence of molecular autonomous agents bridges 
a ‘willingness’ to self-organise themselves into multicellular systems (and 
into social groups). The juxtaposed claims are not necessarily contradic-
tory, but they require elaboration – a concept or theory for the puzzle of 
the one and the many, a puzzle that pervades microbial societies.
Part Four: The human microbiome
Ninety per cent of cells living inside the human body or on its surface 
are bacteria – 100 trillion bacteria. In 2007, the National Institute of 
Medicine (US) created a Human Microbiome project (HMP), funding 
research on the composition and diversity of the microbial communities 
inhabiting major mucosal surfaces of the human body – the nasal pas-
sages, oral cavity, skin, gastrointestinal tract, and urogenital tract – and 
research on the genetic metabolic potential of these communities.2 I will 
use ‘microbiome’ in a restricted sense, to refer to the gut bacteria (enteric 
bacteria). While only a minority of these bacteria form biofilms, a use-
ful comparison can be made between microbiome and biofilm societies. 
There are abundant and obvious similarities, but I want to begin with an 
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important difference, concerning the quality of ‘containment’. Here, and 
throughout this chapter, I have retained the societal terms used by micro-
biologists. Containment refers to factors preserving physical borders or 
boundaries. The biofilm’s boundary is a viscous polymer covering created 
by the resident bacteria. A biofilm protects its resident bacteria: its job is 
to keep external threats out.
The boundaries of the gut microbiome are ready-made, but not its 
contents. The human fetus is bacteria free, and acquires its first bacterial 
residents during vaginal delivery, a second wave in the course of suckling, 
and additional bacteria via contact with the ambient environment. In the 
process, the immune system is educated and matures. There are three com-
peting views of how this happens. The traditional view is that ‘the immune 
system is educated not to react to self and to react to non-self. [The] self is 
good and induces tolerance … Non-self, including microbes … are evil and 
elicit an immune response aimed at destroying non-self’ (Eberl 2010, 454). 
The microbiome view is that the immune system is educated to be tolerant 
to self through a system of microbial pattern-matching.3 The notion of self 
is modified: ‘good’ includes both the familiar, normal self plus its mutualis-
tic microbes. The third view, now emerging, is that: 
[T]he perceived duality of mutualistic and pathogenic microbes, 
normal and altered self … represents extremes of a continuous 
reality. Microbes can express different levels of mutualistic or path-
ogenic properties and these levels can vary during interaction with 
the host. [T]he state of self and of immune responses … navigate 
between well-described extremes, and the most likely states are 
combination of these extremes. (Eberl 2010, 454)
All three views posit that the immune system plays a key role in contain-
ment – restricting the resident bacteria to the confines of the microbi-
ome. However, it is the third view that emphasises the dual character of 
friendly microbes, the fact that even good friends can become dangerous 
threats. Once past the gut’s epithelial wall, microbial friends become a 
source of sepsis, and potentially septicaemia. It is the strategy of contain-
ment that makes this unlikely. The innermost layer of the intestine is the 
epithelium, and contains specialised cells that secrete mucus to lubricate 
the passage of food. The sheer number of intestinal bacteria makes an 
occasional breach inevitable. The bacteria that penetrate this barrier are 
generally eliminated by macrophages. Bacteria getting through this bar-
rier are engulfed by dendritic cells (DCs) and carried alive to the mes-
enteric lymph nodes where their identities (chemical signatures) are 
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decoded. A protective immunoglobulin IgA1 is released and distributed 
over the mucosal layer that coats the gut’s epithelial cells. Thus a barrier 
is erected that neutralises the bacterial threat before the microbes can 
reach the cells (Hooper et al. 2012, 1269).
Part Five: Bacteria’s brain
The gut bacteria contribute to the production of neurotransmitters 
and neuroregulators integral to the development and functioning of 
the sympathetic and central nervous systems.4 Gut bacteria communi-
cate with the brain and nervous systems through multiple pathways: 
the  circulatory system, the vagus nerve, and the neuroendocrine cir-
cuit (hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis) that underpins the stress 
response. The pathways are bidirectional, but the mechanisms through 
which the gut bacteria receive and respond to incoming chemical signals 
is unclear.5
The bio-behavioural effects of gut–brain signalling are studied by 
comparing the behaviour of germ-free (gnotobiotic) mice with normal 
mice under controlled conditions. Germ-free mice exhibit low anxiety 
behaviour when placed in novel environments, for example, they show 
greater inclination to exploratory behaviour. Similarly, HPA axis arousal 
is less intense (measured via levels of corticosterone) when germ-free 
mice are put into stressful situations, such as maternal separation or 
physical restraint. Other efforts to study gut–brain signalling focus on 
the influence of specific bacterial species. These experiments alter the 
bacterial composition of the microbiome through dietary change, the 
introduction of probiotic bacteria or invasive pathogenic bacteria via 
faecal transplants etc., and the administration of selective endogenous 
bacteriocins. Although it is widely presumed that social relations within 
the microbiome – competition for binding sites on the gut wall, and com-
petition for nutrients needed for growth – have differential effects on the 
host’s behaviour, cognition and mood, it remains unclear how the under-
lying mechanisms can be studied experimentally. Consequently, conclu-
sions regarding the microbiome’s contribution to psychiatric disorders 
(depression, anxiety disorders, autism spectrum disorders) are based on 
correlations rather than causation.
The history of the microbiome is a chronicle of efforts aimed at con-
necting bacterial communities and strife to organ systems, physiological 
processes, and popular conceptions of selfhood and sensibility. This is the 
background for explaining the explosive growth in biological research, 
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science publications, journalism, and government funding focused on 
the microbiome. Thus, advocates for the creation, in the US, of a Human 
Microbiome project comparable to the Human Genome project (HGP) 
justified its enormous expense by arguing that the HGP, as it was origi-
nally conceived and executed, had been incomplete.
Part Six: The social life of enteric bacteria
Over the past 5 years, studies have linked our microbial settlers to 
conditions as diverse as autism, cancer and diabetes … This excite-
ment has infected the public imagination. ‘We Are Our Bacteria’, 
proclaimed one headline in The New York Times … Companies offer 
personalised analysis of the microbial content of faecal samples, 
promising consumers enlightening information … Faecal trans-
plants have been proposed – some more sensible than others – for 
conditions ranging from diabetes to Alzheimer’s disease. With 
how-to instructions proliferating online, desperate patients must 
be warned not to attempt these risky procedures on themselves. 
(Hanage 2014, 247)
Popular interest in the human microbiome in North America remains 
unbounded, notwithstanding the scepticism of many researchers and 
dubious evidence of its salutogenic potential. ‘Eat your way to health’ is 
an old theme. The transgressions are new. Childbirth transformed into 
a bacchanalian rite of passage, in which a sterile fetus drinks deeply, 
through mouth and nose, of germs, dirt, and vaginal excretions, and 
emerges a viable human being. Woe to the uninitiated child (Caesarean 
birth): he will be punished with obesity. This is new. Ditto the vision of 
vindictive Gaia: ‘Like ecosystems the world over, the human microbiome 
is losing its diversity, to the potential detriment of the health of those 
it inhabits’ (Brody 2014). Who would have predicted the happiness of 
educated Americans following the discovery that ‘we’ (i.e. somatic cells) 
occupy only 10 per cent of our manifest bodies?
While these responses are worth ethnographic attention, I want to 
finish by calling attention to a significant absence. I began this paper with 
a theme developed in a recent issue of Current Biology: all life is social, in 
some sense collective.
The evolution of collective behaviours demands intrinsic pheno-
typic flexibility in the behaviours of individuals and groups in response 
to changing social and environmental conditions and mechanisms to 
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facilitate coordination among members of the collective (Ross-Gillespie 
and Kümmerli 2014). Brainless microbes satisfy these demands partly 
by quorum-sensing. The quorum-sensing systems favoured by bacteria 
rely on the diffusion of chemical signals and pooling information. To 
be more precise, the scientists are writing about social information: sig-
nals and/or cues generated by other individuals. By averaging across 
multiple potentially noisy informational inputs, the decision-makers 
(individual cells) acquire an accurate impression of their surround-
ings and neighbours and produce egalitarian decisions. Operations 
involve an intrinsic response threshold and local feedback. Once signal 
receptors are sufficiently stimulated, a group-coordinated shift in gene- 
expression is induced.
Adjustments in the signal threshold are geared to maximising adap-
tation to prevailing conditions. If the signal threshold is set too low, a pre-
mature collective response follows, and fitness drops at the level of the 
population. When set too high, it is difficult to mobilise an effective col-
lective response. Shifts aim for either greater speed (lower threshold) or 
greater accuracy (higher threshold), and are produced, in the short run, 
via phenotypic plasticity and, in the long run, via selection (facilitated by 
lateral gene transfer). These effects have been observed via experiments 
and computer simulations.
Cooperation is impeded by conflicts of interest. Conflicts are less 
frequent in communities with a high degree of relatedness. Natural 
microbial communities involve interactions among individuals that vary 
widely in their relatedness to one another. The creation of disincentives 
for dissent and cheating helps to limit these conflicts. This solution pre-
sumes a decision-making mechanism anteceding the increased costs: 
Besides destabilising cooperative actions, and the collective  decision- 
making processes that underlie them, conflicts of interest can also 
influence selection for different forms of decision making. When 
conflicts are relatively minor, and where information can be pooled 
fairly broadly (for example, small groups) it is easy to see how 
leaders could emerge – typically from among those individuals for 
whom different decision outcomes would have strongest effects on 
fitness – and how an initially democratic decision process could 
transition into a more autocratic one. Where more substantial con-
flicts of interest exist, meanwhile, democratic systems of collective 
decision making should be the most robust, since these give rise to 
the most accurate decisions (i.e. best-fit compromise across all indi-
viduals). (Ross-Gillespie and Kümmerli 2014, 7)
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This social dimension of microbial life, and therefore everyday life in 
the human microbiome, is missing in the popular accounts. Moreo-
ver, it is likewise neglected in the published rationale for the Human 
Microbiome project. The project’s defining technology, metagenomics, 
is creating a distinctively desocialised version of the microbiome. The 
project does not overlook social relations altogether: it is committed 
to understanding ‘how the microbiome and human host interact to 
support health or to trigger disease’. However, the logically anteced-
ent question is ignored: How do enteric bacteria organise themselves; 
how do they compete and cooperate with one another? The NIH sub-
sequently established an Ethical, Legal and Societal Implications pro-
gramme (ELSI) whose job is to address ‘the new and unexplored issues 
which arise from human microbiome research’. However, once more, 
attention focuses on relations among humans and between humans and 
microbes.
Conclusion: A question and less-than-satisfactory answer
Do bacteria really have a ‘rich social life’, as microbiologists claim, or does this 
idea falsely anthropomorphise a truly asocial nature, in a way reminiscent of 
the metaphorical ‘cell state’ pictured by Haeckel, Virchow and Spencer?
The social life claim is based on two propositions: a) bacteria 
behave in socially patterned ways, for example, cooperating with rela-
tives, competing against strangers; and b) bacterial behaviour is guided 
by bacterial cognition, the capacity to recognise and choose among alter-
native possibilities. Proposition b accounts for the critics’ scepticism. To 
be meaningful, ‘cognition’ must include decision making. According to 
sceptics, bacterial ‘cognition’ is a physico-chemical process, based on 
deterministic transduction of chemical signals, while ‘decision making’, 
in the ordinary language sense, requires a brain – at the very least, a 
nervous system. Bacteria possess neither. But there is another possibility: 
decision making can function through stochastic intelligence, a capacity 
bacteria possess.
Life is a study in contrasts between randomness and determinism: from 
the chaos of biomolecular interactions to the precise coordination of 
development, living organisms are able to resolve these two seemingly 
contradictory aspects of their internal workings. Scientists often recon-
cile the stochastic and the deterministic by appealing to the statistics of 
large numbers … (Raj and van Oudenaarden 2008, 16)
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Quorum-sensing, as described above, is one way in which bacterial social 
life reconciles the stochastic and the deterministic. The part played by ‘lead-
ers’ in clonal communities – where individuals share a single genotype – is 
especially interesting in this regard. Notwithstanding the shared genotype, 
there is significant variation among individuals – a consequence of ran-
domness in transcription and translation leading to cell-to-cell variations in 
mRNA and protein levels. During periods of collective stress, such as expo-
sure to antibiotics, a small fraction of individuals become ‘competent’, able 
to take up DNA from the environment. Competence is a stochastic function 
(the result of randomness in transcription) that enables the leader to exploit 
noise (random variation) generated during quorum-sensing.
This chapter ends more or less where it began, with the puzzle of the 
one and the many. Who is the individual possessing stochastic intelligence? 
Is it the single cell (a bacterium), a biofilm (comprising a leader, species 
mates, and neighbours), or a super-organism (10 per cent ‘host’ and 90 
per cent microbe, i.e. a ‘distributed system’)? Why should it matter? We 
are equally perplexed (since the time of David Hume) by decision making 
located in the brain and self-consciousness. The two puzzles are connected 
by stress and anxiety, and a neo-Darwinian imperative. Is there more?
Notes
1. I have taken my title from a landmark volume on acephalous human societies, Tribes without 
Rulers: Studies in African segmentary systems, edited by J. Middleton and D. Tait (1958). See 
Theis et al. 2016 for an overview of the Holobiont concept.
2. The microbiome is inhabited by archaea (like bacteria, eukaryotes), viruses (including bacteri-
ophages that infect bacteria), fungi, and protozoa. The HMP is focusing on bacteria.
3. Eberl (2010) describes two types of pattern recognition receptors (PRRs): microbe-associated 
molecular patterns (MAMPs) and pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs).
4. The gut bacteria are the body’s main source of tryptophan, a serotonin precursor; and contrib-
ute to the production of major neuroregulators, integral to the development of the central nerv-
ous system and operations of the stress response: acetylcholine, GABA (gamma-aminobutyric 
acid), and BDNF (brain derived neurotrophic factor). Species of bacteria are likewise implicated 
in the production of dopamine and norepinephrine.
5. ‘In the late 1920s, Walter Cannon, the founding father of the study of gastrointestinal motility, 
emphasised the primacy of brain processing in the modulation of gut function. It is now increas-
ingly being recognised that the gut–brain axis provides a bi-directional homeostatic route of 
communication that uses neural, hormonal and immunological routes, and that dysfunction of 
this axis can have pathophysiological consequences’ (Cryan and Dinan 2012, 701).
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Chapter 6
Biosocial Dynamics of Multidrug-
Resistant Tuberculosis: A Bacterial 
Perspective
Jens Seeberg
Humans have created an ideal environment for the development of 
antibiotic resistance (Orzech and Nichter 2008, 269).
Increasing access to medicines
How may the spread of antimicrobial resistance to medicines for tubercu-
losis (TB) be understood if it is seen from the perspective of bacteria engag-
ing with an epidemic of treatment? Moreover, how do new medicines and 
technologies reconfigure the biosocial dynamics of this particular epi-
demic, when implemented through underfunded public health systems?
A call was put forward during the 1990s and 2000s for univer-
sal access to existing and effective treatment against common diseases 
such as TB and HIV. Paul Farmer (2001, 2005) consistently and force-
fully argued that the denial of such treatment was an expression of a 
global war against the poor, fought through mechanisms of structural 
violence. The call for global access to treatment is a strong moral imper-
ative. Indeed, whether at the individual level when facing a patient or at 
the level of public health, the argument regarding access to life- saving 
medicine is well justified. Concurrently, new global funding mecha-
nisms have come into place since the 1990s to support access to drugs. 
An example of this is the financing of the global TB control programme 
known as directly observed treatment, short-course (DOTS) through a 
combination of government and donor funding. In India alone, millions 
of patients were treated under DOTS, and by 2006, the government of 
India estimated that the lives of 2 million TB patients had been saved 
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(Government of India 2006). For this reason, DOTS was celebrated as 
a success in India during the 2000s. Two ticking clocks were placed on 
the website of the government’s control initiative, the Revised National 
TB Control Programme (RNTCP): one for patients put on treatment and 
one for lives saved. These clocks have since been removed, though their 
traces remained visible for a long time afterwards, perhaps indicating a 
general lack of resources for the programme. Despite the emergence of 
new funding mechanisms globally, however, the effective improvement 
of health systems necessary to safeguard the quality of programmes such 
as DOTS and other medicine-intensive global health programmes did 
not materialise. Increasingly, healthcare is privatised, and state-funded 
health provision is under pressure, in India and elsewhere.
From its inception, the RNTCP in India had a substantial interest in 
the production of ‘success stories’ demonstrating the curability of TB with 
DOTS. Such messages were intended to decrease the stigmatisation of 
TB patients and stimulate passive case finding. Gradually, success stories 
became moderated a little by growing attention to treatment failure related 
to antimicrobial resistance. It was clear from the beginning that DOTS was 
a complex strategy that would also involve limited strengthening of the 
health system. Even if, in the later Stop TB strategy, this was given some 
attention as an area where investments were needed, the dominant line of 
thinking assumed that the general health system would somehow automat-
ically be strengthened once scarce resources were flowing to the vertical 
TB treatment programme. This assumption disregarded evidence that the 
simultaneous existence of many competing vertical programmes resulted in 
a compartmentalised, fragmented and unevenly funded health system. So 
far, the priorities of dominant funding mechanisms, which see the solution 
to these epidemics in terms of physical access to pharmaceuticals and diag-
nostic technologies, have failed to address the biosocial dimensions of the 
disease. An understanding of biosocial dimensions would take as its start-
ing point the lives of humans and of bacteria. In what follows, I shall pursue 
an understanding of the social co-existence of bacteria, their human hosts, 
and the anti-TB medicines with which both engage, in an analysis that seeks 
to incorporate three different scales across which social practices play out 
and interlink: the microbial, the human, and the global.
Phages
The constant engagement of a bacterial cell with whatever inhabits its envi-
ronment may at any point in time result in the cell’s death, engagement 
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in relations of symbiosis, or resilience (i.e. resistance). From this perspec-
tive, the presence of anti-TB medicine in the host organism may be likened 
to the presence of viruses capable of infecting bacteria, so-called bacte-
riophages; or in the case of mycobacterial hosts, mycobacteriophages. A 
phage that infects Mycobacterium TB (M. TB), which causes TB, was first 
discovered in 1947, and hundreds of such ‘TB viruses’ have subsequently 
been identified. Once they are hosted by M. TB, they communicate their 
genetic material to the TB cell, affecting different aspects of its genetic 
code. Little is known about the complex relationship between phage 
infection and bacteria behaviour, but some phages seem to enhance the 
ability of bacteria to produce biofilm, while only a few have the potential 
to kill their hosts.1
Napier has argued in favour of a new sociobiology that priori-
tises ‘organic relatedness over organic autonomy’, where the self – the 
 somewhat bounded organism – is as much xenophilic, i.e. seeking 
engagement with its organic environment, as xenophobic, defending 
itself against it (Napier 2013, 20; see also Young (this volume) for an 
overview of similar positions). A metaphor of travelling through an 
organic landscape could perhaps replace the traditional immunological 
metaphor of warfare as an appropriate trope for capturing this engage-
ment of organisms, as in microbiologist Graham Hatfull’s description of 
mycobacteriophages’ search for suitable host cells: 
Thus, the observed phage diversity can be explained by assuming 
that wherever broad and diverse ranges of hosts are present, the 
phages can rapidly dance across the microbial landscape, using the 
hosts as ‘stepping-stones’. Migration across this landscape requires 
that the ‘stepping-stones’ be spaced sufficiently close (genetically) 
to enable a host-range transition jump with either very few muta-
tions or a gene acquisition event. (Hatfull 2014, 1)
Hatfull proceeds to talk about certain phages as ‘merely accidental tour-
ists in the Mycobacterium locale’.
From the perspective of the mycobacteria, such encounters with 
viral travellers constitute both communicative opportunities and risks. 
Whether a xenophobic or a xenophilic response would be advantageous 
is determined through engagement. For some mycobacteria, engagement 
with phages has been shown to influence their physiology in ways that 
increase virulence through expression of phage-encoded proteins or inte-
gration of the phage genome into the host gene, the so-called lysogenic 
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cycle, potentially affecting the ability to create biofilm and hence giving 
host cells with a particular phage infection a selective advantage (Hatfull 
2014, 2). Another process of viral replication, known as the lytic cycle, 
allows the phage’s DNA to exist as a separate molecule and replicate 
in a process that eventually kills the host cell when the cell membrane 
bursts and multiple new phages are released. Using a more conventional 
metaphor for the co-existence of bacteria and phages and the mecha-
nisms of resistance to phage infection developed by the former and the 
 counter-mechanisms to overcome resistance developed by the latter 
(and so on), Labrie et al. have described such processes as the ‘arms race 
between bacteria and phages’ (Labrie et al. 2010, 321); they describe 
the blocking of phage receptors as one of several resistance mechanisms 
developed by bacteria. Though an ‘arms race’ metaphor is open to dif-
fering interpretations, it seems to imply a war that can be won. I suggest 
that a ‘traveller’ metaphor takes us further in reflecting on organic inter-
actions that involve risk and (evolutionary) development potentials, and 
hosts that are more or less welcoming along with guests that are more 
or less intrusive and influential and that sometimes become part of the 
family, so to speak. Less metaphorically, perhaps, we see that the long-
term interaction of bacteria and phages has resulted in a flexibility for 
both that is crucial for their survival and continuous adaptation to ever- 
changing environments. Development of phage resistance is, therefore, a 
daily routine for bacteria, as are the other possible outcomes of the inter-
action, i.e. death and incorporation.
From the perspective of M. TB, anti-TB drugs have certain simi-
larities to phages, but they are also dissimilar in important ways. Most 
importantly, the standard treatment drugs are not viral, i.e. they do not 
contain genetic material capable of replicating in the host cell, and the 
person under treatment must therefore consume them for a long period. 
If naturally occurring, phages contrast with the sudden and prolonged 
high concentration of engagement achieved through medical treatment 
and, in the case of combination therapy, the simultaneous presence of 
several antibiotics. Nevertheless, medicines may be considered similar to 
phages in terms of the natural response of the cell to develop, through 
mutation, mechanisms that enable the cell to resist the specific mode of 
operation of a given drug. Bacterial stress (for example, during antibiotic 
treatment) increases the mutation rate (Martinez and Baquero 2000). 
However, resistance can also occur by acquisition of resistance genes car-
ried by other ‘tourists’, i.e. plasmids or transposons, across the microbial 
landscape, or by recombination of foreign DNA into the chromosome 
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(Martinez and Baquero 2000) further supporting the use of a viral met-
aphor for the spread of drug resistance among bacteria. The chances for 
development of resistance in M. TB to a single drug vary depending on 
the drug (Zhang and Yew 2009), but are invariably much higher than 
those of simultaneous development of resistance to several drugs. This is 
the logic behind the multidrug treatment regimes. Theoretically, if three 
or more drugs are present in the host body, the possibility of simultane-
ous development of drug resistance to all drugs is virtually non-existent. 
However, once resistance is developed, the genetic material of the TB 
cell has changed, and hence that drug resistance is replicated through 
standard processes of cell division. This allows for a new resistant strain 
of TB to spread, both within the human host (known as ‘acquired’ or 
‘treatment-induced’ drug resistance) and, if it is pulmonary TB, to other 
people (known as ‘primary’ or ‘transmission-generated’ drug resistance).
Multidrug-resistant TB (MDRTB) is rapidly increasing worldwide. 
With approximately 25 per cent of the global TB burden, India is one of 
the most important geopolitical spaces for the TB epidemic and for the 
development of MDRTB.2 In what follows, I shall discuss MDRTB in the 
context of the TB control programme in India.
TB control in India
‘Directly observed treatment, short-course’ (DOTS); ‘short’ in this context 
means 6 months of uninterrupted treatment. The World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) developed this treatment regime in the 1990s in response 
to problems with patient compliance with the former treatment, which 
was of even longer duration and was unsupervised. A  multidrug regi-
men, it was intended to control the risk of drug resistance. Even though 
WHO advocated DOTS as a globally uniform treatment strategy, in the 
event, it was implemented with some variations across countries; this 
chapter focuses on DOTS in India.3 In ‘directly observed treatment’, a 
so-called DOT provider (DP) was in charge of the full amount of tablets 
for the duration of the treatment. During the initial two months’ ‘inten-
sive phase’, the patient had to visit the DP three times per week (this was 
known as intermittent treatment) and take the medicine under ‘direct 
observation’. In addition to directly observed treatment and availability 
of the entire course of treatment from the outset, earmarked for individ-
ual patients, the DOTS regimen also included an extensive monitoring 
system. Each individual patient visit to the DP and each intake of drugs 
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were registered, and the information fed into a surveillance system that 
aggregated data at relevant administrative units up to the national level.
From its inception, and throughout high-burden countries, DOTS 
was a highly complex strategy that depended on the success of many 
simultaneous interventions at all levels of a given health system (Gericke 
et al. 2005). A vertical programme, it was semi-integrated with the exist-
ing health infrastructure and hence depended on the quality and sta-
bility of that infrastructure to achieve the desired effect on TB control. 
The programme rested on a calculation indicating that achieving a case 
detection rate of at least 70 per cent of all actual cases and a cure rate 
of at least 85 per cent could cut the TB caseload by half within a dec-
ade (Elzinga et al. 2004). This constituted a strong selling point for the 
adoption of the DOTS strategy as a major public health intervention by 
governments globally. In India, the National TB Control Programme had 
failed to manage the TB epidemic effectively during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Brimnes 2016). There was an urgent need for policy change, and WHO 
was advocating DOTS as an answer to the problem. This approach was 
eventually accepted by the government of India (GOI) and incorporated 
in the RNTCP, which was launched in 1993 as a pilot project. The pro-
gramme was gradually scaled up from an initial coverage of 2.35 million 
people to cover a population of 20 million in 1996, the year in which 
World Bank funding was introduced, and a plan for rapid nationwide 
scaling-up of the programme was developed. Within the next 10 years, 
by March 2006, DOTS had been expanded to cover the entire Indian 
population, even if coverage as defined by GOI did not imply that all TB 
patients were treated under DOTS; rather, it meant that the formal DOTS 
structure was nationally accessible as per the norms established by the 
programme (Seeberg 2014).
Contamination and configuration: TB treatment  
as an epidemic
Rosenberg uses the concepts of ‘configuration’ and ‘contamination’ to 
describe two distinct approaches historically used to explain the occur-
rence of epidemics (Rosenberg 1992). Configurationist explanations 
assume a normal health-maintaining steady state of ‘climate, environ-
ment and communal life’, and Rosenberg suggests that such ‘holistic’ 
explanations dominated before the appearance of medical knowledge 
about specific infectious agents (Rosenberg 1992, 295). Contamination 
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designates the idea of ‘person-to-person contagion, of the transmission 
of some morbid material from one individual to another’, or ‘an event 
or agent that might subvert a health-maintaining configuration’ (Rosen-
berg 295). Even if these explanatory models contrast, they are not mutu-
ally exclusive; rather, as Rosenberg points out, they weigh differently in 
different cases of epidemics and at different times. Using these concepts 
as analytical categories (Seeberg and Meinert 2015) rather than as con-
trasting types of explanatory models allows for us to explore the con-
figuration of an epidemic of contamination of drug resistance (see also 
Seeberg 2019). Furthermore, if we adopt the perspective of TB bacteria, 
TB treatment in the age of global health becomes a pandemic of contam-
ination that is potentially fatal for M. TB. Studying the configuration of 
this pandemic (i.e. global TB governance and its implementation in spe-
cific contexts) enables us to explore from a new angle, ways in which the 
bacteria have been able to transform into drug-resistant strands, seem-
ingly successfully surviving the global health ‘treatment pandemic’.
Due to its strong walls, M. TB is a very robust cell, capable of sur-
viving in dry environments for years, and in air for days. Its cell walls 
have enabled it to develop a ‘complex parasitic relationship with its host’s 
immune system’ and ‘down-regulate its host’s immune response, allow-
ing the pathogen to protect itself from attack by the immune system and 
thus to survive in a latent state for decades’ (Nightingale 2010, 167). It 
is this capability that explains how an estimated one-quarter to one-third 
of the world’s population can be infected with latent TB, capable of sub-
sequently producing disease if the immune system is compromised, for 
example, with HIV co-infection or malnutrition. As is the case with the 
TB cell’s evolutionary relationship with phages, the cell’s relationship to 
its human (or non-human) host is one of biological co-evolution. With 
the configuration of urbanisation from the sixteenth century onwards, 
the disease gradually changed from rare to epidemic (Nightingale 2010) 
because of the combination of high population density, poor hygienic 
conditions and widespread undernutrition. The relative disappearance 
of TB from the Global North and its epidemic proportions in the Global 
South can be seen as expressing global reconfigurations of these three 
factors, further fuelled by its syndemic relations to HIV (Singer 2009).
If the TB control programme creates, from a TB bacteria per-
spective, an epidemic of contamination, it is potentially a very serious 
one. DOTS used a combination of four drugs – Isoniazid, Rifampicin, 
Pyrazinamide and Ethambutol – in the first 2 months of treatment. If the 
medicines had the desired effect, demonstrated by a negative sputum 
test, the dose was reduced during the following 4 months of treatment 
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with only Isoniazid and Rifampicin, where the patient was given treat-
ment to take home for a week at a time.4 Isoniazid, Ethambutol and prob-
ably Pyrazinamide attack the cell wall, whereas Rifampicin inhibits the 
cell’s ability to perform RNA (ribonucleic acid) polymerase (Laurenzo 
and Mousa 2011). If all these drugs are administered together, and for 
an extended period, a treatment-naïve TB cell has virtually no chance of 
survival, since it depends on mutation to develop the appropriate forms 
of resistance for each drug independently. Patients who resumed treat-
ment after an interruption of 2 months or more (so-called ‘defaulters’) 
and relapsing patients were categorised as Category II patients; in these 
cases, intravenous Streptomycin was added to the regimen and inten-
sive and continuation phases were increased to 3 and 5 months respec-
tively, resulting in an additional 8 months of treatment. In spite of this 
chemical carpet-bombing of the TB cell’s walls and interior, similar to 
a contamination syndemic (the mutually reinforcing dynamics of two 
or more concurrent epidemics in a population) (Singer and Clair 2003) 
with quadruple exposure to pathogens for the TB cell, multidrug resist-
ance still happened; conversely, the reduction of incidence that had been 
calculated as the desired public health outcome (i.e. cutting TB by half 
in a decade) did not result. Figure 6.1 shows the trends over the period 
2005–18 for notified cases of TB (the flat graph) and MDRTB (the rising 
graph, note: logarithmic scale) in India.
Estimated numbers are much higher than notified numbers, and so 
it seems that M. TB is so far able to adapt to this syndemic of anti-TB 
medicines. Keeping in mind Napier’s call for a sociobiology that focuses 
Figure 6.1 Trends for notified TB and MDR/RR-TB cases in India. Data 
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on the communication between organisms, it seems that the TB bacteria 
engage in similar ways with drugs and phages, with outcomes that may 
be positive (resistance or adaptation) or negative (death), but in specific 
cases are unknown and perhaps unpredictable. To understand how the 
TB cell is able to resist contamination, so to speak, I return to the trope 
of configuration. How is the ‘epidemic of anti-TB medicines’ configured?
Configuring the spread of TB treatment
Most public health studies on the occurrence of drug resistance under 
the DOTS programme either take a standard epidemiological approach 
involving the identification of risk factors for ‘defaulting’, or (more sel-
dom) take a qualitative approach and ask ‘defaulters’ about why they 
have left treatment. ‘Defaulters’ constitute by definition the category of 
patients who have interrupted treatment for two or more consecutive 
months. A frequently held view on acquired drug resistance in TB in 
public health literature would state that MDRTB ‘for the most part [is] 
due to inappropriate treatment protocols, non-compliance or inappropri-
ate dosing schedules’ (Laurenzo and Mousa 2011, 6). I shall return to 
inappropriate treatment below; here I focus on non-compliance. Given 
that DOTS, by definition, used correct treatment protocols and appro-
priate dosing schedules, it is hardly surprising that attention initially 
concentrated on the category of ‘defaulters’ in attempts to understand 
their ‘non-compliance’ or ‘non-adherence’. For example, a hospital-based 
study in South India identified patients ‘vulnerable to default such as 
males, alcoholics,5 smear positive cases, and DOT being inconvenient’ 
(Jaggarajamma et al. 2007, 130). The authors felt that ‘Intensifying moti-
vation and counselling of this group of cases are likely to improve patient 
compliance and reduce default’ (Jaggarajamma et al. 2007, 130). Other 
study designs have allowed for a more nuanced discussion of the issue, 
and suggested that the category of ‘defaulter’ be reconsidered (Jaiswal 
et al. 2003), a revision of terminology that was embraced by WHO in its 
‘End TB Strategy’ (WHO 2014b).
Seeing the issue from the bacterial perspective, and hence perceiv-
ing treatment as a contamination epidemic, makes it possible to ask a 
somewhat different set of questions. What is ‘access’ combined with 
‘non-compliance’ in a global health perspective now becomes a ques-
tion of exposure. A number of situations could offer TB bacteria some 
relief from exposure to the toxic treatment. As mentioned earlier, India 
had from the beginning decided to implement so-called intermittent 
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treatment, with administration of medicines three times per week dur-
ing the intensive phase, whereas most other countries had implemented 
DOTS with daily medicine administration.6 The reasons for intermittent 
treatment were economic and managerial, but the risk of adverse side 
effects was also reduced (Saltini 2006). It was cheaper to manage a sys-
tem with patient–provider contact reduced to less than half that required 
for a daily regime. It meant, however, that missing one dose equalled 
missing close to 3 days’ medication. If this happened regularly, bacterial 
exposure was reduced and the risk of Rifampicin resistance increased 
(Saltini 2006, 2089). Another cause of interruption of treatment was 
the gap that often arose between the intensive and continuation phases. 
After the intensive phase, the patient had to travel to the diagnostic cen-
tre for a sputum test. Whereas the distance between patient and DP was 
supposed to be less than 2 kilometres, the distance to the microscopy cen-
tre could be considerable, and it could be difficult to organise the journey 
due to work and social obligations. Even if the journey was made, there 
was no guarantee that health staff were available. With effective treat-
ment, the sputum test would be negative (sputum conversion) and the 
patient would be shifted to the less aggressive ‘continuation’ regimen, 
whereas patients with a positive test would remain on intensive phase 
treatment. Depending on the stability of exposure during the intensive 
phase, this window between the intensive and the continuation phases 
established another systemic risk of interruption. The pressure to ensure 
that the patient went for the sputum test fell on the DP, adding to the 
need for a trusting relationship between DP and patient. 
Furthermore, in many cases, the assumption that a trained DP would 
be within reach of any patient across the subcontinent was rather optimis-
tic. For this reason, two emergency measures were routinely taken. One of 
these was ‘spot training’ of a relative or neighbour, who in place of a full 
day’s DP course would be given a briefing on how to give the medicine, 
how to complete the patient card and whom to report to. This was not nec-
essarily a less effective approach, since as many as 50 per cent of trained 
DPs at a given point in time did not treat any patients for years after their 
training was completed (Hjalsted 2003). If spot training was not possible, 
for instance, if no volunteers were available, a second measure was for the 
medicine box to be given to the patient, who would be given similar on-the-
spot instructions. Faced with the alternative of denying sick patients treat-
ment, dedicated frontline health workers who were used to ‘improvising 
medicine’ (Livingston 2012) in difficult situations in order to make sense 
of their work were squeezed between rigid programme guidelines and 
rough realities. Patient-administered TB treatment was often practised in 
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areas very far from functioning health clinics with trained staff. A study 
from Odisha – a state in India with a large population classified as ‘sched-
uled tribes’, who have historically been pushed into hilly and mountain-
ous areas with poor infrastructure – found that in 2001, only 68 per cent 
of patients registered in the DOTS programme received directly observed 
treatment (DOT) throughout the intensive phase of treatment. One of the 
main reasons for not having DOT among patients even when a DP was 
available was ‘reluctance to have nine tablets on an empty stomach in the 
morning’ (AIMS Research 2002, viii). A comparison of ‘community DOT’ 
provided by health workers and ‘family DOT’ given by a relative showed 
that more patients completed treatment with family-based supervision 
and support (Newell et al. 2006). A study from Kerala, India, found that 27 
per cent of those patients who were reported to receive observed treatment 
in fact did not and that they accounted for 86 per cent of treatment failures 
or relapses (Balasubramanian et al. 2000, 410). Given that approximately 
70 per cent of registered TB patients in India were male and that the vast 
majority of DPs (80–90 per cent) were female (Hjalsted 2003), the idea 
that maleness could be constructed as a risk factor for defaulting as quoted 
above is hardly surprising. However, this observation should be placed in a 
context where it was often difficult for female DPs to operate and assume 
the authority necessary to personify a very paternalistic treatment system 
in a society with pronounced gender inequality. In addition, DPs without 
other health training frequently faced problems when trying to obtain the 
medicine from and otherwise interact with health personnel at the TB 
centre (Hjalsted 2003). The implementation of a programme that force-
fully interfered with patients’ daily lives in a strict treatment-cum-control 
regimen was highly dependent on local context and existing power struc-
tures to assert itself. In the fast and target-driven expansion of DOTS in 
India, such dynamics were ignored or assumed to be unproblematic. The 
speed with which DOTS was expanded and the necessity of disregarding 
local solutions to implementation problems in favour of easy-to-manage 
uniform policies pushed by the World Health Organization was itself an 
important part of the configuration. These factors created a context in 
which reports of dysfunctional health posts, untrained personnel and long-
term vacancies at key posts in peripheral districts were highly unwelcome 
among state-level and national-level TB administrators who were engaged 
in the race against time to complete full DOTS coverage by March 2006 
(Seeberg 2014). In many places, DPs and lab technicians were trained in 
large numbers, but the system’s internal supervision and monitoring prac-
tices could not be uniformly sustained, at least not for an extended period 
 B IOSOCIAL DYNAMICS OF MULTIDRUG-RESISTANT TUBERCULOSIS 135
of time. The logic of the surveillance system focused on registering the 
moment at which the patient was supposed to swallow the tablets.
Hypothetically, one could imagine a different kind of monitoring 
system, one that not only registered ‘missed doses’ but that monitored 
the quality of the health system: days without the presence of a medi-
cal doctor or a lab technician due either to ‘other work’ (a euphemism 
commonly used for personal business elsewhere) or long-term vacan-
cies; periods with defective microscopes; lack of fuel for supervisors to 
conduct field visits; or periods where the DP would travel to other places, 
and so on. This kind of workplace monitoring would have its own practi-
cal, ethical and social problems, and supporting an underfunded public 
health system seems more important than adding new control mecha-
nisms. Still, it seems a valid point that the existing monitoring system 
was not designed to demonstrate the need to invest more resources in 
the public health system, and it failed to connect its structural shortcom-
ings more directly to the phenomenon of drug resistance. The ‘faults’ 
of ‘defaulters’ were given privileged visibility by the monitoring system 
and therefore in policy discussions, especially at the district and lower 
administrative levels, where the blame for health system inadequacies 
was typically directed (Seeberg 2014). In this configuration, the DOTS-
based ‘epidemic of antibiotics’ proved less fatal to TB bacteria than had 
been calculated, as the meeting with ground realities offered sufficient 
opportunities for M. TB to develop drug resistance.
If, despite the tremendous efforts and resources invested in the 
programme, the DOTS strategy failed to take into account the living 
conditions of and social dynamics between providers and patients on 
the ground, it also had another serious problem. The rapid expansion 
of DOTS did not take place in a context free from pre-existing TB treat-
ment. On the contrary, in an Indian health system dominated by com-
mercial health clinics, DOTS had primarily found its takers among poor 
patients in rural areas of India where government-run health clinics were 
fully or partially functional. In the large cities, government services at 
primary and secondary levels were largely absent and patients gener-
ally had to rely on commercial healthcare services. TB management in 
the commercial healthcare sector was, however, rather flawed. Uplekar 
and Shepard showed in 1991 that in Mumbai, 100 private practitioners 
prescribed 80 different regimens that were generally expensive and inef-
ficient (Uplekar and Shepard 1991). In 1998 the situation was largely 
unchanged (Uplekar et al. 1998). This situation contributed substantially 
to the development of MDRTB in India (Udwadia 2001). The booming 
pharmaceutical industry’s engagement with and monitoring of private 
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providers was the main driver of healthcare services in the commer-
cial sector (Kamat and Nichter 1997, 1998; Seeberg 2012). The Indian 
drug company Lupin, with a dominant market share in anti-TB drugs, 
had a substantial influence on ‘continued medical education’ in the com-
mercial sector, where doctors had few other options for keeping up to 
date with pharmaceutical developments. Ecks and Harper have shown 
that ‘big doctors’ (specialists, such as, pulmonologists) were opposed 
to DOTS because they considered the guidelines too inflexible for the 
management of individual patients: they saw a need to experiment in 
individual cases so as to reduce side effects and match dosage with the 
weight gain that typically accompanied successful treatment (Ecks and 
Harper 2013). General practitioners were less concerned with TB, since 
it was perceived as affecting only a small proportion of the cases they 
saw in their clinics. Therefore, they were less susceptible to the medical 
representatives’(MRs) ‘education’ about TB even if this, according to the 
MRs, might save doctors from engaging in malpractice (Ecks and Harper 
2013, 266–7). The vast population of registered (or rural) medical prac-
titioners (RMPs, often labelled ‘quacks’ by medically qualified doctors) 
also constituted an important outlet for Lupin’s medical representatives, 
as for most Indian-based drug companies, even if these practitioners did 
not ‘understand the quality’ of the medicines (Ecks and Harper 2013, 
267). While active TB infection was already disproportionally affecting 
the poor, the differential costs involved in consulting these practition-
ers clearly favoured opportunities for M. TB to develop drug resistance 
among poor patients, who had no option but to choose the short-term 
treatment of RMPs for economic reasons, unless they were enrolled in 
DOTS. Add to this the circulation of expired, substandard and spurious 
drugs in a potentially illegal medical economy with few or no quality 
checks in place among the non-specialised and non-qualified practition-
ers more often frequented by poor patients.
Especially in urban slums, it was difficult to implement DOTS 
(Seeberg 2013; Das 2015). Inhabitants had plenty of unpleasant expe-
riences with state representatives and often lived under a general fear 
of eviction, another bureaucratic constraint that could lead to treatment 
delay or treatment refusal, since proof of residence was a prerequisite for 
assigning a DP (Seeberg 2013). Furthermore, primary-level government 
health services were virtually non-existent in urban India. This meant 
that the health infrastructure was insufficient to support DOTS (Seeberg 
2012), working as it was against the systematic anti-DOTS campaign 
among practitioners in the commercial sector (Ecks and Harper 2013), 
further supported by MRs from companies who saw DOTS as a potential 
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threat to their business. In this context, with only around 0.25 per cent of 
medically qualified private practitioners involved, it was not surprising 
that the response of ‘public–private mix’, as a strategy to expand DOTS 
and control the unstandardised treatment regimes in the commercial 
health sector, had very limited success (Seeberg 2014). With a 46 per 
cent share of TB drugs in India, and with 74 per cent of the TB drugs con-
sumed in India being dispensed by the commercial health sector and only 
26 per cent by DOTS (Ecks and Harper 2013, 254), the dominant phar-
maceutical company Lupin seemed to ignore the rise of drug resistance 
in the interest of short-term profit rather than engaging in a long-term 
collaboration with the state to promote DOTS. This apparent strategy 
was pursued despite the consideration that changes in global treatment 
regimens are likely to develop faster than any single drug company can 
adapt to such change, thereby creating space for new and competing 
pharmaceutical companies to become dominant.
From the perspective of the TB bacteria, it is obviously immaterial 
whether the host is engaging with drugs that pass through the commer-
cial or public healthcare sector. From its perspective, this is one syndemic 
(Singer and Clair 2003) involving multiple contaminants distributed 
along socio-economic differentials among their hosts in their immediate 
organic environments. Viewing this as configuration rather than contam-
ination, however, the political and economic separation of these sectors 
works to optimise the opportunities for TB bacteria to develop resilience. 
Conversely, this has a negative impact in the form of an escalating epi-
demic of MDRTB as seen from a human perspective.
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis in India
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis is defined as drug resistance to at least 
two of the four first-line drugs used in standardised TB treatment. For 
an extended period during and after the expansion of DOTS, the GOI 
refuted that drug resistance among DOTS patients was a problem. Lack 
of access to diagnostic facilities to test for drug resistance allowed MDRTB 
to remain invisible. As these facilities became more accessible and with 
a growing number of alarming studies showing an escalation of MDRTB 
patients (for example, Almeida et al. 2003), the GOI eventually incor-
porated the so-called DOTS+ regimen in the TB control programme, 
following a ‘consensus statement’ issued jointly by the government and 
leading TB research centres in India on MDRTB in 2007 (Engel 2013). 
DOTS+ was not only much more expensive; with a treatment duration 
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of 2 years of chemotherapy, its management added exponentially to the 
complexity of an already complex public health intervention.
Furthermore, in India, because access to drug susceptibility test-
ing during the 1990s and 2000s had been poor, it was generally not 
known whether drug resistance or other factors caused treatment failure. 
Towards the end of this period, however, upgrading of laboratories and 
availability of medicines for patients who tested positive for drug resist-
ance, classified as CAT IV treatment, changed this situation in parts of 
India. This also led to dramatic changes in the figures involved: an esti-
mate of 99,000 new MDRTB cases annually by 2011 was quoted by a 
leading national expert (National DOTS+ Committee 2011). Compare 
this with figures saying that 4,217 patients had been placed on CAT IV 
treatment by end of 2009, of whom only 756 were alive 12 months later. 
The rapid expansion of the DOTS+ programme (meanwhile renamed 
to ‘programmatic management of drug-resistant TB’ (PMDT)) is visible 
when these figures are compared with the STOP TB India country profile 
for 2012, with 64,000 notified cases of MDRTB and 14,143 (22 per cent) 
patients started on MDRTB treatment (WHO 2014a).
The challenges posed by this iatrogenic epidemic for public health 
are formidable. Not only are individual patients and their families 
forced to realise that the kind of TB they have is very difficult to treat 
successfully and likely to cause individual death, household disaster and 
 community-level distress. The rise of MDRTB turns the image painted by 
the commercial healthcare sector of DOTS as a failed government pro-
gramme into a self-fulfilling prophecy, even if the commercial sector con-
tributed substantially to the development of drug resistance.
Lock and Nguyen have pointed to the ‘military-like organisation’ 
(not to mention, rhetoric) adopted in large-scale public health cam-
paigns developed in continuation of colonial medicine in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America (Lock and Nguyen 2010, 153). DOTS, with its strongly 
hierarchical organisation and emphasis on disciplining both patients and 
peripheral providers through supervision, monitoring and ‘motivation’, 
was an example of this. With its near-exclusive emphasis on drug deliv-
ery, the system was a carefully designed attack on TB bacteria. Patients 
were at best passive vessels through which the medicines had to pass, 
at worst obstacles to the success of the attack due to epidemiologically 
constructed risk factors of non-compliance such as being uneducated or 
consuming alcohol. Gradually, however, this medicine-centred approach 
was seen to conflict with rights-based approaches, which began to influ-
ence discourses about healthcare delivery globally. In particular, the 
need to address the TB–HIV syndemic brought into closer contact two 
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treatment systems that had hitherto viewed the issue of patient rights 
very differently. In India, confidentiality regarding information about TB 
patients was not routinely maintained at the community level; anybody 
in a village would be able to point a treatment supervisor to the house of 
a TB patient. At the same time, the discrepancy between policy changes 
and actual implementation was increasing, since ‘policy translation’ is a 
time-consuming process of negotiations, adaptations and (un)learning. 
Hence, while DOTS was rapidly being scaled up in India under the initial 
strategy, the then-new STOP TB strategy was being launched in Geneva 
in 2001. As DOTS reached national coverage in India, the Global Plan to 
Stop TB 2006–15 was published, calling for ‘human rights imperatives’ to 
be incorporated. However, the route from policy changes made in Geneva 
to the practising of TB treatment in a remote Indian village is very long.
Harper has pointed to a growing tension between problems with drug 
resistance and the patient-centred approach as advocated by the STOP TB 
partnership (Harper 2010). This tension was even more pronounced in 
connection with extensively drug-resistant TB (XDRTB), where additional 
resistance to second-line drugs made the disease untreatable in most set-
tings. The dramatic rise in drug-resistant strains of TB created a situation 
where not only the prognosis, but also the rights of patients could vary 
depending on the type of TB, while it remained difficult in some contexts 
to determine the existence and extent of drug resistance.
Disregarding the classificatory issues mentioned above as well as the 
other barriers to treatment initiation that sometimes occur with stand-
ard TB, all patients identified by the DOTS programme were presumably 
placed under DOTS treatment. According to the Patients’ Charter for TB 
Care, patients have a right to free and equitable access to services, includ-
ing treatment, care and information; and they also have the responsibil-
ity to comply with the prescribed treatment plan. However, in the face 
of MDRTB and XDRTB, documents originating from WHO have begun 
to discuss more restrictive measures, including a return to isolation 
practices and the consequent risk that such measures could jeopardise 
the treatment programme as a whole and add to the stigmatisation of 
patients (Harper 2010, 210).
Resistance-driven technologies
The DOTS+ strategy seemed unduly optimistic because it was essentially 
based on an idea of ‘more of the same’, i.e. more toxic drugs for a four-
times-longer period compared with the regimen that had failed in the first 
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place. Dr Mel Spigelman, President and CEO of the Global Alliance for TB 
Drug Development (TB Alliance), talking in 2014 about the promises of a 
new drug combination going into phase three clinical trials, stated: 
Many of the problems with today’s MDRTB treatment are due to the 
fact the regimens were assembled as an emergency reaction to the 
problem – an approach of treating patients with the ‘kitchen sink’ 
of available drugs to find something that works [and] an approach 
whereby you throw what you have, flawed as it may be, at the prob-
lem and hope for the best. (Prasad 2014)
This may be seen as a somewhat arrogant description, given the substan-
tial resources that had gone into convincing governments that DOTS+ 
was the necessary answer to the MDRTB epidemic and into the subse-
quent revamping of the programme in order to enable the system to apply 
this ‘kitchen sink approach’. Nevertheless, Spigelman illustrates that the 
response to the crisis of MDRTB was one of more drugs, rather than one 
of addressing health-system failures leading to the development of drug 
resistance in the first place.
One would like to share the optimism that the answer to drug 
resistance is new drugs: that we can solve the problem with yet another 
technological fix. One of the most prominent candidates for such new 
treatment, according to Bill Gates in 2014, and depending on the out-
come of phase three trials partially funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, was a new combination therapy known as PaMZ. This 
regimen was linked to promises to reduce treatment periods for TB to 
4 months and for (susceptible) DRTB to 6 months, with fewer tablets 
to take for patients (Gates 2014). Both were important dimensions of 
potentially less troublesome treatment regimens. But two years later, TB 
Alliance decided to close enrolment to the trial in favour of a more prom-
ising Bedaquiline trial known as BPaMZ. Important as new anti-TB medi-
cines are, they are also goods circulating in the economy of technological 
hope; by contrast, improvements of the public health infrastructure with 
well-established positive effects remain underfunded.7
The role of the phages in the above discussion was to launch the idea 
that from a bacterial perspective, anti-TB medicines could be seen as an 
epidemic of contamination, that the bacteria had to relate to in order to 
either die, survive as self, or transform into a new (drug- resistant) strain. 
However, phages too may become medicine. The landscape of phages 
could constitute another potential frontier for treatment- orientated 
developments. Phage-based therapies have been tested in treatment of 
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MDRTB patients in some countries of the former Soviet Union, where 
the breakdown of the health system in the wake of the collapse in 1989 
of the state, along with abysmal conditions and treatment practices in 
prisons, resulted in widespread drug-resistant TB (Farmer 2001). Phage 
therapies have the theoretical advantage over standard antibiotics that 
they target specific bacteria and, therefore, do not have the generalised 
negative impact on the bacterial fauna that antibiotics have; indeed, for 
the same reason they are self-limiting – they can only exist in the body 
for as long as the host cell is present. Problems include high immuno-
genicity that may result in their rapid clearing by the body, as well as 
the risk of production of high levels of endotoxins from lysed bacteria.8 
However, addressing such biotechnical issues is generally not considered 
interesting by a pharmaceutical industry that is nervous about intellec-
tual property rights, given that phage therapy has been used in the pub-
lic domain for a century and that individual phages are unlikely to be 
patentable (Clark and March 2006). Thus, a major obstacle to pursuing 
this potentially less harmful and more specific (although, so far, not very 
effective) treatment directed at a major health problem is that it does not 
fit the dominant business model of present-day global health financial-
ism (Erikson 2012, 2015).
Using the standard treatment in environments with high but 
unknown levels of Rifampicin and Isoniazid resistance can lead to the 
so-called ‘amplifier effect’, whereby resistance to the other first-line drugs 
develops faster (Harper 2010), since the effect of having a combination 
of four drugs in this situation is significantly reduced. For this reason, 
the difficulties involved in testing for MDRTB combined with a uniform 
approach to DOTS implementation in a context such as India, in which 
most commercial-sector TB treatment is insufficient, has in itself poten-
tially contributed to fuelling the MDRTB epidemic. Therefore, WHO 
approval in 2011 of a new technology to rapidly test for resistance to 
Rifampicin, known as Xpert MTB/RIF, which reduces the time for such 
testing from months to hours, was met with high expectations. The 
machine was designed for district-level implementation and was rolled 
out worldwide with support from USAID and the Gates Foundation, 
among others. The number of machines distributed in this approach has 
become a measure of success in itself. As pointed out by Adams, global 
health ‘envision[s] a world in which, interventions can be mapped out 
as problems of scale and measurement (or specifically as counting prac-
tices) rather than as problems of custom, culture or national political will’ 
(Adams 2016, 6). Riding the hope of improved TB control, such inter-
ventions allow for the continuation of an exclusively pharma-technical 
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understanding and management of what should in fact be regarded as a 
biosocial complex, with very selective and specialised ‘vertical’ support 
mechanisms to health systems in dire need of general strengthening 
(Biehl and Petryna 2013).
Between nature and culture
The initial treatment standards of DOTS, with at least 70 per cent case 
detection and 85 per cent treatment completion, held out the promise that 
the caseload of TB would be reduced by half in a decade. This bioeconomic 
calculation shaped the projections of a regimen onto the complex dynam-
ics of daily living for TB patients, health providers and bacteria alike. 
Among the many thousands of people involved in TB treatment globally, 
two interpretations of these standards can be imagined. One interpretation 
sees such targets as minimal quality criteria that must be fulfilled by any TB 
control programme. However, an alternative interpretation sees these as 
programme targets to be achieved. The two inter pretations thrive along-
side one another, even if target-orientated systems tend to favour the latter. 
A central question concerned the remaining 15 per cent of patients whose 
treatment completion was, so to speak, outside the target. The production 
of so-called ‘defaulters’ was a by- product of this target (Seeberg 2014), 
explained through the projection of certain characteristics (for example, 
being male, alcoholic, uneducated) onto systemic programme failure. For 
many years, this contributed to the configuration of the MDRTB syndemic 
by establishing a reservoir of TB cells that had better chances of developing 
drug resistance among those human hosts least able to follow the standard 
TB treatment, much less treatment for MDRTB.
From the perspective of the TB cell, medical treatment is a poten-
tially fatal source of toxic contamination. The DOTS programme was a 
pandemic of such contamination, configured in particular ways that 
 varied according to context. I have focused on India; but within India, 
configurations of DOTS varied across state and district boundaries, social 
classes, castes, gendered inequities, urban and rural settings, households, 
and individual patients, as well as density and performance of both gov-
ernment and private-for-profit providers. The projection of DOTS as 
a universal TB control programme and its rapid expansion in need of a 
one-size-fits-all logic was blind to the political economy of which it was 
itself a part. The relevance, if not the existence, of all these variations was 
forcefully denied. Revised global and national TB control strategies may 
have strengthened their focus on both DRTB and patient rights in certain 
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limited ways, but in contexts of serious resource constraints in govern-
ment health facilities as well as in the households of most TB patients, it 
is likely that M. TB will continue to find successful ways to engage with 
the pandemic of medical contamination. Indeed, in this Waddington-like 
landscape (see Lock, this volume; Petryna, this volume), it seems likely 
that TB cells will continue to produce drug resistance faster than biomed-
icine can ‘mutate’ into new drugs and renew the efficacy of treatment. 
From this perspective, new drugs – and global access to them – may buy 
some time for humans in the ongoing engagement with bacteria such as 
M. TB. Biomedical optimism holds that this time will be sufficient for bio-
technology to develop new vaccines of high potency, thereby solving the 
problem of antibiotic drug resistance en route to ‘End TB’. While we wait 
to see what is on the ‘blindsided’ fold of this hopeful horizon (see Petryna, 
this volume), beginning to understand the biosocial dimensions of TB 
could help us to prepare better for yet another disappointment, perhaps 
even to learn from past failures about how to take the life circumstances of 
patients, providers and bacteria seriously when trying to help the former.
Notes
1. The latter have inspired therapeutic use of mycobacteriophages against TB, but this remains 
difficult and controversial and is so far only approved in medicinal form for treatment of MDRTB 
in Russia and Ukraine. Recently, more attention has been given to the diagnostic potential of 
mycobacteriophages in detection of drug-resistant strains of TB.
2. Multidrug-resistant TB (MDRTB) and extensively drug-resistant TB (XDRTB) are sometimes 
grouped as DRTB, which is any form of drug-resistant TB.
3. Certain aspects of DOTS have also changed over time.
4. Earlier during the DOTS programme, three drugs were administered during the continuation 
phase.
5. An ‘alcoholic’ in India is not necessarily a person who has a dependency problem; often, it is 
a label conveying moral disapproval of any person who consumes alcohol, irrespective of the 
frequency and amount of intake. While often used among DPs and treatment supervisors in 
programme implementation, the concept is rarely defined, even when used in scientific articles 
about ‘defaulting’ in India.
6. Recently, this was changed to a daily treatment regime in the national TB strategy, even if this 
change takes time to be fully implemented.
7. Bedaquiline has subsequently proven to be an important new drug in the treatment of DRTB.
8. Lysis is the breaking apart of the cell wall and subsequent expulsion of cell content.
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Chapter 7
When Sickness Comes in Multiples: 
Co-morbidity in Botswana
Julie Livingston
Introduction: Situations of complexity
Biology is often assumed to determine much about how illness and med-
icine are experienced. Yet what are we to make of situations in which 
biology points in multiple directions simultaneously? Botswana, like 
many places, is rife with co-infection and co-morbidity. The complexity is 
overwhelming. Simultaneous epidemics of tuberculosis (TB), HIV/AIDS, 
and cancer are deeply entangled and fuelling one another in this small 
Southern African nation. There are also ongoing epidemics of diabetes 
and hypertension to consider as well (Young et al. 2009; Haregu et al. 
2012).1 The situation is creating great challenges for both patients and 
their clinicians. They are seeking diagnosis and treatment in a health sys-
tem whose institutional and intellectual architecture was to some extent 
designed to separate these three disease categories even as health plan-
ners and clinicians alike recognise how TB, HIV, and cancer continually 
clot back together, aggregating in the human body, clinical thought, and 
the social imaginary. The challenges are compounded by the potential for 
a silent or latent stage of each disease, the nature of AIDS as a disease of 
co-infection, the plurality of disease contained under the rubric of can-
cer, the historical freight of TB in the region, and the dissonance brought 
by the relative novelty of cancer in the country.
This kind of complex epidemiological landscape calls our analytical 
capacities into question. It troubles disease-centred social and medical 
science. It is local biology that at once threatens and reveals the taxo-
nomic project at every level of iteration (see Lock and Nguyen 2010 this 
volume for an extended discussion of local biology).
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It is not that disease specificity, that legacy of the bacteriological 
revolution, is absent entirely. Historians use the term ‘disease specificity’ 
to refer to a fundamental transition in medical reasoning that took place 
over the course of the nineteenth century. Charles Rosenberg (2002, 
242) explains: ‘In traditional [Western] medicine, disease concepts were 
focused on the individual sufferer. They were symptom orientated, fluid, 
idiosyncratic, labile, and prognosis orientated. Diseases were seen as 
points in time, transient moments during a process that could follow any 
one of a variety of possible trajectories.’ By the early twentieth century, 
this idea had given way to ‘the more abstract notion of disease entity 
as ideal type abstracted from its particular manifestations. A legitimate 
disease had both a characteristic clinical course and a [discrete, causa-
tive] mechanism.’ However, while this sense remains, the presence of co- 
morbidities mean that the complexities of experience must be continually 
and artificially disentangled and sorted along biological, institutional, 
and intellectual grids in order to support such analytics. Clinical deci-
sion making around drug and radiation dosage, timing, and interactions 
necessitates great care in a medical system that is overwhelmed by the 
volume of patients and their biological intricacies. The stable, normative 
biomedical body within which disease is imagined, is not available. Nor 
are the ontological certainties that separate diseases from one another. In 
some cases, the ontological barriers make little sense: Kaposi’s  sarcoma 
(KS) in women is so extremely rare that it is almost thought not to exist 
without HIV, so are these two diseases or one? However, the political, 
economic, moral, and institutional projects that arise around specific dis-
eases continue to matter tremendously.
Here is a quick glimpse at what that complexity looked like 10 years 
ago, in January 2007. At the time I was working as an ethnographer in 
the oncology service in Princess Marina Hospital, Botswana’s central 
referral hospital, located in the capital city, Gaborone. I made the follow-
ing entry in my field notes.
A woman arrives dizzy and weeping. We see her sitting on the floor 
by the waiting bench and Dr P, the oncologist, has her put into a 
bed. She is very miserable. There is a man accompanying her. Is this 
her husband? Brother? She has HIV. Her CD4 is 251 and she is not 
yet on antiretroviral therapy. They have been treating her for TB for 
one month even though she has two purple KS lesions in her mouth 
and a big one on her arm and her lung x-ray shows the symmetrical, 
butterfly shaped pattern that is typical of KS. Dr P does a fine needle 
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aspiration from the swelling in her neck to see if maybe she also has 
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, but meanwhile, given the urgency of her 
lungs, will begin chemotherapy for the KS.
Or another from that same month.
A man arrives on a stretcher. It turns out this patient is a nurse. He 
is in his late 20s and has HIV, TB, and KS – three wasting diseases. 
He is gaunt. He arrives from one of the provincial hospitals via 
the dental clinic, brought by Dr O, the maxillofacial surgeon, who 
wants Dr P to have a look. This patient has defaulted chemotherapy 
twice and he has big KS lesions inside his mouth, Dr O explains. 
No. The nursing assistant who has accompanied the patient from 
the provincial hospital corrects Dr O. This man has been hospital-
ised since June so it can’t be his fault if he ‘defaulted’. Now he is 
being referred by the doctor at the provincial hospital who is asking 
for a resection. But, as Dr O says ‘No way – you can’t cut KS out, 
it will bleed like mad’ (KS, like other sarcomas is a very vascular 
cancer). Dr P agrees. They are frustrated with the doctors back at 
the provincial hospital, as is the nursing assistant. The patient will 
need to begin chemotherapy for a third time. The next day he was 
back, now accompanied by a nurse. It turns out he has multidrug- 
resistant TB (MDRTB). Dr P says to put him outside on the veranda 
where the ultraviolet light from the sun will kill the bacteria, while 
he waits for his chemo, but no one does it. Instead the stretcher is 
in the crowded hallway where cancer patients sit waiting for their 
chemotherapy and clinic appointments.
As you can see, some patients arrive in Botswana’s oncology ward suffer-
ing from HIV, KS and TB. Some patients have been on TB treatment for 
months to no avail, before they are able to get the cancer in their lungs 
diagnosed, while others have to let their cancer wait while hopefully their 
TB and HIV are brought under control enough to give them the strength 
to undergo chemotherapy. Some patients have scar tissue in their lungs 
from previous TB infections, which increases their susceptibility to lung 
cancer (Vento and Lanzafame 2011). Sometimes the oncologist (who in 
the time of my research also served as the ward cytologist) finds lym-
phoma cells and TB bacilli in the same lymph node. Some HIV patients 
are co-infected with cancers, meaning they have multiple malignancies 
at once and of course some patients have cancer and TB but not HIV.
 WHEN SICKNESS COMES IN MULTIPLES:  CO-MORBIDITY IN BOTSWANA 149
This chapter uses the particular vantage point of the cancer ward 
to try to understand how the meaning of co-morbidity and the densi-
ties of entanglement between HIV, TB, and cancers shift over time and 
across scale in this context of intersecting and accumulating epidemics. 
Epidemic multi-morbidity challenges the institutional capacity of the 
health service, the intellectual and technical capacity of hospital and cli-
nicians, and the social, emotional and existential capacities of patients 
and relatives. In this way, it provides a key site for elucidating biosocial 
complexities and the need to refuse any false separation between nature 
and culture (see Lock, this volume) at all scales of analysis. For exam-
ple, in the case of co-morbidity in Botswana, ethnographic attention to 
the medical institution as social environment further reveals contradic-
tions between biomedical reasoning and the institutional organisation of 
both the hospital and larger health system. The biology with which the 
co-morbid patient lives is in contradiction to the environment designed 
to heal her. Ethnographic methods reveal the dilemma of the biosocial 
patient and the limits of the biological purchase of the clinician.
In what follows, even as I pursue the logic of co-infection, and given 
that approximately 40 per cent of the patients who arrive at the cancer 
ward are HIV negative, I also want to push a bit against an easy assump-
tion that HIV is the index disease around which TB and cancers appear 
as co-morbidities (Valderas et al. 2009). While the production of knowl-
edge (not to mention the political and funding impetus) in Botswana 
is to some extent organised around HIV, and while there is great truth 
to understanding HIV as a disease of co-infection, a model that overly 
privileges HIV is too limited to capture the complexities on the ground. 
Viewing cancer in Botswana mainly as an epidemic of co-infection risks 
subsuming the politics of oncology within those of HIV, even as they point 
in somewhat different, if overlapping directions. Cancer (like TB) asks us 
to think about labour migration in terms of occupational health and not 
only as the historical structuring force behind contemporary sexual and 
care-giving norms. It points to questions of toxicity and environmental 
health and cancer shifts the economic dynamics of the pharmaceuticali-
sation of public health (Biehl 2007).
I also want to push back against an assumption that co- infection, 
rather than co-morbidity is what matters. The majority of diabetic 
patients in Botswana are also hypertensive. While this relationship is often 
explained by its predication on shared risk factors (obesity, physical inac-
tivity) what are the results of diabetic and hypertensive  co- morbidity? 
What meaning does this articulation have for the patient who must attend 
two clinics, manage two pharmaceutical regimes, etc.? Or, given that not 
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all cancers have an infection component, what might it mean to rethink our 
taxonomy of infectious versus non-infectious disease? How might upend-
ing taxonomy help us to contemplate the presence of HIV in patients on 
antiretrovirals? These are persons whose viral load is contained so well as 
to be negligible in terms of transmission, even as the effects of the drugs 
themselves are somatic and enduring, and whose sexual activity nonethe-
less proceeds under the sign of HIV. What if as a thought experiment, and 
given the high rates of diabetes in Botswana, we reimagined this epide-
miological landscape as one united around metabolism, tumour necrosis 
factor and wasting, rather than privileging the paradigm of infection? Or 
what if we rethought diabetes and hypertension as an epidemiology signif-
icantly determined through vascularity rather than through obesity? What 
happens if we triangulate dyadic diabetic and hypertensive co- morbidity 
through HIV, recognising that HIV infection raises rates of both? Might 
foregrounding co- morbidity open new sightlines in aspects of disease 
and illness that are currently overdetermined by the infectious disease 
paradigm?
Such thought experiments abound once one gives them free rein. 
What I am suggesting is that by paying attention to patient experiences 
and to clinician’s frustrations at the contradictions that they must navi-
gate, one finds places where the human body overspills or does not quite 
fit biomedical categories. These experiences can thereby be the basis for 
biomedical theorisation or question raising. As the editors of this volume 
observe in their introduction, and as the chapters demonstrate, anthro-
pological perspectives on biosociality can speak to and resituate biologi-
cal inquiry and practice in vital ways.
Botswana is a middle-income country with an agentive and  forward- 
thinking ministry of health. For nearly 50 years, the post-independence 
state has steadily invested in infrastructure and social services, develop-
ing capacity in their system of universal healthcare. However, Botswana 
is not without its problems. While the GDP has gradually risen over the 
past four decades, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
estimates that about a third of Batswana (as citizens of Botswana are 
called) live below the poverty line, as the gap between rich and poor 
expands across the globe (Republic of Botswana and United Nations 
2010). Quality of care and capacity remain a problem as the health system 
struggles to keep up with a challenging national epidemiological profile. 
Human resources and technological capacity are uneven and strained, 
and as in many medical systems, bureaucratic requirements often ham-
per delivery of efficient, effective care. Nonetheless, given the degree of 
state commitment to health, in recent years Botswana has become one 
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site in the region where new health policies and clinical modalities are 
developed and piloted, including most notably, the first public antiretro-
viral programme on the African continent. From Botswana, we can begin 
to see the thicket of intellectual, infrastructural, technical, and social 
 challenges posed by the complicated relationship between ongoing epi-
demics of cancer, HIV, and TB.
I observed the brief scenes described above only 5 years into the 
start and scale up of Botswana’s public antiretroviral programme. From 
its inception in 2002, the national programme triaged enrolment on 
antiretroviral therapy, to ensure that the sickest patients were covered 
first and then gradually scaled up from there. In 2007, the criteria for 
initiating Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) for a Motswana 
patient with a confirmed HIV diagnosis, were a CD4 count of 200 or 
below or an AIDS defining condition as established by the US Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC). In 2008, the threshold was raised to a CD4 count 
of 250 (and has continued to scale up to the current level of 350) and a 
shift was made from CDC clinical staging to WHO staging. In both stag-
ing systems, the presence of KS, invasive cervical cancer, non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma, and/or TB (pulmonary or extra-pulmonary) indicated that 
HAART should be initiated regardless of CD4 count, though as we can see 
from my ethnographic vignettes, in practice this was not always done.
January 2007 also marked 5 years into the opening of the can-
cer ward and the beginnings of public oncology care in Botswana. The 
Botswana Ministry of Health had anticipated that the new antiretrovi-
ral programme would amplify the effects of HIV/cancer co-infection and 
so they planned accordingly. As HIV undermines the immune system, it 
makes patients more susceptible to a range of virus-associated cancers – 
most notably KS, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, genital cancers, head and 
neck tumours, and other lymphomas. Before antiretrovirals were pro-
vided, AIDS patients with these cancers often died fairly rapidly from 
other opportunistic infections. But now as patients were put onto HAART, 
they began to survive longer, but with a new set of complications brought 
by their cancer. Experience in the US also shows that patients who do 
not have a cancer when beginning their antiretroviral treatment, none-
theless appear to develop cancers at higher rates over time even if they 
remain on antiretrovirals (Shiels et al. 2011). Botswana’s lone oncology 
service was set up in a separate part of the central referral hospital from 
the Infectious Disease Care Clinic (IDCC) (as the HIV clinics in Botswana 
are called), and yet in some sense also as a response or supplement to it.
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Botswana’s epidemiology of co-infection
Since the mid-1990s, Botswana has had one of the highest rates of 
HIV prevalence globally. A national survey in 2008 indicated an HIV 
 prevalence of 17.6 per cent among the general population and a 40 per 
cent prevalence among people aged 30–44 years. In 2009, an estimated 
331,000 people were infected with HIV, and there were over 8,700 HIV/
AIDS-related deaths, and an estimated 18,000 new infections annually 
in this nation of 2 million citizens (Republic of Botswana 2011, 6). TB 
rates have also been consistently high since the mid-1990s. In 2008, Bot-
swana had the sixth highest TB rate globally (536 per 100,000). As part 
of this unfolding epidemic, the rates of  multidrug-resistant TB (MDRTB) 
are also rising, with a reported ‘increase in new cases of MDRTB from 0.2 
per cent in 1995 to 2.5 per cent in 2008’ (Republic of Botswana Ministry 
of Health 2011, 8). Meanwhile, rates of cancer are also on the increase. 
Botswana has been building its cancer registry for the past decade, but 
its capacity for diagnosing and counting cancers remains much thinner 
than the  epidemiological apparatus necessary for counting TB and HIV. 
Therefore,  figures for cancers are necessarily more tentative than those 
for HIV or TB. Nonetheless, we know that 8,494 cancers were diagnosed 
between 2003 and 2008 (Dryden- Peterson et al. 2012; Suneja et al. 
2013). We can be fairly certain this is an under-reporting of the true bur-
den of cancer in the country.
A dense picture emerges from tracing connections between these 
figures. In a revealing limitation of logic in the health system (one 
I am told that the Ministry of Health is actively seeking to change), 
I  could not find figures for TB/cancer co-morbidity, or for TB/cancer/
HIV  multi-morbidity, only for dyadic co-infections with HIV.2 Recent, 
 preliminary studies suggest that over 60 per cent of Botswana’s cancer 
patients are co-infected with HIV (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2012; Suneja 
et al. 2013). They also suggest that even as patients are initiated onto 
HAART with relatively higher CD4 counts (remember the rise from 200 
to 350), high rates of cancer persist. While rates of KS are dropping 
slightly, those for non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and HPV-related cancers 
have risen.3 Meanwhile, epidemiological research in Botswana suggests 
HIV  co- infection rates of 60–80 per cent in patients with active TB.
‘Moreover,’ researchers in Botswana have noted, ‘the clinical 
 presentation and natural history of TB differs between HIV positive and 
negative individuals. People living with HIV are more likely to be sputum 
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smear negative and have atypical clinical and radiographic evidence of 
TB disease, especially with advanced immune suppression. Treatment of 
patients with TB/HIV is also challenging, due to the frequency of immune 
reconstitution inflammatory syndrome (TB–IRIS), drug interactions and 
toxicity’ (Republic of Botswana Ministry of Health 2011, 9). The same 
could be said for atypical clinical presentations of cancers in HIV positive 
people as well as the problem of drug interactions and toxicity. This is an 
epidemiology that resituates the ‘normal’ body.
The situation in Botswana is this. There are three epidemics at 
present: TB, HIV/AIDS and cancer. One of these epidemics is emergent 
(cancers). One is the resurgence of a long-standing problem (TB). One 
is an epidemic of co-infection (HIV) that acts as an accelerant and an 
amplifier of the other two, even as it generates an unstable clinical profile 
among co-infected patients. Meanwhile the other two (TB and cancers) 
also enjoy a synergy independent of HIV. The epidemic and historically 
familiar nature of TB causes a misrecognition and thereby delayed (or 
absent) diagnosis of many cancers. Yet the presence of an oncologist who 
does fine needle aspirations facilitates the diagnosis of extra-pulmonary 
TB. The public health apparatus and resources brought by one epidemic 
(HIV) facilitate and force the recognition of the other two epidemics. 
However, the configuration of the health service makes co-morbidity dif-
ficult to manage – and parses infections by citizenship. Non-citizens are 
covered by the national programme for TB, but unlike Batswana they are 
not otherwise covered under the system of universal care and so they 
must pay for antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) and oncology out of pocket. In 
order to understand the syndemic roots of the situation (Singer 2009; 
Meinert and Whyte, this volume), let me step back and explain how this 
problem has unfolded over time in the briefest of terms. What we will see 
is a field of synergistic complexity and widespread distress similar to the 
case described by Meinert and Whyte (this volume) in Uganda, in which 
caregiving resources are overstretched, existential angst is widespread, 
and no one therapeutic domain is sufficient to apprehend, much less tend 
to, the syndemic field.
Tuberculosis: The colonial epidemic
Tuberculosis was the great scourge of Southern Africa, including Bot-
swana (previously Bechuanaland) for much of the twentieth century. 
European observers in the nineteenth century had remarked on the seem-
ing absence of consumption/phthisis in the region, but this would soon 
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change. In the late nineteenth century, the British colonised Bechuanal-
and and eventually ran the country as a migrant labour reserve for the 
South African mining industry, a labour regime structured by the institu-
tionalised racism that would reach its fullest expression under apartheid. 
As historian Randall Packard has described, in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries the mines became an engine for the introduc-
tion and then dissemination of TB, which reached epidemic proportions 
in places like Bechuanaland by the 1930s (Packard 1989).
Tuberculosis remained endemic at very high rates even after 
Botswana gained its independence in 1966. The new nation inherited a 
handful of mission hospitals and clinics, but essentially had to build a 
health system from the ground up. By the 1970s and 1980s, a now inde-
pendent Botswana had developed enough reach in its new primary care 
system to begin expanding access to antibiotics for TB patients. In 1975 
they launched the National Tuberculosis Control Programme, introduc-
ing short-course chemotherapy in 1986, which was already making sig-
nificant progress when they began implementing the directly observed 
treatment, short course (DOTS) therapy in 1993. The annual risk of infec-
tion declined from 5.8 per cent in 1956 to 0.1 per cent in 1989 (Republic 
of Botswana Ministry of Health 2007, 11). Tuberculosis notification rates 
declined from 506/100,000 in 1975 to less than half that figure by the 
end of the 1980s. Undoubtedly, this decline in TB rates was also facili-
tated by rising incomes and expanding social welfare programmes which 
together meant a rise in general nutrition. Unfortunately, this decline in 
TB was short lived. As outlined above, TB rates soon began to rise again 
in the face of widespread HIV infection, but the point here is that TB pol-
icy was foundational to the public health system in the country.
As I have described elsewhere, the history of TB was a fraught one 
in Botswana. Fuelled by, and mapping onto, a migrant labour economy 
that separated husbands and wives, parents and their grown sons, the 
TB epidemic shaped a moral imagination that scrutinised and patholo-
gised women’s sexual and maternal behaviour. Improper sexuality (often 
an issue of timing and purification) was understood to produce illness 
in children and partners, even as the migrant labour economy exposed 
women to overwhelming caregiving burdens and extreme economic vul-
nerability. The symptoms of pulmonary TB overlapped with those of a 
Tswana disease thibamo that resulted from the violation of sexual and 
parenting expectations (in terms of timing of liaisons, modes of purifica-
tion, etc.) and thereby carried some moral tinge.
Meanwhile, throughout the colonial and post-colonial period, the 
biomedical establishment focused on pulmonary TB when designing 
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diagnostic, preventive, epidemiological and therapeutic interventions 
(Livingston 2005). Yet in the mid-1950s, extra-pulmonary TB accounted 
for fully a third of registered cases of TB. Extra-pulmonary TB has con-
tinued to account for a significant portion of the known burden of TB 
infection in Botswana, despite an epidemiological system premised on 
sputum smears and x-ray technology that is designed to identify and 
count pulmonary cases.
HIV/AIDS: The epidemic of national existential 
emergency
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Southern Africa was seeded through the high 
mobility and economic inequality of the population which began under 
the colonial migrant labour system. It built upon its legacy of sexual sus-
picion and overwhelmed caregiving networks. Like the TB epidemic that 
preceded it, HIV/AIDS too hit people in their prime. Young children, 
young adults, and the middle-aged formed the bulk of the patient pop-
ulation. Despite preventive efforts by the Botswana Ministry of Health, 
by the mid-1990s, the epidemiological scale of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
had overwhelmed the health service which was designed to prioritise 
primary care. Hospitals, clinics, and private homes buckled under the 
weight of long-term, terminal illness. HIV brought TB back with a venge-
ance. Within a few years of the declared success of the national TB pro-
gramme, the disease was palpably present and its prevalence escalated 
at an alarming rate. Meanwhile, the scope and scale of illness and death 
presented a grave moral crisis within the country and an existential crisis 
for the nation itself.
In 2002, when Botswana began its national antiretroviral pro-
gramme, TB had already resurged and gained visibility as an epidemic of 
co-infection. Batswana to some extent made sense of HIV/AIDS through 
older understandings of existential crisis, epidemic, latent infection, 
and toxic sexuality through their historical experience with pulmonary 
TB/thibamo. These ideas were further fed by public health messages 
about sexual dangers and dirty blood. The incredibly high death rates 
amplified and added new vital dimensions to the problems of social tox-
icity associated with the disease as families and communities struggled 
to make sense of and cope with the impossibly high volume of death and 
caregiving needs in their midst.
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The Botswana government, reeling from the scale of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, publicly feared the long-term viability of the nation (Mogae 
2001). By the mid-1990s, the government had already begun to parlay 
this epidemiological crisis into new transnational research partnerships 
and investments, successfully marketing themselves as a clinical research 
and training hub. Over time, the government would expand these part-
nerships significantly, first around TB and then HIV/AIDS and then even-
tually cancer.
The new ARV programme, at once a political and a public health 
innovation, introduced the question of citizenship directly into the heart 
of Botswana’s public health system. It did so just at a moment when high 
numbers of undocumented immigrants were arriving in Botswana flee-
ing economic and political collapse in neighbouring Zimbabwe. Whereas 
TB treatment had long been extended to immigrants in accordance with 
WHO recommendations, access to free care in the new ARV programme 
(like other medical services in the country) was limited to those who 
could provide proof of citizenship. Over time, experience with the ARV 
programme, like the TB programme a generation earlier, began to pro-
duce a cautious, and no doubt fragile therapeutic optimism among many 
patients and relatives, and an attendant politics around expanded access 
to biomedical technologies.
Cancer: The emerging epidemic
While there were well-documented cases of cancer in Bechuanaland/
Botswana going back to the mid-century, the disease was not well accom-
modated by the public medical system until the cancer ward in Princess 
Marina Hospital (PMH) was opened in late 2001. Before this, patients 
with diagnosed cancers were either sent to Zimbabwe (previously a site 
of high quality medicine) or South Africa for oncology treatment, and/
or sent home to be tended by family until death. However, in the face of 
the escalating HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the new ARV programme, and 
with cervical cancer gaining increased international attention, Botswana 
developed a new oncology service in PMH (Livingston 2012). This was 
quickly expanded through a domestic public–private partnership with 
the Gaborone Private Hospital, which the Ministry of Health supported 
in their bid to acquire and run the national radiotherapy service. Eventu-
ally, access to clinical oncology was expanded to the north of the country 
 WHEN SICKNESS COMES IN MULTIPLES:  CO-MORBIDITY IN BOTSWANA 157
as well. An oncologist from China was brought, through a bilateral agree-
ment, to work in the medical ward of Botswana’s second referral hospi-
tal, which served that region.
The development of an oncology service enhanced diagnostic 
capacity for cancers in the country. Not only were the expected can-
cers among patients with HIV now emerging in growing numbers, but 
also a significant HIV negative patient population began arriving at the 
PMH oncology ward, and soon the service was overwhelmed by patient 
volume. In recent years, efforts have begun to train doctors in the pri-
mary and provincial hospitals to diagnose and treat routine cases of KS, 
and efforts are underway to diagnose and treat cervical cancers early 
through new see-and-treat technology beyond the two referral hospitals. 
However, for the most part, cancer diagnosis remains highly centralised 
and the pace, volume, and quality of cancer diagnoses (which in turn 
feeds into epidemiological knowledge) is constrained by the limits of lab-
oratory, surgical, and imaging capacity in the country.
The combination of a centralised and over-stretched diagnostic capac-
ity, the lack of screening services (except for new cervical cancer screening 
programmes for HIV positive women), bottle-necks in the referral system, 
the novelty of the disease category in the country, and the problem of co- 
infection with HIV, which both makes cancers more aggressive and also lim-
its treatment options, means that the majority of cancers are diagnosed at 
an already late stage (stage 3 or 4), and mortality rates are high.
It is now possible to see that the epidemic of HIV clarifies the pres-
ence of the co-morbidity. HIV makes cancer visible – institutionally and 
epidemiologically. It has also made TB visible again after a period of dor-
mancy. Meanwhile, the presence of an oncologist/cytologist in the hos-
pital who performs fine needle aspirations on swollen lymph nodes helps 
to diagnose extra-pulmonary TB, thereby making it more visible. Yet at 
the same time, the epidemic of TB often delays or confounds the diagnos-
ing of cancer, since most clinical staff have rightly learned to suspect TB 
when faced with persistent cough and wasting, or swollen lymph nodes. 
There are three vertical programmes in the health system one for each of 
these diseases, even as each programme acknowledges and attempts to 
grapple with the problem of co-infection.
Receiving a differential diagnosis
Within the oncology clinic, historical experiences begin to layer onto one 
another. Though there have long been cancers in Botswana, the novelty 
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of oncology combined with the rapidly emerging epidemic scale of mor-
bidity make the disease category a protean one in the popular imagina-
tion. Patients make sense of their cancer through historical experiences 
of TB and HIV/AIDS. In 2006, 2007 and 2008, this meant that TB was 
known, shameful and feared, while cancer was neutral. It also meant that 
relatives often assumed cancer patients really had HIV, when they might 
actually not, and it meant that patients with HIV who were now receiv-
ing a cancer diagnosis at first might not understand that this was an 
entirely separate disease with which they were now additionally faced. 
These ideas were further confused by the regular blood counts that were 
taken for cancer patients, since neutropenia meant that a scheduled 
dose of chemotherapy would have to be delayed. Such routinised tests 
and the continual talk of the strength of the patient’s blood, made can-
cer resonate with clinical practice and communication around HIV. Key 
symptoms – lumps, wasting, coughing and dyspnea – meanwhile, also 
resonated with TB.
Over time, cancer is gradually becoming more familiar in popular 
experience, so these dynamics are in flux. However, here is how they 
appeared in my field notes from the oncology clinic in 2007 and 2008.
A young woman with enlarged lymph nodes comes for a second fine 
needle aspiration. Before beginning the procedure, Dr P thinks it 
looks like TB and tells her this. She gets very upset and begins to 
cry. She has had a fever for a few days now. Dr P reassures her, ‘TB is 
good it can be treated. It is better then kankere (cancer). In 6 months 
you are cured.’ Perhaps the fever is part of what is making her so 
emotional.
A young guy comes in to collect the results of his fine needle aspi-
ration. He speaks excellent English (suggesting his level of edu-
cation). He lives in a neighbourhood of Gaborone. The test was 
done in the parotid area. It turns out he has TB and so he is told 
he should also get tested for HIV. He looks so upset – quiet but 
upset. We try to explain to him that this is good news. ‘You do not 
have cancer,’ but he doesn’t seem to believe us that this is a pos-
itive thing. The 47-year-old woman who looks miraculously young 
and wore that beautiful tukwi (headscarf) and black and white shirt 
finally comes back to gets her results from the fine needle aspiration 
(the original slide was lost by the medical ward). She has TB and 
looks a bit upset especially for someone who was so calm through 
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everything. Again I am struck by this incredible contrast between 
the cancer diagnosis and the TB diagnosis in popular reactions.
A young guy 33 years old comes with KS in his lungs, hand, groin, 
mouth, tongue, and palate. He has HIV.
Dr P asks ‘Do you know what your problem is?’
‘Yes’ he says, ‘I know what my problem is.’
Clearly, he is already tired of all the questions and the counselling 
(the IDCC clinics and HIV testing and treatment use a didactic 
counselling script in which the patient learns to repeat their status, 
CD4 count, etc.) (Brada 2013).
‘I am HIV positive.’
‘No. Do you know why you are here?’ (Meaning the oncology ward.)
‘Yes. It is on the card.’
The nurse pursues further. ‘No. Not what’s on the card. Do you 
know what is this place?’
‘They told me that side – at the clinic.’
‘What?’
‘They just used some big words. I don’t know.’
‘You have skin cancer (kankere ya letlhalo) or KS. This problem is 
also in your lungs and in your mouth.’
He says, ‘Doctor, I am suffering. I walk 50 metres and it feels bad 
like I ran 100 metres.’
‘We know.’ I finally interject and also try to explain. ‘Wena, nyaa – 
you have two problems, di le pedi. These problems are friends. 
Kankere and mogare (HIV) are different, but they can go together.’ 
He looks like he doesn’t want to know this.
A man in his 30s, well dressed but imperfect English. His KS is 
mild, but it is how he is learning that he has mogare. I think he is 
stunned – quiet, but stunned.
The woman from Phakalane with the one big KS lesion on her heel 
is back a week early. She and Dr P have a debate as to whether it is 
better or not. It is half the size it was before but now it is infected 
so she has a lot of pain in her ankle. This is because of the infection 
not the KS so they disagree. To Dr P, the pain is from the cellulitis 
but the KS is better. To the patient it hurts more so clearly she is 
worse. The nurse (Christine) struggles to explain that there is kank-
ere (cancer) and mogare (HIV – the virus) and megare (bacteria/
germs/virus). I pitch in, and so does the student nurse.
A woman comes to get her results. She is in her mid-20s, on HAART 
and has been taking the TB prevention programme (IPT) for 6 
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months. Her fine needle aspiration shows she has TB. When told 
this she starts to cry, and she really cries for a few minutes. Dr P tries 
to console her. ‘No, this is not a big mathata. You will be fine.’ But 
she leaves in tears.
There is a man in Male A bed 2 with Hodgkin’s who is HIV negative, 
but emaciated. He wants to be checked for TB. Dr P says he is smart. 
We should not be fooled into assuming we know why he’s so thin, 
even though Hodgkin’s is a wasting disease.
Patients stood in a thicket of cross-referencing between the three diseases 
as they attempted to understand their situation and navigate treatment. 
Making sense of cancer meant separating it from TB and HIV, but it also 
meant putting them back together. Yet such ontological exercises were 
necessary in order to navigate the treatment landscape. One could not 
‘default’ on chemo or antibiotics just because they were diligent about 
their antiretrovirals, at least not without serious consequences.
From the perspective of the oncology ward a simple TB diagnosis 
was terrific news. For many patients, it was the opposite. At that point, 
cancer was still relatively unknown to them, while TB had long been 
feared and was perhaps shameful. Furthermore, TB was often the vehi-
cle by which someone learned that they had HIV, which carried its own 
burden of fear and perhaps stigma. However, as they developed expe-
rience as a cancer patient, they came to realise how awful it was, with 
some patients remarking to me that even HIV was much better than 
cancer.
Within the hospital, differential diagnosis had other effects. Whenever 
bed space was available a cancer patient would be housed in the cancer 
ward. Though the oncology ward was greatly overworked, it was quieter, 
less chaotic, and more orderly than the medical wards where most TB 
and/or AIDS patients would be. In the medical wards, many patients 
were on gurneys packed into hallways or on mattresses crammed into 
empty spaces on the floor. In the cancer ward, space was tight, but the 
oncologist simply did not allow floor beds. Patient-to-nurse ratios were 
smaller in the cancer ward, and staff became familiar with patients and 
their relatives over the cyclical process of their care. Furthermore, pain 
medicine was more readily dispensed and fewer people got lost in the 
shuffle. More than once I remember the medical officer, faced with a 
patient co-infected with cancer and AIDS, who lay dying in the medi-
cal ward, deciding to transfer this patient to oncology, calling her ‘our 
patient’. This transfer was meaningful, intended as a final gift to her and 
her family, allowing her to die from cancer and not from AIDS.
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Meanwhile, different drug regimes seemed to create an overlapping 
intelligibility but in fact were often misleading in their cross-references. 
Second line cancer treatment is less efficacious than first line, in contrast 
to second line antibiotics. Prophylactic isoniazid as a public health pro-
gramme to some extent mirrors the logic of the new prophylactic antiret-
roviral programme (PrEP), while chemotherapy drugs, by contrast, have 
lifetime limits. The nausea that often accompanies ARVs tends to fade 
for patients over time, while the nausea that results from chemotherapy 
tends to escalate with each new cycle.
Mma T, a nurse counsels a patient with KS – a young woman. She 
tells her, ‘This medicine will make you nauseous, you will lose your 
hair, but this is temporary.’ The patient is visibly upset about this, 
but Mma T says, ‘Look with TB you take a pill a pill a pill. With 
kankere, the drug is so strong you take an injection every few weeks 
instead.’
The same extrapolating logic can also go in reverse.
In the oncology clinic G, the young woman with Hodgkin’s is still 
here. She is in remission but coughing – is it TB? She and I go 
together to see if we can find Michelle to do a sputum smear, and 
on the way it is clear she knows less than we think. Dr P said to her 
earlier, ‘I think you have TB my friend’ and when the nurse starts 
to translate he says, ‘No she speaks English!’ I explain to her about 
what TB is and what it would mean for treatment. It turns out she 
is worried that it would be like cancer medicine but every day for 
months. I say, ‘No. It is much easier – the pills, it is just that it lasts 
for months, but there should be fewer side effects.’
Clinical intelligibility
In this context of rampant co-infection, differential diagnosis and the 
charting of a clinical strategy were blurrier than the moments of clinical 
communication presented above would suggest. An enlarged lymph node 
could contain both lymphoma cells and tubercle bacilli. Lungs could be 
plagued with both TB and lung cancer or TB and KS. The unevenness 
of the technological infrastructure further contributed to the diagnostic 
and treatment challenges. Even if there was only one disease present, it 
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could be hard to come to a definitive diagnosis (Vento and Lanzafame 
2011). Without the normative body available, and faced with an unsta-
ble technological field, the oncologist and other doctors were often left 
working empirically.
Consider, for example, this scene in the cytology lab from my field 
notes in June 2008.
Dr P, Dr S, and I are in the lab using the teaching microscope to try 
to make sense of what is happening to a middle-aged woman with 
Burkitt’s lymphoma who has just had a spinal tap. Dr P explains 
the problem. ‘Here you spin, then take the upper part off and put 
the bottom part in. But here, there is no cytology centrifuge, which 
would spin directly onto the slides and this is part of why the slides 
are destroyed. You can see that there are lots of cells here, which 
does suggest central nervous system involvement of her lymphoma 
but the cytoplasm is destroyed in those cells.’ We search the two 
slides for intact cells. Dr P says if we can find a single blast, then we 
would know. But it is not possible. But there is no bleeding evidence 
and ordinarily one would expect to see between 4 and 12 cells. Here 
there are at least 100 so this really looks like the lymphoma is there. 
Why else? It could be TB or cryptococcal. We will have to wait for 
the national TB lab on that. But Dr P doesn’t think the TB lab can 
definitely see it.
Or this scene from a morning meeting in the medical ward in 2007.
The medical officer presents the case of another patient where they 
are querying lung cancer. His x-ray is displayed. Is it a chronic pul-
monary disease like pneumoconiosis or is it a cancer of the lung? 
Or is it chronic TB? The American medical student and the visiting 
professor pitch in to push towards cancer. The head of department 
says first we need to rule out TB. The patient has a history of 24 
years in the mines. They agree that they need to rule out TB first, 
but the x-ray does not provide a clear diagnosis.
Or this one from the oncology ward in 2007.
We are on the Monday ward round. The woman with KS who we 
brought as a cancer patient to be transferred from the Female 
Medical Ward is having problems breathing. She had a pleural 
 WHEN SICKNESS COMES IN MULTIPLES:  CO-MORBIDITY IN BOTSWANA 163
effusion tapped over the weekend. It was blood tainted, and there-
fore suggestive of KS. But now she is still having trouble breathing. 
Now the question is – is this TB or does she need her lungs irradi-
ated. Dr P decides to go for 2 more weeks on TB treatment and see 
if she responds. If not, then irradiation.
Problems of technical capacity within the system hamper the outcome of 
public health programmes that are designed to target co-infection. The 
Isoniazid Prophylactic Therapy (IPT) programme for HIV positive patients 
began in Botswana in 2001. In a logic that foreshadowed the PrEP pro-
grammes for HIV, IPT required screening for active TB among all persons 
diagnosed with HIV infection, and those not requiring treatment for active 
disease, receive 6 months of prophylaxis. The IPT programme, therefore, 
is premised on being able to screen out active disease. However, as we have 
seen, some patients were on IPT for months before their TB was diagnosed, 
and some clinicians suspected that this must contribute to a rise of MDRTB.
Living and dying with co-infection
If co-infection presents challenges to clinical staff and to institutional 
efforts, for patients, and the relatives who help care for them, existing in 
a state of unfolding and acute medical complexity is profoundly trying. 
Physically, any one of these diseases can be miserable and disorientat-
ing, much less two or three at once. The same can be said of the pres-
sures of overlapping and intersecting diagnostic and treatment regimes. 
The bureaucratic and institutional challenges of co-infection mean that 
patients have multiple appointments and advice to manage, which are 
incredibly time consuming between long queues at pharmacy lines, on 
waiting benches for imaging studies or blood taking, for clinic appoint-
ments, at bus and taxi ranks, not to mention the expense of travel. Fur-
thermore, it was also existentially overwhelming for people to learn they 
had all of these problems at once. If there are social models and messages 
out there for how to ‘live positively’ with HIV or how to be a ‘cancer sur-
vivor’ there was precious little guidance for those trying to buoy them-
selves against the bodily insults and psychic uncertainties of co-infection.
Sometimes, this means that a patient with HIV refuses a pap smear, 
recognising that she is not ready to take on cancer as well if it were to 
come back positive. Sometimes, it means that a patient fails to come 
and collect the results from their fine needle aspiration until after some 
months, when the symptoms of their cancer become so overwhelming 
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that they are now desperate for relief. Sometimes, patients who were 
co-infected looked at me wistfully and remarked that they wished they 
just had AIDS, which now seemed so simple and relatively manageable 
rather than both AIDS and cancer. In late 2006, I visited a young woman 
in her village home. She had already completed treatment for KS, which 
had destroyed her knee and she remarked, ‘… I know if it were the HIV 
alone, I could take the ARVs, stand up and go and work. But now this 
cancer has actually crippled me. I can’t walk, I can’t work.’
Imagine what it feels like to be the parents of this young man.
The parents and aunt (mmangwane) of the 29-year-old man with 
penile cancer and KS, TB and HIV come to talk. They have been 
waiting since noon and it is now 5.00 p.m. (This is because Dr P first 
sees all of the patients and then only counsels relatives once all the 
chemo had been administered and the clinic visits completed). Dr 
P opens by telling them that the situation is hopeless. ‘Your son has 
two cancers, HIV and TB. It is too much.’ They have no questions, 
though the father is a military officer and speaks excellent English. 
The father says, ‘All we can do is hope. It is in God’s hands now.’
Imagine still what it feels like to be this patient with half a penis, tethered 
to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath, in tremendous pain and misery. 
Then again, imagine how relief slowly came to him as against all odds, he 
recovered from this crisis to become just an HIV patient again (albeit one 
with scarred lungs and half a penis).
Think about what Agnes has been through. Born in the late 1930s, she 
was still a farmer when I met her in 2007 in Gaborone where she had been 
sent for radiotherapy. She was living with her daughter, one of six children 
she had, though two had already predeceased her. The same year she lost 
her son, 2004, was the year her problems started. She was ill and went to 
the clinic in her village where they diagnosed her with TB. In 2005, she had 
finished the TB treatment and started on ARVs. Her chest was better, but 
she developed swollen glands and there was no improvement despite all the 
pills she was taking. She kept going to the clinic complaining of the swell-
ing, and then finally in February 2007 they sent her to Nyangabwe. There 
they took a specimen and sent it to the laboratory and diagnosed her with 
cancer. The doctors at Nyangabwe told her that because of her age and her 
immune status they could not operate on her to remove the tumour (which 
I presume was in her hypopharynx but since the doctors did not tell her 
what type of cancer she had, I could not clarify this in my conversation with 
her). When I met her she was just beginning radiation treatment.
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Co-infection asks a tremendous amount from patients and from 
relatives. It leaves them destabilised, without a clear centre of gravity 
around which to organise their energies and their futures. It exhausts 
them in ways both large and small. This very exhaustion underscores a 
palpable truth about the body in sickness, one that is effaced in the intel-
lectual work of statistical categories and biomedical specialisation.
Provisional conclusions
How should we make sense of such complexity on an epidemic scale? 
What does biological complexity do to the logic of biodeterminism and 
any assumed separation between biological and social life? Will new cat-
egories emerge to capture co-infection, such that cervical cancer with 
HIV is a different disease than cervical cancer without? Or will we see 
at least a minor retreat from disease specificity? Or an expansion of local 
biology into the foundational logic of biomedicine as new work in epige-
netics and the microbiome suggest (Lock, this volume)?
Co-infection and co-morbidity in the biomedical institution was 
not the same as a more holistic framework of misfortune with ramify-
ing symptom constellations mapped onto broader social grids, such as 
Tswana disease nosology might afford. Yet for cancer patients, their rela-
tives and their clinicians, addressing cancer meant separating it from TB 
and HIV even as they mingled in the body and the social field. Why stop 
with these three diseases? I could easily make a case of hypertension and 
diabetes as part of this complex co-morbid landscape.
What about the structure of the health system itself and the need 
for medical and epidemiological knowledge to emerge at the intersec-
tions between diseases? The epidemic scale of co-infection in a context 
of uneven technical infrastructure presents clinical challenges and raises 
questions that contribute to the ambiguity of oncological practice in 
Botswana. The Botswana Ministry of Health is aware of the problem of 
co-infection and is trying to accommodate it within a health system that 
has evolved through consecutive and aggregating waves of epidemic. 
However, this remains difficult to coordinate and systematise within a 
single hospital, much less a health system.
Experiences of co-morbidity in Botswana point to scalar problems 
of public health and institutional policies that are designed vertically 
around an implied presumption of disease specificity. A close look at 
co-morbidity reminds us that epidemiological patterns layer on top of one 
another over time, as one disease gains traction via another. At the same 
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time, it reveals the problem of living co-morbid. Bodily insults cluster 
together in experiences that defy the disease-specific logic of clinicians 
and medical institutions, as well as the master narratives and metaphors 
of disease-specific biosociality.
Notes
1. Pursuing diabetes (or hypertension) is beyond the scope of this essay, which already feels un-
wieldy. But it raises all sorts of questions about TB and HIV co-infection in Botswana. 
2. A colleague tells me that the Ministry of Health has asked that he begin to collect TB data in his 
prospective cohort study of cancer. He notes that it will be challenging to get accurate data be-
cause many patients receive TB treatment before their eventual diagnosis of cancer (lymphoma, 
lung cancer, etc.), so it is difficult to know whether the TB was originally misdiagnosed or if they 
really have concurrent TB and cancer (Scott Dryden-Peterson, personal communication).
3. ‘Results: Between 2003 and 2008, prevalence of untreated AIDS (CD4 ≤ 200 cells/μL) fell from 
5,510 to 1,170 per 100,000 (p = 0.001) and median CD4 at ART initiation increased from 106 
to 160 cells/μL (p = 0.002). During this period 8,494 cancers were diagnosed. There were no 
significant changes in incidence of AIDS-defining (41.1 per 100,000, p = 1.0) or non-AIDS-de-
fining (73.1 per 100,000, p = 0.57) cancers. However, incidence of KS declined by 4.83% per 
year, p = 0.017. Incidence of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (NHL) and head and neck squamous 
cell carcinoma increased 12.0% (p = 0.007) and 10.8% (p = 0.019) per year respectively. Taken 
together, possible human papillomavirus (HPV)-related tumours increased 6.0% per year, p = 
0.006.’ (Dryden-Peterson et al. 2012).
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Legacies of Violence: The 
Communicability of Spirits and 
Trauma in Northern Uganda
Lotte Meinert and Susan Reynolds Whyte
How may the spread of the biomedical concept ‘trauma’ as well as cen 
spirits in Northern Uganda be understood as part of syndemic processes 
of situated concerned responses to violence?
Sitting on the floor in her kitchen hut, Wilma recounts the story 
of her brother’s son, Oloya. Like so many other children in Acholiland, 
he was abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). When everyone 
else was interned in camps for Internally Displaced People, Oloya was in 
the bush with the LRA. From the age of 12, and for 7 years, he was with 
the rebels, who forced him to kill and to step on dead bodies. When he 
finally came back, he was taken to the reception centre for returnees run 
by World Vision in Gulu town. After a year there, he really came home, 
that is, back to his paternal family in the village, where he stayed with 
his father’s mother. ‘It was then that the cen started disturbing him,’ says 
Wilma. He used to dream that someone was on his neck wanting to kill 
him and in desperation he would run outside, pursued by his worried 
home people. His family took him back to World Vision, who brought 
him to Gulu Regional Referral Hospital. The doctors there recognised his 
problem as trauma. Many who have been in the bush suffer that way, 
they explained. Most with such a history saw killing or killed people 
themselves. They have flashbacks – they cannot forget. Take him back to 
World Vision, the health workers advised. However, Oloya’s stepmother, 
who was an ajwaka, a diviner/healer, was with him that day and she had 
another plan.
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‘Let me have my son and I work on him,’ she said. As she shells her 
groundnuts, Wilma tells about the methods they used for sending the cen 
away. She was there and saw how they called the cen to speak.
It accused Oloya. ‘You walked on me!’ He replied, ‘I didn’t mean to 
do it, they forced me.’ Pulling a black goat, the group of relatives went to 
the bush and made Oloya remove his shirt and crawl into an anthill. Well-
bitten, he withdrew, and they slaughtered and roasted the goat. Then they 
took pieces of meat and threw them in each of the four directions,  saying, 
‘You leave our son. He didn’t mean to do it, he was forced.’ They put med-
icine (te ocuga) in his nose. After that he went to stay with his cousin (his 
father’s brother’s son) in Gulu town. There was some improvement but 
still Oloya had disturbing symptoms including bad headaches. What to 
do? The cousin with whom he stayed took him back to the hospital; he 
did not believe in cen, although his own mother was an ajwaka. Oloya’s 
stepmother was convinced that the cen wanted him to be an ajwaka like 
herself. They scheduled a day to do the initiation ceremony, but when the 
day came, Oloya never showed up. He did not want to be an ajwaka. He 
stays in town, working as a mobile telephone agent. Up to now, he takes 
two kinds of medicine: tablets from the hospital and the te ocuga herbal 
medicine recommended by the ajwaka.
Studying legacies of violence
Oloya’s story may serve to highlight a methodological and a conceptual 
matter in the discussion of how legacies of violence are spreading in the 
contemporary world. The methodological matter is one of scale. For 
our purposes here, we will distinguish three dimensions: the family, the 
individual, and the broader regional and international configurations of 
scale. Our concern is especially with the family; as Oloya’s story suggests, 
dealing with the everyday legacies of violence is a family affair. However, 
in order to understand the possibilities that families have, we must recog-
nise other scales as well. This is particularly the case given the conceptual 
matter of biosocial complexity that this volume addresses. Biomedical 
ideas and treatment practices spread through global connections and 
regional interventions. They are tried out on individual bodies shaped 
within local biologies.
Like other scholars, we are intrigued by the possibility that trauma, 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in particular, are ‘communi-
cable’ conditions, spreading to more and more people around the globe. 
We agree that the transmission of trauma must be understood in terms 
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of transformations in sensibilities and interventions emanating from 
the Global North (Fassin and Rechtman 2009) and the appropriation of 
these within local political and cosmological worlds (Bubandt 2008). In 
the case of Northern Uganda, these local worlds include cen, the spirits 
of the resentful dead, which also seem to be increasing as a legacy of vio-
lence. The co-existence of trauma and cen must be considered on a family 
scale in relation to the concerns and possibilities of people like Wilma 
and her nephew Oloya. For families struggling to deal with the legacies 
of violence, trauma and cen are repertoires (ways of talking and perform-
ing) that constitute plans for action and possible relief of affliction. The 
failures of one kind of treatment help to grow interest in the other.
The suffering and caregiving related to trauma and cen are exam-
ples of local biology (Lock and Nguyen 2010) that require a biosocial 
framework to interpret the illness experience and evaluate the outcome 
(Kleinman 2015, xv). In our exploration of trauma, we examine the leg-
acies of mass violence for individuals, families and the social worlds in 
which they live and try to recover (Hinton and Hinton 2015, 1). Persons 
(mindful bodies) like Oloya have been formed by the present and past 
circumstances in which they live and they and their families experience 
and manage affliction accordingly.
Starting from the situated concerns of persons and families con-
fronted with recalcitrant problems, we suggest that trauma and cen may 
be contested, accepted, or simply ignored as a possible way of dealing 
with mindful ‘dis-ease’ (Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1987) in post- conflict 
situations. Family concerns are almost always in the plural. That means 
considering the range of problems that either cen or trauma might 
address. As we will show, the behavioural symptoms of both cen and 
trauma often co-exist with what biomedicine might diagnose as alcohol-
ism, HIV and diverse health conditions. In biomedical discourse, this is 
commonly described as ‘co-morbidity’, a clinical term used for biologi-
cal conditions (see Livingston, this volume). In a broader perspective, 
medical and other problems thrive in particular social, economic and his-
torical circumstances. We suggest that the rapid spread of multiple inter-
related problems be seen as syndemic (Singer and Clair 2003; Singer 
2009) rather than as instances of co-morbidity or co-existing epidemics. 
As repertoires, trauma and cen are appropriated where other problems 
(drunkenness, domestic violence and land conflicts as well as disease) 
are spreading in the ‘conducive’ environment of war, displacement and 
poverty.
In Northern Uganda, the Acholi sub-region has been worst hit by 
the long running civil war. The LRA, led by Joseph Kony, and consisting 
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mainly of Acholi people, fought most intensely and persistently in the 
Acholi districts. The national army, the Uganda People’s Defence Force, 
interned practically the entire population, about 1.8 million people, in 
crowded camps, which they called ‘protected villages’, for up to 10 years. 
Yet the army was not able to keep the internees safe from abduction and 
killing by the LRA, and the national soldiers themselves committed atroc-
ities against those they were supposed to guard (Dolan 2009). Finally, in 
2006, a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in Juba, and peo-
ple gradually began to return to their rural homes. When we first began 
collaboration with Gulu University in 2008, many people still remained 
in the camps. Awach sub-county, where we have worked most consist-
ently, was no exception. Over the years, we have followed the resettle-
ment process (S. Whyte et al. 2013), including the return of dead family 
members buried in the camps, who are being exhumed and reburied in 
their rural homes (Meinert and Whyte 2013).
In the course of our work, we talked with many families affected 
by cen, and we became acquainted with NGOs and visited health facili-
ties offering treatment for trauma (Whyte et al. 2015). We interviewed 
ajwaki dealing with cen, and Christian clergy who counselled and prayed 
for victims of cen. In August 2014, we more systematically added to our 
understanding of these matters by interviewing 19 individuals or families 
who claimed to be affected by cen, revisiting two health facilities where 
trauma was treated, and having long conversations with an ajwaka and 
with a psychologist at an NGO specialising in the treatment of PTSD.
In considering the communicability of trauma and cen, we ask sev-
eral questions. How and by whom are they transmitted? What is commu-
nicated? How are these ideas appropriated and used by those who are 
communicating? Moreover, what are the conditions of communicability?
Cen: The ghosts of the resentful dead
Spectres of violence that visit and haunt the living in dreams and in wak-
ing states are known in many places. In Vietnam (Kwon 2015) and Indo-
nesia (Good 2015), the spirits of the dead become more prominent in the 
public imaginary after periods of mass violence and destruction. How-
ever, this phenomenon always has particular local characteristics. Acholi 
people explain that cen are the spirits of people who died violently or 
unjustly, and for whose death no compensation was made. Those whose 
corpses were not buried properly may also, as cen, affect others who come 
upon their remains. Cen are a legacy of violence in that they result from 
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the malicious destruction of human life and the imagined resentment of 
those who died with a legitimate grievance. Thus, the idea of cen is fun-
damentally a moral one. It attributes to the dead a sense of righteous ill 
feeling that may cause misfortune to the living.
The word ‘cen’ with the same general meaning is widespread in 
Eastern Africa. It is found in all the Nilotic languages (Evans-Pritchard 
1956, 173) and in a Bantu form (omushieno) among neighbouring peo-
ples (Whyte 1997, 132–40). Long ago, Evans-Pritchard explicated the 
moral nature of ghostly vengeance (cien) among the Nuer, people closely 
related to the Acholi. ‘The essence of the concept is the notion of a wrong 
unrighted, of a grievance which demands, and rightly demands, redress’ 
(Evans-Pritchard 1956, 176). As a plan of action, the idea of cen thus sug-
gests attempts to right wrongs or at least to mollify the resentful spirit.
If someone causes the death of another, even if indirectly, repara-
tion should be made to the family of the deceased. Failure to do so may be 
cited as the reason for cen to afflict the wrongdoer or his (rarely her) fam-
ily. In principle, clan members of the offender should come together to 
pay compensation. We found several cases where this had been enjoined 
but never followed up. If it is not possible to identify the family entitled 
to compensation, then something should be given to the cen itself. This 
usually entails sacrificing an animal, as in Oloya’s case, after the cen 
speaks through its victim to assert its demands. Or, as some put it, the cen 
wants blood. Some cen insist that they will only be placated if the person 
afflicted becomes an ajwaka.
As repertoire, cen is a collection of possibilities alluding to a funda-
mental assumption about the morality of actions and the powers of the 
wronged dead. Cen spirits are often referred to as evil because they inflict 
suffering on the living. They are contrasted with tipu, the spirits of the 
dead who are neutral or beneficial towards their descendants. However, 
the dead become cen because they were offended in some way, so rec-
ognition of cen acknowledges wrongs committed by someone sometime 
even if no one now remembers what that wrong might have been.
The signs and symptoms of cen cover a wide range of strange and 
disturbing behaviour. It was often family members who recounted the 
distressing developments that led them to consider cen. Irene started to 
tell her own story, about how she went out to relieve herself one night 
and the darkness became darker, then changed to red like blood. Soon 
her husband took over to recount what she could not remember, that she 
ran off, refused to talk when they found her and would not eat or drink. 
At night, she still cries and struggles in her dreams and in the morning 
recalls a huge man with bulging eyes threatening to kill her with a spear 
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or water flooding on the road and then turning red. She herself says that 
she feels like some living thing is walking in her brain. It makes her dull 
and forgetful. ‘I live in the hand of God,’ Irene added.
A man told how his wife Anna refuses to eat or light a fire to cook 
for her children or work in her garden. She has headaches and hears a 
voice that is sometimes a man’s and sometimes a woman’s. We visited 
her, looking painfully thin and withdrawn, where she was staying at her 
brother’s place. When she said she wanted to go back to her own home, 
her husband remarked, ‘That is not herself but the evil spirit speaking.’ 
Others told of children falling in fits, with saliva drooling, or children 
who wandered about, laughed uncontrollably, burst into tears, fell silent, 
and had to be taken out of school because of their strange behaviour.
Hellen recounted that her husband, father of their 11 children, had 
been a successful businessman, but is now kept locked up lest he run off, 
become aggressive and get beaten up. Early one morning he suddenly 
woke and began to hit his children with a stick shouting to those who 
tried to intervene. ‘Go away! Let me beat them, I want to kill them!’ 
Although he spent a year in Butabika, the national mental hospital, is 
well cared for by his family, and is made to take tablets from the health 
centre every day, he has never become normal again.
How can we explain the spread of cen? The question is really a 
double one about both the transmission of affliction and the conditions 
in which the image of cen is communicated and flourishes. Those with 
whom we talked about how cen catches people mentioned several path-
ways of transmission. Cen can affect someone who comes upon a corpse 
and fails to acknowledge the wrong of its death and neglect. In line with 
the recognition that a moral offence has been committed, the passerby 
should say respectfully, ‘I did not kill you’ and ‘I have buried you’, placing 
a leaf (preferably from the olwedo plant) on the remains. Several accounts 
suggested that the afflicted person might have happened upon human 
remains without realising it, thus acquiring cen unknowingly. Or one can 
walk into a place where cen are hanging about, near the river or near a 
location where people were killed. Outbreaks of possession occurring in 
boarding schools have been attributed to proximity of killing sites. One 
can also be affected by cen because an ancestor killed someone and no 
compensation was ever made. The cen of the resentful victim may affect 
the descendants through several generations. So cen can be communica-
ble within families. Finally, and importantly for our interest in trauma, 
cen may affect someone who has caused a death, committed a murder or 
seen a killing that was not acknowledged and compensated.1
174 BIOSOCIAL WORLDS
Given these concerns about intentional and inadvertent killing, 
and the moral obligation to bury the dead respectfully, it is understand-
able that the wars in which Acholi people have been involved since the 
1980s have provided fertile ground for the spread of cen affliction. In 
her major study of the Holy Spirit Movement, which preceded the LRA, 
Heike Behrend (1999) traces efforts to deal with the unreconciled spirits 
of those who died by violence. The Acholi soldiers who fought against 
Museveni’s advancing army in 1985 and returned home after their defeat 
were thought contaminated by cen of those they had killed. Behrend 
argues that the problem was not so much that the returning soldiers had 
taken lives, but that they did not undergo rituals to cleanse them and 
appease the cen, as had fighters in earlier wars (Behrend 1999, 28). She 
suggests that they were unwilling to accept the authority of the elders 
in these ceremonial matters and also that warfare was anonymous so it 
was not easy to know whom one had killed. Many of these returning sol-
diers joined Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit Movement, which invented new 
rituals to cleanse them of cen and carried out sacrifices to atone for the 
transgressions they had committed (Behrend 1999, 45). As Hutchinson 
described for the Nuer in the era of modern warfare, it was necessary to 
develop new ways of managing the increased numbers of unknown peo-
ple killed in battle (Hutchinson 1996,107).2
Cen were thought to increase not only because of the rise in violent 
deaths, but also because the dead were not buried properly. When Acholi 
people were finally allowed by the army to leave the camps and return to 
their rural homes, they came upon human remains as they cleared the 
bush to begin farming again. If they did not actually see bones with frag-
ments of clothing, they sometimes heard or saw or even smelled evidence 
of the neglected dead in the area.
Efforts to alleviate the effects of cen served to confirm its existence. 
There were at least three institutions that reinforced or even helped to 
spread the repertoire of cen. Most important were the ajwaki, the divin-
ers and healers who identified cen and organised ceremonies to pla-
cate them. Several informants told us that the numbers of ajwaki have 
increased since the war. Reverend Abia was worried about the many 
women who had become ajwaki after leaving the camps. He thought 
that it was hard for people to start anew after so many years of intern-
ment, that women were oppressed and this work gave them respect and 
a source of income. The increase in cen because of the war went hand in 
hand with the increase in ajwaki.
Christian churches played an important role in dealing with cen as 
well. Many clerics and committed Christians acknowledged the existence 
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of cen. Reverend Abia and Reverend Onyango pointed out that the Bible 
itself tells of evil spirits. But for them cen pointed to the need for strong 
faith and prayer (and sometimes hospital medicine) rather than consul-
tations with ajwaki and spilling animal blood in ceremonies. In several 
families (and even within the same individual), there were conflicts 
about Christian versus ‘traditional’ modes of dealing with cen, and they 
played out as a micro-politics of identity and influence. However, our 
point is that church recognition of cen served to confirm the idea and 
make it communicable within Christian discursive practice.
On a larger political scale, efforts were made to cleanse areas of 
cen as people moved back upon leaving the camps. These were organ-
ised by ‘traditional’ leaders, including the government-recognised rwodi 
moo. In an effort to acknowledge local concerns, the Northern Uganda 
Transitional Initiative (NUTI), funded by USAID, provided resources 
for sacrificial animals and other requirements so that ceremonies to 
send away cen could be performed. This was part of a larger tendency 
to recognise elements of Acholi culture that could be used in efforts to 
promote peace and reconciliation. The attention to cen and the need to 
cleanse areas and placate them was of scholarly as well as policy concern 
(Harlacher et al. 2006; Baines 2010; Finnegan 2010).
Two other reasons for the increase in cen relate to the nature of the 
problems with which they were associated and their resistance to availa-
ble treatment. Most people said to be affected by cen had conditions that 
biomedicine would call mental or behavioural, though there were often 
grave somatic symptoms too. Thoughtful interlocutors pointed out that 
cen affects those who have other problems as well. Anna’s husband noted 
that her cen affliction became much worse as the family got embroiled 
in a land conflict that involved violence and arson. In a study of former 
child soldiers, Akello and colleagues (Akello et al. 2006) suggested that 
cen especially affects children who are not accepted by their own kin and 
communities, when they return from fighting with the LRA. Problems of 
reintegration aggravate cen.
Many of those we spoke to told of efforts to seek biomedical 
treatment of their conditions. Like Oloya, people tried pharmaceutical 
remedies and in quite a few cases, they were still taking medications. 
Sometimes, their symptoms had diminished, but when they were not 
really cured, people continued to entertain ideas of cen. If the biomedical 
diagnosis was not accurate, if the pharmacotherapy was inappropriate, 
if people did not take their medicine properly, and if the problems went 
beyond what medicines could address, then biomedicine’s shortcomings 
enhanced interest in cen as a possibility.
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Trauma and its treatment
During and after the war, trauma spread in Northern Uganda in several 
versions. One is the stringent monothetic category of PTSD, based on 
criteria in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American 
Psychiatric Association (Young 1995, 118). PTSD is a diagnosis made 
by health professionals with training in psychiatry. It points toward psy-
chotherapy and/or pharmacotherapy with treatment consisting of coun-
selling and talking and/or medication with psychopharmaceuticals. In 
a somewhat looser version, trauma is understood as mental, emotional 
and behavioural consequences of personal experience of violence, need-
ing some kind of care, counselling and monitoring. Finally, the English 
word ‘trauma’ has entered popular discourse in Acholi, especially among 
more educated people, to denote sadness and despair after loss or dis-
tressing events. It highlights the affected person’s emotions and calls for 
sympathy. An example of this was when one of our field assistants told 
us about her elderly maternal aunt who had suffered trauma because she 
had lost all of her children to AIDS.
In all of its versions, trauma underlines the relationship between 
first-hand experience of violence or other wrenching events and the feel-
ings of the person who has directly undergone them. Whereas cen can dis-
turb the descendants of someone who violated or was violated, trauma 
affects the owner of the experience. Furthermore, where cen as a rep-
ertoire calls for exchange (that is, compensation to the wronged family 
or an offering to the cen), trauma calls for self-reflection, self- narration, 
and the treatment of the emotional and perhaps medicinal needs of the 
afflicted individual.
This kind of approach was already familiar in Uganda before the 
LRA war. The early response to the AIDS epidemic involved individual 
counselling, attention to feelings, and later on encouragement to take 
long-term medication, so many Ugandans were aware of these ways of 
dealing with chronic illness. The term ‘counselling’ and its various prac-
tices spread as government, donors and NGOs mobilised against HIV. 
AIDS counselling practices promoted historically specific Euro-American 
ideas of the psychological self (Rose 1998) and became known in Uganda 
by the early 1990s. By 2005, when antiretroviral therapy became widely 
accessible, counselling was closely associated with medicating the indi-
vidual ailing body. The infrastructures of AIDS counselling and medi-
cation, which reached almost all corners of Uganda although unevenly, 
fertilised the ground for the spread of the idea that selves could be trau-
matised and healed through psychotherapy and pharmaceuticals.
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Many international donors and NGOs were active in Northern 
Uganda during and after the war. In fact, it has been argued that their 
support made possible the military policy of camp internment (Dolan 
2009; Branch 2011). The repertoires of trauma probably entered Northern 
Uganda through the NGO reception centres first established in Gulu in 
1994. They received adult and child returnees ‘from the bush’, that is, 
those who escaped from the LRA, and offered a safe place to stay, medical 
care, assistance in tracing family members, some training, and support 
for ‘reintegration’. A study in 2005 found that the most highly appreci-
ated aspect of the centres was counselling. ‘The word “trauma” is often 
used, and some ideas from psychotherapy inform efforts to help formerly 
abducted persons (FAPs) tell their stories, and even act out what has hap-
pened to them’ (Allen and Schomerus 2006, vii).
Researchers documented the toll that the war and encampment 
was taking on the civilian population; a recurring theme was the high 
level of PTSD. One study in 2006 reported some of the highest ever rates 
of depression and PTSD in displaced populations, which were found 
among people in Gulu and Amuru districts, then still in the camps. 
Using the Hopkins Symptom Checklist-25 and the Harvard Trauma 
Questionnaire, 67 per cent met symptom criteria for depression and 54 
per cent for PTSD (Roberts et al. 2008). Humanitarian organisations 
responded to the picture of mental distress by offering treatment for 
‘trauma’, PTSD and depression. In 2012, a study identified 25 NGOs 
in the Acholi region providing treatment for trauma caused by the war 
(Whyte et al. 2015).
The modalities of mental health work varied. Some NGOs worked 
in collaboration with government health facilities at different levels. An 
important example is the Peter C. Alderman Foundation clinic within 
the Mental Health Unit of Gulu Regional Referral Hospital.3 It is named 
after a young man killed in the attack on the twin towers in New York. 
His family established the foundation in part to deal with their own 
distress at his loss. The clinic specialises in PTSD. Patients coming for 
mental health treatment are referred for screening using an instrument 
based on the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire translated into Acholi. 
From its beginning in 2008 until late 2011, the clinic registered 850 
patients. Records showed a strong pattern of co-morbidity. Most patients 
had more than one diagnosis (for example, PTSD and depression or 
alcoholism or psychosis or epilepsy) and nearly all received psycho-
pharmaceutical medication in addition to counselling. One of the very 
few local psychiatrists bemoaned the fact that fluoxetine, a selective 
serotonin reuptake inhibitor that is standard treatment for PTSD, was 
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too expensive for general use in Uganda. Instead, the Regional Referral 
Hospital, like all government health units, relied on amitriptyline, an 
earlier generation of tricyclic antidepressant drug. Staff told us that even 
though the war had ended, new patients continued to appear because 
domestic violence and land conflicts ‘triggered’ PTSD. The Alderman 
clinic, like the Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation (TPO), another 
NGO, did outreaches to government rural health centres that lacked 
staff with training in psychiatry.
Other organisations provided care independently of public health 
facilities and eschewed the use of medicines. One of the most important 
was Vivo (victim’s voice), a German-based NGO that provides treatment 
based on narrative exposure theory and started working in Northern 
Uganda in 2005. Psychologists, who had been treating asylum-seekers in 
Germany and displaced people in several countries, established an out-
reach programme, a clinic in Gulu town, and a programme to train lay 
counsellors. In partnership with other NGOs, they have screened several 
thousand people and provided treatment to about 1,000 who were con-
sidered to suffer PTSD. About 80 per cent of those they treat are formerly 
abducted persons. A counsellor meets with a client 10 times over a period 
of 5 weeks to help the client construct a lifeline and tell their life story, 
placing the traumatic events in the context of their lives and recounting 
what happened in great detail. Vivo Uganda has an active research com-
ponent reported in a number of publications written in a medical genre 
and appearing in respected medical journals (Neuner 2008; Ertl et al. 
2010; Ertl et al. 2011; Neuner et al. 2012).
In many ways, it looks as if Northern Uganda has been incorporated 
into the empire of trauma of which Fassin and Rechtman write (Fassin 
and Rechtman 2009). The humanitarian support to nearly 2 million 
people in the camps that comprised food rations, water supplies, nurs-
ery and primary schools, medical care, and a host of training sessions on 
gender equity and human rights came to include humanitarian psychol-
ogy. The movement to recognise and treat trauma was carried by NGOs. 
The Alderman Foundation and Vivo, unlike Médicins sans Frontières and 
Médicins du Monde of which Fassin and Rechtman write, do not depend 
on foreign doctors to do clinical work. Instead, they trained hundreds of 
lay counsellors, which was probably a more effective way of spreading 
the repertoire of trauma than relying on a small number of professionals. 
In practical terms, trauma was most effectively communicable to clients 
by people who were fluent in Acholi.
Fassin and Rechtman see the rapid expansion of trauma in rela-
tion to the changing moral landscape of the Global North (Fassin and 
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Rechtman 2009). In the space of a decade or two, the figure of victim 
has emerged, deserving of sympathy, support, and even compensa-
tion for suffering caused by violence. They suggest that there has even 
occurred a conflation of perpetrator and victim, in that both may suffer 
from experiencing a terrible event. This obviously has political as well as 
moral implications. Trauma fits usefully in the particular situation of the 
LRA war, where children were abducted, committed brutalities as LRA 
fighters, and then had to come home to ‘reintegration’. In the reception 
centres, they were counselled to understand that they were not respon-
sible for what they saw and did because they acted under duress. This 
was the way they learned to tell their stories, even if they sometimes felt 
and talked otherwise (Akello et al. 2006; Verma 2012). The LRA conflict 
was a civil war; atrocities were committed by kinsmen and neighbours 
with whom one had to go on living (Meinert et al. 2014; Whyte et al. 
2015). There was popular support for amnesty and much concern about 
the difficulties that returnees met when they tried to resume life in the 
camps and later in the villages. Sympathising with and supporting them 
as victims was helpful and may be one of the reasons why the repertoire 
of trauma was appealing and why it spread.
Yet seen from Wilma’s kitchen, from the homes of thousands of fam-
ilies trying to help their relatives with frightening disabling conditions, 
and from the hospitals and health centres charged with their treatment, 
the empire is not so firmly established. Yes, the repertoire of trauma has 
been appropriated and yes, treatment of PTSD seems helpful for some. 
However, diagnosis and treatment of PTSD are largely dependent on 
humanitarian assistance, mostly administered through NGOs. These 
efforts are patchy and short term. PTSD is little visible in government 
health facilities (Whyte et al. 2015), even in those that have mental health 
clinics run by psychiatric nurses and clinical officers (medical assistants). 
Yet the public health system is widely available and persists, while NGO 
projects come and go. Thus, the apparatus for spreading and implement-
ing the repertoire of trauma treatment is not strong and sustainable.
It is also noticeable that the repertoires of trauma and victimisa-
tion are not appropriated evenly by all in Northern Uganda. In a study 
of the return process of adult ex-LRA combatants, Odong points out that 
the receiving communities reacted very differently towards returnees 
who had held high rank positions in the rebel army (Odong 2014). They 
were generally not perceived as traumatised victims by their families and 
communities; in fact, they often faced stigmatisation and exclusion. So 
even though the ideas of trauma and conflation of perpetrator and victim 
seem widespread, these ideas are appropriated in a differentiated and 
micro-politically sensitive manner.
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The co-existence of cen and trauma4
The new repertoire of trauma took hold in a landscape where repertoires 
of cen were well-established and spreading. They now exist side by side. 
Their parallels and overlaps intrigue researchers, are recognised by clini-
cians, and provide possibilities for patients and their families.
Psychologists recognise in cen many of the assumptions found in 
PTSD about violence, memory, and certain symptoms of extreme anxiety. 
Harlacher, who wrote a PhD thesis on Acholi beliefs from the viewpoint 
of Western psychology, discusses the symptoms called ajiji, commonly 
associated with cen possession (Harlacher 2009). Ajiji follows on fright-
ening experiences of violence. It includes intense fear, nightmares, reliv-
ing the experience, aggression, and distraction. Harlacher compares 
these symptoms one by one with the criteria for PTSD in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual and finds substantial overlap.
A team of psychologists (Neuner et al. 2012) working with Vivo 
conducted an epidemiological study of cen possession and its correlation 
with other mental health measures. Carried out in 2007 and 2008, it sur-
veyed a representative sample of 1,113 Acholi people between 12 and 
25 years of age. Strikingly, 43 per cent had been abducted by the LRA, 
although some for only a few hours. The researchers developed a Cen 
Spirit Possession Scale to measure prevalence and intensity of possession 
by cen. High levels were found among 14.3 per cent of the abductees and 
3.7 per cent of those never abducted. Among those with high levels of 
cen possession, 44.5 per cent met criteria for PTSD, while only 9.8 per 
cent of those with low levels or no cen possession were diagnosed with 
PTSD. The authors conclude that in the terms of the fifth edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), posses-
sion state disorder is among the most common mental diseases of youth 
in Acholiland. Risk factors for cen possession were exposure to traumatic 
events, female gender, extreme poverty and low level of education. 
Although Harlacher worked with case accounts and ethnographic mate-
rial (Harlacher 2009), while Neuner and colleagues made a quantitative 
study (Neuner et al. 2012), there was agreement on the overlap between 
cen and PTSD. In this, the researchers all share the growing interest in 
the relationship between psychiatric diagnoses of traumatic memory and 
cultural variations on the same theme (Kenny 1996).
The biomedical health workers in Acholiland who offer treatment 
for mental health problems recognise the importance of cen for their 
patients. At the Alderman clinic, the psychiatric nurse remarked that 
most of their clients had tried other treatment before, mainly treatment 
 LEGACIES OF VIOLENCE 181
for cen. He said some went to church for help, but 70 per cent sought 
ajwaki.5 The nurse explained that cen and PTSD are the same thing. 
‘PTSD is our modified language for those who have gone to school. The 
community takes it as cen. They mean the same.’ His colleague at Awach 
Health Centre IV agreed. Both said that they translated PTSD as ajiji, the 
recurring image of terrifying events. They did not try to dissuade patients 
about cen, but encouraged them to try the hospital medicine to see if it 
worked. If not, they could go back to the ajwaka or try prayer and healing 
in church. Thus, despite the overlap between cen and PTSD, there was an 
emphasis on difference in treatment and recognition that patients were 
most interested in cures.
Patients and families also juggled the co-existing repertoires of 
trauma and cen. Some people, like Oloya, took hospital medicine while 
still entertaining the possibility of cen and taking herbal medicines to 
‘cool it’. Alice explained that her problems started in the camp. She would 
feel that something was suffocating her at night, and she would ‘walk 
anyhowly’ (aimlessly), keep silent, and refuse to eat. Or she saw visions 
of people moving in long lines, some with bicycles. One ajwaka told Alice 
that she had encountered cen in the camp; they offered an animal for it, 
but there was no improvement. Another ajwaka revealed that her hus-
band’s brother had killed his wife and hung up her body to look like sui-
cide. The cen of that murdered woman affected Alice because it wanted 
to make itself known and to demand that compensation be paid. The 
family did pay, and Alice no longer walks anyhowly. ‘But the cen made 
me lose sense, and now I still have a mental problem. I started getting 
medicine from the hospital when I lost my mother in 2001.’ She brought 
out a small envelope of amitriptyline. When Susan asked if she had ever 
heard of trauma, Alice replied promptly, ‘Oh yes, I have it myself. When 
you overthink, it can disorganise your brain.’ Alice explained that TPO 
staff had told her she had trauma, given her counselling, and connected 
her to the health centre where she continued to get refills of medicine. 
Asked if anything bad had happened to her during the war, she said that 
she saw a dead person, her husband’s father’s brother. The rebels had cut 
his head with an axe so it looked terrible. For Alice, as for many others, 
there were several cen possibilities: the cen from the camp, the murdered 
wife made to look like a suicide, and the victim of an LRA axe. Now the 
pharmaceutical medicine for trauma was helping, but she still believed 
she had been affected by cen.
The afflicted individuals and family members with whom we spoke 
often seemed to consider possibilities in a subjunctive mode of trying out, 
hope, puzzlement, and doubt. Irene told of her son Onek, who started 
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acting strangely some years after he returned from the bush. He would 
sit quietly and suddenly cry, ‘I did not want to kill.’ They did a traditional 
ceremony, slaughtering a goat, to release him from cen and it helped for 
some time. Then he took to leaving home early and staying in the bush, or 
walking about silently or sitting for hours on a chair; he refused food and 
lost weight. They brought him to hospital where he was given some med-
icine that helped for a while, but then he did not want to continue with 
the drugs. Irene thinks it is cen. It seems he killed someone while he was 
with the LRA. She considers her options. Maybe hospital drugs can help 
this thing? Or maybe they need to cleanse him again. She does not know.
Edith was affected herself, as she recounted, speaking too quickly 
and looking uneasy. She could forget everything in this world and just sit. 
They tried many ajwaki and offered goats, chickens, and money. Finally, 
she followed her husband’s advice to go to church and get saved, but still 
the strange spells continued. She went to hospital and took medicine for 
2 months. When there was no change, the health worker said she need 
not continue with medicine and that it was better to keep praying. One 
ajwaka said it was something her co-wife had sent, but she tended to think 
it was cen. When Lotte asked if it might be ‘trauma’, Edith remarked, ‘If it 
was trauma, the drugs would have worked.’
The repertoires of both cen and trauma continue to spread in part 
because of the way people keep on trying them out. When attempts with 
one fail, the other offers a way forward.
Co-morbidity and syndemics
One family case that we followed over 3 years (August 2011–August 
2014) allowed us the opportunity to explore how searches for cen and 
trauma treatment play out in a family context over time and how they are 
used in situations of multiple problems.
Adong is a widow in her 50s, a mother and a grandmother. When 
we first met her in 2011, she had recently exhumed the bodies of five 
family members from the Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp and 
reburied them at home. Her family was disturbed by continuous, seri-
ous problems, and she wanted to find out how to solve the issues and 
find peace in the home. The worst case was one of Adong’s grown sons 
who had been abducted for 3 years during the war. When he came back 
home he had changed and Adong thought that maybe he was afflicted 
by cen. He escaped from the LRA alone, came directly home and did not 
go through an NGO reception centre. His behaviour was unpredictable. 
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He was angry, given to alcohol and marijuana, acted crazy and threat-
ened his mother, sometimes even at night. Adong’s friends were telling 
her to take her son to an ajwaka, but she did not want to. She was a saved 
person and preferred praying for her family in church. The son had not 
been to the health centre, but Adong hoped that one of his friends could 
persuade him to go for treatment of trauma. The 10-year-old son of this 
son was also mentally unwell and behaved strangely, but he had never 
been abducted or experienced serious violence, so Adong was wondering 
what was affecting the family.
Her daughter, who was abducted when she was 13 and stayed with 
the rebels for 3 years, had relatively fewer problems. She was rescued 
by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) in Sudan and brought 
to Gulu by airplane with two children she had given birth to in the bush. 
The family heard her name announced on the radio and came to pick 
her up from the army barracks. The daughter was usually well behaved, 
but if she got into a quarrel with someone, she might threaten the other 
person saying that she could easily kill them. The son fought with the 
daughter, who complained that her brother’s problem ‘started from the 
bush’ where he had seen and done bad things. Adong thought that her 
son might have killed someone in the bush, but he did not want to talk 
about it.
The next time we saw Adong, she had moved to her father’s home 
because the ‘traumatised’ son kept disturbing her, beating her and tell-
ing her to go away. The grandson who also had a mental problem, or 
perhaps epilepsy, was not doing well, but the ‘traumatised’ son would 
not let Adong care for the grandchild and take him to the health centre. 
The family situation was further complicated by an ongoing land conflict 
between two clans. All Adong’s sons were on police bond because they 
had gone to fight the opponents. Adong and her late husband’s brother 
were the only people who knew the real boundaries. She had not told her 
sons about the boundaries because they had ‘treated her badly’ and the 
‘traumatised son’ had even threatened her with an axe.
In 2012, Adong managed to take her grandson to the health clinic 
in Awach, where he was given medicine, but there was no remarkable 
change in his condition. The health worker had told them to come back 
if the medicine did not work, and he had asked her whether this problem 
was common in their clan, so she doubted that medicine could cure him. 
Adong thought there might be ‘something running in her husband’s clan’. 
She was wondering if it was something inherited in the genes or cen fol-
lowing the clan.
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The next year she moved back to her marital home and the family 
gave up the land case, surrendering to the other clan. The grandson was 
referred to Gulu main hospital and the health workers said that he had a 
‘mental’ problem (cim, epilepsy), but even the medicine from there did 
not help. The grandson moved to his mother’s place, but Adong was still 
worried about him.
When we last saw her in August 2014, Adong seemed satisfied with 
the recent maize harvest and most of her grandchildren were thriving. 
However, the problems with the ‘traumatised son’ and the grandson con-
tinued, and her daughter’s husband had divorced her because his family 
complained that she was too rude. On top of these problems, Adong’s 
house had fallen down. Lightening had struck the house while she was 
inside with her daughter and grandchildren. A fire started, the house col-
lapsed on them, and the daughter had a shock because she ‘still had that 
trauma problem’.
‘No one was badly injured, only because I don’t have a problem with 
anyone. My house was clean [free of evil charms],’ Adong pointed out. 
She reasoned that someone had been working with an ajwaka to send 
the lightening to her house. Other family members wanted an ajwaka 
to come and ‘release those things’. Adong was suggesting that they get a 
priest to come and pray, even though she had not been praying in church 
since January. She was disappointed because she had prayed hard for the 
son, the daughter and the grandson, but there was no improvement. The 
grandson was getting worse; he did not eat and had even stopped walk-
ing. The son was still aggressive and had divorced another wife.
One of the striking issues in Adong’s family is the multitude of, and 
connections between, problems and afflictions. At an individual clinical 
level, this may be recognised as co-morbidity of PTSD, neurological and 
psychological disorders, alcoholism and other drug abuse. Yet for much 
of our material, it seems more relevant to consider the family as the unit 
of analysis, and disorders as both biological and social. Several members 
are afflicted at the same time, and these people and their problems influ-
ence and enforce each other.
Singer and Clair have suggested a syndemic approach to analyse 
how various epidemics are entwined and mutually enforcing at biologi-
cal and population levels due to harmful social conditions and injurious 
social connections (Singer and Clair 2003, 429). We suggest focusing on 
intermediary levels, in our case the family, to understand how social con-
ditions and connections play into the equation. Singer and Clair describe 
synergetic effects of alcohol abuse and HIV infection on morbidity and 
mortality for patients with HIV co-infection (Prakesh et al. cited in Singer 
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and Clair 2003, 530). Similarly, we see synergetic effects of alcohol abuse 
and behavioural disorders on the social health of families, and further-
more how afflicted individuals in a family affect each other. Thinking 
about trauma and cen as repertoires for dealing with syndemics at the 
family level allows us to foreground social dynamics. Adong’s family 
problems are caused by several contributing factors that are epidemic in 
themselves.
War can be regarded as a form of epidemic violence and the war in 
Northern Uganda was no exception. Patterns of LRA rebel attacks, mas-
sacres, and UPDF responses followed certain rhythms and escalations, 
both endemic and epidemic. Violent conflict is known to spread socially 
and geographically, and so-called fragile states with ongoing conflict 
may therefore be considered contagious and dangerous to their neigh-
bours (Harpviken 2010). The young people who were abducted into the 
LRA describe their experiences of, and participation in, violence as part 
of a larger movement they could not control, but got enrolled in. The 
brutalities that Adong’s son and daughter experienced and/or commit-
ted during their abductions were part of this epidemic of violence. The 
son’s alcoholism is part of another well-recognised epidemic phenome-
non in post-conflict Northern Uganda (Roberts et al. 2011). Land con-
flicts like the one Adong’s family was involved in, as well as other kinds of 
land conflicts, have erupted in Acholiland after the war on an epidemic 
scale (M. Whyte et al. 2013). The mistrust between Adong and her sons 
regarding the land boundaries also seems to be part of a spreading social 
atmosphere in Northern Uganda after the war (Meinert 2014). The AIDS 
epidemic and higher rates of morbidity and child mortality in the camps 
during the war also contributed to syndemic effects. These various epi-
demics and increased disorders, as well as other factors, form the syn-
demic to which cen and trauma respond as possible ways of ordering 
problems.
A biomedical perspective on PTSD would foreground the damage 
to the individual brain during traumatic events, and would regard the 
other factors merely as ‘triggers’ of disease. The syndemic concept was 
developed in response to this dominant biomedical conception of dis-
eases as distinct entities in nature, located in specific organs, separate 
from other diseases and independent of the social and cultural contexts 
in which they are found (Singer 2010, 25). The syndemic perspective 
allows us to think about disease in relational rather than categorical 
terms, and consider the importance of interacting social (and environ-
mental) conditions that promote the spread of disease. In syndemics, the 
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health effects of co-morbid conditions are not additive, but multiplicative 
(Singer 2010, 26).
We have written of cen and trauma as repertoires, ideas and dis-
courses that can be enacted to deal with problems and make them 
more understandable. However, for families in the midst of difficulties, 
cen and trauma are conditions in themselves. Not only do they seem to 
pile up with other social problems, they are also generative of some of 
these problems. For families, cen and trauma create and contribute to 
cases of domestic violence, child neglect, land conflicts and other forms 
of conflict. The violence of war transforms through cen and trauma into 
other forms of violence. It may make little sense to establish precise links 
between cause and effects in these problems because they are so inter-
twined. Fixing one problem (traumatised brains) is no magic bullet that 
solves all. Broader multi-sector approaches are needed.
We might ask whether it matters if one thinks about trauma and cen 
as repertoires, as syndemic phenomena, or as cases of co-morbidity with 
primary trauma and secondary trigger factors. It matters for the per-
ception of what kind of response is needed and how this gets organised 
(or not). Miller and Rasmussen advocate for a psychosocial approach 
in which a focus on ‘daily stressors’ is equally important as the focus on 
traumatic events themselves. Based on this they argue for broader inter-
vention programmes that aim at improving a variety of social conditions 
(Miller and Rasmussen 2010). Neuner, Ertl and colleagues, who work 
through Vivo in Northern Uganda, prioritise trauma-focused therapy 
(in their case narrative exposure therapy) because this has been sci-
entifically proven to be an effective way of dealing with PTSD (Neuner 
2010; Ertl et al. 2010). The Vivo group argues convincingly that a small 
organisation cannot gain expertise in what they do if they have to work 
in several sectors. From an NGO point of view, it may be more satisfying 
to be able to prove that you are doing something about the specific prob-
lem (PTSD) that you set out to solve. If we take Adong’s family or some 
of the others we have spoken to as a point of departure, it is clear that 
trauma-focused therapy would only solve a fraction of the intertwined 
problems in a family. However, this fraction might make a difference in 
the whole configuration.
The other issue we would like to highlight in Adong’s story, which 
is characteristic in many cases, is the pragmatics and micro-politics of 
finding solutions. If cen and trauma may be different repertoires for deal-
ing with the same kinds of afflictions, it is important to underscore that 
they have micro-political implications for the actors involved. Different 
members of the same family have different views on their efficacy; for 
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some, cen ideas and practices are unenlightened and unchristian. Even 
the same person may hold different views and try different possibili-
ties over time. Finding out about problems, establishing diagnoses and 
organising solutions are often complicated social processes and those 
who are afflicted may not be interested in the kind of help available. In 
some areas, as in Awach sub-county, only few options exist. They do not 
include narrative exposure therapy, but a rather overburdened health 
centre that dispenses amitriptyline, ajwaki who divine and propose ani-
mal offerings and churches where people can pray. Few (like Adong) are 
dogmatic and exclusive believers in ‘hospital’, ‘traditional’ or ‘church’ 
therapy, but search for possible solutions and try out the options availa-
ble. If one of the strategies turns out to work, then the therapeutic jour-
ney comes to an end. However, in most cases we have come across, the 
search for solutions seems to be ongoing.
A syndemic of problems
We began by asking if and how trauma might take hold and spread in 
Northern Uganda and we tried to answer the question by examining how 
trauma as a repertoire was appropriated within a local landscape where 
cen was also spreading. We considered both trauma and cen to be potential 
plans of action to which concerned families might turn for help with grave 
problems. Diverging from and complementing the focus of Fassin and 
Rechtman, we considered the possibility of an ‘empire of trauma’ from the 
viewpoint of the remote territories rather than the metropole. We thought 
that an empire would not only reflect shifting moral sensibilities at the 
centre. To be considered an empire, to exist and be sustainable, it should 
also provide solutions that people actually use in managing ‘dis-ease’. 
There would be a treatment infrastructure that provides acknowledged 
relief in a given territory of the empire. On these grounds, we found that 
the hegemony of trauma was questionable. The insufficiency of trauma as 
diagnosis and treatment of the problems people experience is reflected in 
the spread of the older repertoire of cen as a possible way forward.
The very real epidemic of problems that people in Northern Uganda 
confront is propelled by vicious circles of violence that keep affecting 
families long after the war has ended. Rather than seeking to trace ‘an 
empire of trauma’, our approach has been ethnographic, starting with 
people such as Wilma in her kitchen. From this perspective, we see fam-
ilies contaminated by problems and violence. Both trauma and cen are 
communicable in this post-war landscape.
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Notes
1. ‘Nuer told me that a man who has witnessed a killing, though he had no part in it, yet if he 
keeps silence, will suffer misfortune because it is like as though he had hidden the [dead] man.’ 
(Evans-Pritchard 1956,174).
2. Acholi men experienced modern warfare serving in the King’s African Rifles in the Second 
World War. Behrend cites Okot p’Bitek on the religious crisis provoked by the death of men in 
faraway lands and the fear that they would become ‘bad ghosts’ because their bodies were ‘left 
in the wilderness’ rather than buried at home (Behrend 1999, 110).
3. The foundation also supports two other similar clinics in Northern Uganda.
4. An interesting parallel to the co-existence of trauma and cen is found in a study of nightmares 
and trauma in post-conflict Aceh by Grayman and colleagues. With findings from a large qual-
itative and quantitative field research project, they point out that even though ‘nightmares’, 
which are perceived to be the work of mischievous spirits called jin, are not reported as part 
of PTSD symptoms, those who are diagnosed with PTSD are also more likely to experience jin 
‘nightmares’(Grayman et al. 2009).
5. This contrasts with the finding by Neuner et al. (2012) that 70 per cent had gone to a church or 
priest for healing.
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Extinction and Time amid Climate 
Change or What is a Horizon?
Adriana Petryna
How is extinction being understood, witnessed, and debated in the early 
twenty-first century? What are the limits of determinism in conceiving 
its complexity? What other sorts of useful imaginaries, past and present, 
grapple with increasingly unpredictable and physically incoherent real-
ities linked to a changing climate? These are some of the questions this 
essay addresses as it critically explores how the pinning of life within a 
predictable or deterministic process obstructs scientific reasoning about 
how ecosystems come under threat in an age of climate change. Specifi-
cally, it addresses the problem of surprising, even catastrophic, shifts in 
nature’s ecologies, and explores some of the epistemological and moral 
complexities of an emerging ‘abrupt change’ climate science. Such com-
plexities, no doubt, signal biodeterminism’s end. However, what is at 
stake in this end? As this essay suggests, it is no longer just the work of 
genetic- environmental interactions or a more general calling into ques-
tion of the universality of biological truth. Rather, it is the difficulty, 
and necessity, of horizoning work, or a distinct kind of human labour in 
which the fate of entire systems (be they organisms, ecologies, or worlds) 
is at stake.
Crossing points of no return
Marten Scheffer, a well-known Dutch lake ecologist, picks up a flask of 
clear water containing Daphnia (water fleas), one of hundreds of simi-
lar flasks filled with zooplankton and cyanobacteria sitting on the white 
shelves of his laboratory at Wageningen University in the Netherlands. He 
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shows me a small steel object (a microenvironment) holding a laser beam 
and some organic lake matter. He jokingly calls this microenvironment 
‘the ICU of water fleas’. In one experiment, Scheffer and a doctoral stu-
dent of his are measuring the time it takes for an algae microecosystem 
to recover from slowly deteriorating environmental conditions (a slight 
temperature increase in this case). After each increase the microecosys-
tem’s rate of recovery will begin a ‘critical slowing down’, tending toward 
a point of irreversible non-recovery. At this stage, smaller increments of 
temperature increase will begin to trigger more qualitative shifts. Before 
this happens, however, the ecosystem will ‘flicker’,1 jumping undecidedly 
for a while between ‘alternative stable states,’ before it loses resilience or 
free-falls into ‘extinction’.
What is extinction? And what do lakes, water fleas, and algae have 
in common? They are communities of living organisms that are said to 
have observable tipping points, or points of no return that result from 
small perturbations that can set off radical change, what in contempo-
rary ecology are known as regime shifts, or a rapid alteration in the 
organisation and dynamics of ecosystems, with protracted outcomes.2 
In his classic essay about lake life, entitled ‘The Lake as a Microcosm’, 
Stephen Forbes, a founder of aquatic ecosystem science, mused on the 
properties of regime shifts this way: ‘The animals of such a body of water 
are, as a whole, remarkably isolated, closely related among themselves 
in all their interests, but so far independent of the land about them that 
if every terrestrial animal were suddenly annihilated, it would doubtless 
be long before the general multitude of the inhabitants of the lake would 
feel the effects of this event in any important way.’3
Forbes highlights an uncertain time trajectory, from total isolation 
to total surprise, inherent in the concept of an ecological regime shift. 
Rapid modifications in ecosystem dynamics, their cause-and-effect rela-
tions, are invisible to the lake organisms themselves and introduce an 
‘invisible present’ with respect to their sensing demise.4 This work is 
one of many experimental efforts to reconcile the timing of such shifts 
with current bodies of scientific knowledge.5 Such research inspired the 
2013 US. National Academy of Sciences report, Abrupt Impacts of Climate 
Change: Anticipating surprises, which called for substantial funding for 
a new ‘abrupt change’ climate science that could help recognise signs 
(like flickering) thought to portend potentially catastrophic changes in a 
variety of vulnerable ecosystems. While much progress has been made in 
predicting sea-level rise and tracking the paths of hurricanes, for exam-
ple, the potential for destructively surprising regime shifts is now recog-
nised as very real.6
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The kinds of changes at stake are familiar: rising temperatures, 
stronger storms, increased fire frequencies, decreases in Arctic sea ice. 
Many of these changes are not gradual, but are happening abruptly or 
within much shorter-than-projected timescales (within one person 
or professional’s lifetime or a few years and decades, not centuries). 
According to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) charged with tracking atmospheric and oceanic changes, the 
years 2010–2019 constitute a ‘landmark decade’ in terms of disaster- 
related costs. Droughts, wildfires, hurricanes, and tornadoes and other 
natural disasters have been more severe or frequent and less foreseeable 
than in the past, disproportionately hurting poorer regions and margin-
alised communities. That decade (as compared to the previous decade) 
saw double the number of ‘billion-dollar disasters’: the signs of ‘shift[ing] 
so far into a new climate regime that probabilities have been turned on 
their head.’7 Indeed, what preoccupies most scientists is not proving the 
existence of climate change, that is a settled case, but of finding the tools 
of ensuring existence in the face of undeniable threat.
What’s new about these changes? To date, much of the research on 
the physical climate has focused on linear extrapolations from recent his-
tory. Change, be it in biology, ecology, economics, or statistics, has often 
been predicated on the assumption of a smooth transition. Considerations 
of stair-step, non-linear or abrupt change – and how they can take on the 
‘catastrophic’ form that they do – occupy the margins of statistical signifi-
cance. Linear models can also inflate senses of agency and human control. 
In climate science, for example, there has been an assumption that ‘slow 
[or gradual] processes pose small risks’ and that ‘a choice can always be 
made to quickly reduce emissions and thereby reverse any harm within a 
few years or decades’.8 In economics models discounting future damages 
assume that time can be bought. Yet mechanisms of temporal discount-
ing avoid the problem of possible irreversible damage. Furthermore, a 
built-in assumption of stability in social and economic systems may not 
hold. There are myths in ecology too that perpetuate an inflated sense of 
control, one being what I think of as a myth of infinite adaptability. Noting 
this myth and its ironies, eminent evolutionary ecologist Simon Levin at 
Princeton told me: ‘There’s no evolution working at [some] level to make 
sure that the [earth] system is preserved. So, we may be filling up – we 
are filling up the atmosphere – with pollutants and greenhouse gases and 
things of that sort. Maybe we’ll survive that, but maybe we won’t, there’s 
no mechanism … We may be adapting ourselves to extinction.’9
In short, the human adaptive calculus is alarmingly off on many 
levels. As with Forbes’ doomed fish, it lacks a reference point around 
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which to orient an expectation (of survival). While the fish perish in 
their sensory myopia, humans have something more than ‘happy’ isola-
tion or a stark surrender (to inevitability) as their options. There is work 
to be done that I have been calling horizoning work in opening up time 
or, rather, in gaining the conditions for responsiveness in a race against 
time. As doubt-mongering noise of climate deniers in the US continues, 
a culture of common sense that can contend with the ‘large realm of the 
given and undeniable’ is yet to be crafted.10 The National Academies 
Report’s principal author, geoscientist James White, underscored such 
sentiments and needs when he stated in a public briefing that scientists 
must address ‘areas of observation where we are largely blind … As a scien-
tist, my hope is that we can study the planet well enough, monitor it well 
enough, understand it well enough, that we’re not going to be blindsided. 
As a realist, I’m pretty sure we’re going to be blindsided.’ Blindsidedness, 
White states, is now a structural feature of climate change science and 
policy.11 Nature’s old resiliencies in the face of pressure are no longer a 
given and scientists and policymakers alike say we need radically new 
maps of potential imminent threats, or, in the language of contemporary 
regime shift science, of tipping points and points of no return.
The idea of a clear and distinct threshold or a tipping point (popu-
larised by Malcolm Gladwell’s book of the same name (Gladwell 2002)) 
has an overly seductive precision in the ecological domain. However, in 
the material sciences (and in engineering especially), the state of knowl-
edge about various ‘thresholds’ of instability and qualitative change 
is well described. In living systems, a tipping point is a mathematical 
characterisation and component of what French topologist René Thom 
(1923–2002) called ‘structural stability’ (Thom 1975). In revealing some 
of the ways systems lose ‘resilience’, tipping points demarcate borders 
between the structurally stable, ‘those things that are knowable,’12 and 
what lies beyond this knowability, or the things that scientists have yet to 
learn that would satisfactorily account for the stability of forms. Tipping 
points do not reveal why these systems evolve or how they adapt, but they 
do tell us something about how a system remains stable at all. ‘Regime 
shifting’, ‘catastrophic folds’, and ‘alternative stable states’ are just a few 
of the exuberant, René Thom-inspired terms to point to these enigmas 
(which, to be sure, are somewhat on the edge of mainstream evolution-
ary ecology). Many ecologists are employing them today to mathemat-
ically describe something as benign as how a certain snail shell is not a 
type of clam shell, or something as terrifying as how familiar habitats and 
forms of life can give way, without much warning, to entirely new and 
unfamiliar ecological states.
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Mathematically inspired ecologists are actively applying Thom’s 
‘catastrophe theory’ to trace the complex ‘locking in’ of different forms, 
states and ecologies.13 The question of tipping points, or the dynamic of 
the actual transition or ‘flip’, exceeds what theories of natural selection 
or models of host–predator interactions can make sense of, and it makes 
extinction, near-extinction, and the ‘hour’ of extinction for that matter 
not at all transparent phenomena.14 In other words, tipping points are 
epistemologically charged constructs that mark a hiatus of expert knowl-
edge about what (alternate states) exist or co-exist once certain critical 
thresholds are crossed and about the forms futures will take.
It should be noted that the past is replete with evidence of abrupt 
shifts that are without signs of apparent proximate causes. The Sahara 
Desert, for example, was made up of wetlands 6,000 years ago, until it 
switched to a desert-like condition. My anthropological investigation into 
the models and tools that are being developed to understand and manage 
environmental risks has taken me to various scientific fields where tipping 
points or various threshold transitions are being quantified (for instance, 
in shallow lake ecology, deep lake ecology, and coral reef ecology). As I 
explore the science of ‘critical transitions’, I ask about where that science 
comes from historically and how it is being applied to ecological concepts 
of overstressed nature. In the process, I am crafting a genealogy of a dif-
ferent pursuit of form in the twentieth century among a line of scientific 
iconoclasts who did not accept the evolutionary modality of minute vari-
ation through gradual differentiation. Among others, René Thom, whose 
catastrophe theory was once highly discredited, is now being vindicated.
Indeed, ecosystem changes are happening with surprising speed or 
within much shorter-than-projected timescales. In exploring both tem-
poral and topological aspects of tipping points (this side of the tipping 
point, opposite the blind side), we also grapple with conditions in which 
given knowledge bases are insufficient more broadly. Within an unde-
marcated space of abrupt ecological change, questions of how far or near 
or over vital thresholds we are, call for new experimental and projective 
media. In what follows, I address the problem of surprising, even cat-
astrophic, shifts in nature’s ecologies, tracing some antecedents of an 
emerging regime shift science. Then I explore dimensions of this science 
(linked to temporal and topological uncertainties of such shifts) and 
illustrate some of its challenges and public policy stakes. Lastly, I probe 
how an unfamiliar and even ‘runaway’ nature poses problems of faltering 
projection and of projective deficit. In this context, I offer the idea of hori-
zoning work as a new kind of projective medium for the problem-space of 
survival at various thresholds of irreversible change.
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On the nature of ‘catastrophic’ forms
The problem of surprising or abrupt shifts, ultimately, goes back to a 
profoundly heterodox (at least for its time), mathematical science of 
form – morphology.15 This is a division of science that was relegated to an 
intellectual periphery with the twentieth century rise of scientific deter-
minism and molecular-genetic techniques which fixed on reduction and 
mechanism as founding principles of efficient cause. Part of René Thom’s 
inspiration begins with those who attempted to theorise evolution 
against teleological Darwinian (and later molecularised neo-Darwinian) 
determinisms, and in terms of an ‘ordinary process of causality’, that is, 
the imprints, stresses, and compressions, of outside physical forces. The 
work of Scottish zoologist, mathematician and classicist, D’Arcy Thomp-
son (1860–1948) is exemplary in this respect. Thompson pioneered the 
scientific explanation of morphogenesis and what he believed he could 
illustrate graphically: the logic of shape change in living forms.
In his classic 1917 book, On Growth and Form, Thompson elab-
orated on what he believed were purely mechanical forces acting on 
and shaping bodies. He showed, for example, that the change from, 
let’s say, a puffer fish to an ocean sunfish (mola mola) or vice versa 
can be explained by the conversion of a rectangular coordinate logic, in 
this instance, into a curvilinear one (Figure 9.1). The coordinate system 
Figure 9.1 Transformation of a puffer fish into an ocean sunfish (mola 
mola).  Source: On Growth and Form (Thompson 1917).
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Figure 9.2 ‘The Epigenetic Landscape’. Source: Waddington, C. H. 
1966. Principles of Development and Differentiation. New York and 
London: Macmillan. Wellcome Collection. CC BY-NC 4.0. 
expands the posterior section of the puffer fish to create corresponding 
points between both the puffer and mola mola. Thompson was mainly 
interested in hypothesising the workings of virtual coordinate net in 
real space. That is, given the fields of physical forces that exist in the 
universe at different scales and at different places, certain morphol-
ogies and not others will emerge. This is a very idiosyncratic view of 
morphogenesis that, perhaps justifiably (from a Darwinian perspective), 
was thrown into the dustbin of history. ‘The triumph of Darwinism,’ 
Stephen Jay Gould once commented, ‘did not assure an adequate treat-
ment of form.’ The prominent evolutionary theorist wrote admiringly 
of Thompson’s work, but called his On Growth and Form an ‘unusable 
masterpiece’.16
Thompson failed to ignite a research programme in his lifetime, 
but in asking by what ‘equation of motion’ an ocean sunfish morphs into 
puffer fish, a snail into a clam, etc., Thompson laid the groundwork for 
further developments in the mathematical study of growth and form. 
Twentieth-century British paleontologist, philosopher, and developmen-
tal biologist Conrad Waddington (who would collaborate and publish 
with René Thom), drew insights from D’Arcy Thompson’s nets and the-
orised morphological processes in what he called epigenetic landscapes 
(Waddington 1957). Waddington coined epigenetics as a branch of biol-
ogy that analyses the linkages between genes and their products that 
give rise to phenotypes.17 His original idea was, like Thompson’s, largely 
topological, pointing to possible physical evolutions of form via virtual 
constructs that would take decades for the scientific community to appre-
ciate and test.
198 BIOSOCIAL WORLDS
The epigenetic landscape illustrated the conceptual properties of a develop-
ing living system. Let us say the ball at the top (Figure 9.2) represents a cell, 
and it progresses along one valley or developmental pathway out of a possi-
ble set of pathways (‘chreode’). At the terminus of each chreode is a discrete 
outcome of differentiation, and that outcome is in a ‘stable state’ (a crucial 
idea for later critical transitions ecologists). Once those balls reach their 
stability state, they are said to be in a state of so-called resilience.18 Yet the 
‘stability cup’ in which a ball turns into a tree, for example, can always ‘flip’ 
toward a different state and the tree can assume some other form. A sense of 
a (topological) accident, not a mechanistically pre-determined macroscopic 
whole, is brought to the centre of intellectualisation.
What René Thom (the catastrophe theorist who inspired research into 
‘critical transitions’ or abrupt ecosystem changes) took from Waddington’s 
epigenetic landscapes and Thompson’s coordinate nets before him is a logic 
of abrupt change, which he attempted to formalise as a distinctive, if some-
what obscure, heuristic. Thom, attentive to the ridges of Waddington’s 
landscape (right when something decides to become something else), 
redefined them as ‘catastrophic bifurcations’ that he made amenable to 
mathematical formulas of non-linear formal behaviour.
This brief excursus into the unorthodoxies of form represents one 
historical instance of an ‘end of biodeterminism’ (Napier 2014). Here, the 
‘nature’ of catastrophic forms – how living forms stay stable and ‘resilient,’ 
or how they abruptly shift, change, or disappear – can be considered anew, 
as certain theoretical constructs used in ecology today highlight the pecu-
liar behavioural and formal ‘openness’ of (eco)systems. While some eco-
systems lack ‘convincingly established’ tipping points, recent abrupt and 
non-linear changes have prompted researchers to expand their toolkits 
for making sense of how near irreversible shifts may be.19 In this research 
even signs of stabilisation are suspect. For example, a recent slowdown in 
the increase of the earth’s surface temperature had been observed even 
though greenhouse gases have been accumulating in the atmosphere ‘at a 
record pace’.20 Was this slowdown mere business as usual, luck, or a sign 
that an ecosystem is drawing closer to some critical boundary?
Navigating non-parametric worlds
In the scientific void of how ‘surprises’ come about, what is observed 
instead is an intricate superstructure of accumulating surprises, consist-
ing of overlaid climate events whose net physical interactions and impacts 
are unknown. For example, in characterising key scientific challenges in 
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the wake of Hurricane Sandy, which caused severe damage in both the 
Caribbean and along the US Atlantic coast, Marcia McNutt, the former 
director of the US Geological Survey, stated: ‘It is not the gradual rise 
of sea level that is going to get anyone. It is the combination of extreme 
events superimposed on that gradual rise … that will destroy our natu-
ral protection and offer much less protection for future storms.’21 That 
is, any estimation of destruction in the future must be recalibrated in 
accordance with lowering baselines of protection in entire ecosystems. 
McNutt notes, ‘We have already crossed a threshold. Superstorm Sandy 
was a threshold, and we crossed it.’ The threshold here, however, is not 
only one of heightened physical danger, but of faltering projection and 
of  limited human coordinating powers (leading to lost opportunities for 
enacting precautionary measures). Here, what scientists are used to call-
ing a problem of uncertainty requiring more data may, in fact, be a com-
plex system on the verge of collapse. The crossing-over McNutt refers to 
also suggests a potential for blindsidedness – not only of not knowing but 
of the potentially high cost of ‘overfitting’ new data within older models 
that themselves must be changed or discarded to deal with the climate 
change hyperobject.22
Yet the key to managing or conserving living ecosystems within 
this hyperobject may not be more knowledge, but the effective schema-
tisation of the knowledge that already exists. In 2009, 29 internation-
ally renowned scientists published a comprehensive assessment of the 
state of knowledge of nine earth systems (linked to climate change, 
biodiversity loss, biogeochemical change, ocean acidification, land use, 
freshwater contamination, ozone depletion, atmospheric aerosols, and 
chemical pollution) and identified their ‘planetary boundaries’, within 
which ‘humanity can continue to develop and thrive’ and beyond which 
‘abrupt or irreversible environmental changes’ might ensue. According to 
the authors of the planetary boundaries concept, ‘Our proposed bounda-
ries are rough, first estimates, only surrounded by large uncertainties and 
knowledge gaps.’23 While some boundaries have been clearly identified, 
the boundary for atmospheric aerosol loading cannot yet be determined. 
The climate-change critical threshold has already been transgressed, yet 
how far past that threshold is not known.
Importantly, such work diverges from an era of climate science in 
which, on the one hand, every grand scientific assessment of climate 
challenges cannot push too far or is ‘larded with caveats’24 or, on the other 
hand, in which every new disaster is regarded as a latest wake-up call. 
The planetary boundaries concept provides a crucial limit-image with 
which to make sense of the causal potential of human destructive action, 
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now stretching across dimensions of geologic time and global space, as 
well as a map of sorts to fathom this non-parametric world.
The work of demarcating safe distances from alleged points of no 
return can also invite danger and arrogance. Paul Ehrlich’s ‘Population 
Bomb’ (1968) is a case in point, fueling hysteria in the 70s and 80s of 
the prospect of mass starvation from overpopulation and used to justify 
repressive reproductive policies. To some sceptics, the planetary bounda-
ries concept might look, in fact, like a grand exercise in hubris. Detractors 
claim that there are plenty of ecosystems that lack early- warning sig-
nals.25 Such signals can be said to be missing in other kinds of ‘extinction’ 
processes. The precise location of extinction boundaries separating the 
great geologic periods has confounded geologists. Prediction of time of 
imminent death to allow referral of cancer-stricken humans to a separate 
room remains elusive. Long before physiological tolerances to high tem-
peratures predominate, other proximate factors can cause scenes of fatal 
‘temporal mismatch’, as when hosts and predators do not migrate at a 
similar pace in response to warming. The tipping points that presumably 
lurk in bodies, ecosystems, and geologic records are literally intangible. 
Rather, the trajectories of species or habitat survival unfold in a chaotic 
‘borrowed time’ and space.26
Indeed, efforts to establish planetary boundaries in the face of 
many unknowns depart from the previous modus operandi for quanti-
fying risk – standard techniques of risk assessment based on probability, 
the maximisation of expected utility, cost-benefit calculation, or scenario 
forecasting. Embedding pre-constructed values and arbitrary endpoints, 
such techniques tend to leave ambiguity out. They isolate some aspect of 
uncertainty, narrow its scope, and thus offer only temporary cognitive 
control. As such, relatively short-term horizons are more conducive to 
strategic decision making. Even the time horizons that scientists employ 
in risk projections are fairly random. The well-known Stabilisation 
Wedges, for example, project out to 50 years (the typical span of a sci-
entist’s career). What about the cases in which there is no probabilistic 
data? Or those for which we have no way to know how seemingly random 
variables may take on value in the future? Or cases in which ‘the relevant 
sources of uncertainty, are difficult to identify?’27
The concept of planetary boundaries doesn’t need the absence of 
ambiguity to contend with unpredictable (or unquantifiable) wholes. 
One could say that the idea functions more like prevention in public 
health, inviting broad strategies rather than ‘magic bullet’ solutions.28 
We can never ‘test’ the efficacy of prevention strategies in advance, just as 
we will never know how many plagues, infections, or disasters have been 
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averted by our persistent reliance on them. In shifting the focus from 
old kinds of uncertainty (about the reality of climate change or whether 
humans cause it) to new kinds (related to over abundant ambiguities and 
related semi-empirical positioning of critical thresholds), the planetary 
boundaries concept embeds existing knowledge about climate change in 
a new qualitative dimension.
Horizoning work
That the earth is a dynamic system capable of both gradual and expo-
nential change suggests processes that, we might say, have been poorly 
horizoned so far. Rather than banishing uncertainties at our own peril, 
horizoning work turns them into schemes that can be held to long enough 
to keep the earth’s forests, oceans, and biospheres intact. But how dura-
ble is that grip? How shall we reckon with nature’s adaptive calculus and 
make our own? For example, what is the right target for stabilising long-
term concentrations of carbon dioxide to avoid ‘dangerous interference 
with the climate system’? Or, is it desirable to ‘cap species extinctions at 10 
times the background rate, as is being advised?’29 The planetary bound-
aries cannot answer these questions, that is because their answers will 
always depend on some other unknown variables, including the ‘com-
plexities of interconnected slow and fast processes and feedbacks in the 
earth System’ that will always make the answers partial.30
It is this space of partial knowledge that invites a potentially dan-
gerous form of misrecognition about the nature of (borrowed) time and 
the future. Across disaster domains, we see ample evidence of how, for 
example, the arbitrary temporal horizoning of expected risk (as with, for 
example, 100-year-return periods in hurricane forecasting) or interven-
tion ‘overkill’ (as with earlier attempts to control the weather) leaves the 
very problem of danger and its timing unaccounted for. In the context 
of this kind of epistemic uncertainty, there is a fascinating, if topically 
diverse, literature about efforts to invent shared temporality with run-
away change in the hopes of restoring ‘system’ stabilisation. Be it navi-
gation of treacherous seas or thinning ice, what escapes perception (a 
horizon line or a precarious patch of ice) is precisely what becomes an 
object of conditioned or acculturated thought.31
Historical and anthropological work on the intimacy of knowledge 
of collapsing ice sheets, glacier retreats, earthquake occurrences, or the 
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timing of any of these events that typically escapes calculation, is emerg-
ing.32 To these we can attach a body of forgotten classic ethnographic 
texts on traditional navigation that show how navigators make the best 
of partial information and, at the very least, assure us that we are not 
alone in needing a better art of interference in worlds of physical incoher-
ence. Of the Puluwat navigators of Micronesia, Thomas Gladwin wrote, 
‘[T]he sea is a demanding master. No style of thinking will survive which 
cannot produce a usable product when survival is at stake.’33 In a more 
contemporary illustration of navigation, anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup 
shows how Thule hunters of Northwest Greenland must navigate on thin-
ning ice according to new diagrams (a ‘diagrammatic imagination’ that 
‘moves beyond calculation to orientation by other means of navigation’). 
There are, she notes, ‘lots of lateral clues to the state of the sea-ice, and 
the hunters have to move by an implicit diagram of their interrelations’.34 
Such local knowledge suggests a form of self-preservation based not in 
more knowledge, but in an effective use of the pre-existing knowledge. 
This self-preservation aims to restore epistemic coherence amid condi-
tions of potential incoherence, if only for an instant of stability for forward 
movement. What is tested in this recovered space of ‘borrowed’ time are 
techniques of projection affording real cognisance of jeopardy to whole 
systems, in this case, to human communities surviving on sea or ice.
The word horizon derives from the ancient Greek ὁρίζω (horizō), 
meaning ‘I mark out a boundary’, and from ὅρος (oros), ‘boundary’ or 
‘landmark’. Across time and many cultures of expertise, people have used 
the horizon concept as a strategic point of reference in the navigation 
of different kinds of physically incoherent worlds. Renaissance archi-
tects used ‘horizon lines’ to properly orient objects in three-dimensional 
space. Early modern surveyors devised mercury-filled ‘artificial horizons’ 
to create an image of a level surface against which the ‘inconstancy of 
the terrestrial horizon’ can be judged.35 Today, robotics engineers encode 
‘predictive horizons’ in remote machines (such as extraterrestrial rovers) 
to allow for autonomous self-correction in the navigation of craterous 
conditions on Mars. In meeting such course-plotting challenges, data 
from the past is useful, but only up to a point. Precisely when prior expe-
rience is no longer useful and prediction capability derived from past or 
present information becomes misleading (or yields high computational 
cost or instability), a new ‘predictive horizon’ must be put into place.36 
Here the system (a boat, a lifeway, a future) to be stabilised takes prece-
dence over the object of uncertainty to be known.
As these examples suggest, horizoning includes an array of calcu-
lative processes in the interface of ‘system’ survival and a blindsiding (or 
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crashing or disappearing) state. It involves working against projective 
deficit as well as testing and assembling appropriate ‘scaling rules’ for 
recognising and ‘maintaining a safe distance from dangerous thresh-
olds’.37 Such work requires demarcation or ‘incrementing’, using known 
parameters, but it is also a practice of continuous self-correction vis-
à-vis changing baselines of safety and knowable risk. In most extreme 
conditions, horizoning work entails a fine-tuned awareness of a system’s 
exposure to jeopardy, without which navigators will inevitably be ‘flying 
blind’. Horizons of all sorts have made complexity temporarily actionable 
within a particular human or technical frame. Horizon thinking ‘makes 
good’ on faulty or fleeting information and allows movement forward or 
prevention of a (literal) crash or disappearance of an entire system. The 
fact of entire trajectories, machines, or worlds being at stake is precisely 
what makes horizons so real.
Biodeterminisms versus ‘remote futures’
When the reality of abrupt change does not always conform to conven-
tional expectations, and when ‘there is no mechanism’ of its rationalisa-
tion, it is no surprise that scientists and policymakers alike are in search 
of new theories. Today, various scientific communities are grappling with 
images of form-succession past critical thresholds; models are still largely 
anchored in temporal dynamics that are either overly gradual or arbitrar-
ily set. Scientists working in the area of regime change puzzle over evo-
lutionary questions not only in terms of adaptation, but also in terms of 
shifts into ‘alternative stable states’. They are attempting to create a ‘search 
image’ that can travel along the frontiers of the observable and the unob-
servable, undermining notions of static equilibrium and linear change. 
This search image suggests that what scientists have been accustomed 
to calling an uncertainty problem requiring more data may, in fact, be a 
complex system on the edge of unforeseen collapse. This fact alone pre-
sents an ethical choice in scientific research, to provide more data about 
the fact of uncertainty or to provide reasonable schemes for navigating 
that uncertainty while also contending with given and undeniable risk. 
Within these complex realms, horizons present us initially with fleeting 
if somewhat arbitrary endpoints, where vision literally disappears. They 
shed this arbitrary quality and reveal their value in coordinating human 
movement in spite of always incomplete knowledge. One could say that 
arrival at a desired endpoint is their final product (and reward).
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Horizons, in other words, make temporal and scalar potential out of 
the unpredictable, giving direction and affording movement. As the early 
progenitors of regime shift science suggested (Thompson, Waddington and 
Thom), abrupt changes in nature require knowledge as well as forms of 
speculation that resist the claim to a fully determined technique. The idea 
that one must dismantle something in order to understand is untenable 
in contemporary ecological worlds. In moving away from an established 
evolutionary telos or orderly nestings of the genetic/micro- and environ-
ment/macro-scales, they showed how a new ground for critical reflection 
in uncertain worlds is required. While today there is much critique of micro- 
reductionism in the natural and social sciences (the atom, the gene, the 
rational actor, and so forth), there is macro-reductionism in science too that 
keeps observers in a kind of horizonless myopia.38 For example, biological 
systems are now said to have emergent macroscopic or macrosocial proper-
ties that determine their components. Individual ‘agents’ interact with each 
other according to ‘altruistic’ or ‘selfish’ agendas, motives, or algorithms 
that can ostensibly be derived from the aggregate behaviour of such phe-
nomena as a school of fish, or a beehive. Epigenetics in its current incar-
nation is said to solve the nature–nurture debate ‘that has divided life and 
social scientists for many years’.39 However, Margaret Lock and others have 
argued that despite this apparent shift of focus beyond the molecular, the 
fetishisation of the gene (as well as the epigenome) continues, albeit in a 
macro- reductionist form.40 Scientific macro-reductionism (as with micro- 
reductionism) contains an array of unsubstantiated onto- epistemological 
and moral claims about the social, humans, and animals alike.
As the editors in this volume suggest, the purpose of biodetermin-
ism’s critique ‘is not to simply draw the pendulum towards the culture 
side’ (Introduction, this volume). If there is any larger lesson to derive 
from the stark epistemic questions raised by ongoing ecological regime 
shifts accelerated by climate change, it is that the science of nature and 
the science of the social must be recaptured from current macro- and 
micro-reductionisms. As complex phenomena like behaviour and biology 
become ‘fundamentally informational and statistical’, the social breaks 
down into meaningless bits of data points to be repurposed for economic, 
health, and surveillance-driven prediction sciences and algorithms.41 
Worlds that are structurally misaligned with, and misunderstood within, 
these algorithms can become the target of more bias. Keeping check on 
what these algorithms create (natures) or prescribe (stereotypes/oppres-
sive norms) remains crucial.
The problem of being blindsided by regime shifts within our 
envelopes of life is a serious one, challenging the ‘Darwinist luggage of 
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adaptive evolution’ (Introduction, this volume). Rather than jumping too 
often and too quickly to final scenarios, the trouble of blindsidedness is 
one worth ‘staying with’.42 It also echoes classic anthropological trouble 
linked to temporal distancing and a denial of shared or coeval time.43 
Critical transitions scientists and their forgotten or misunderstood fore-
bears attempted to redefine temporal and spatial proximity to natural 
phenomena outside the biological dogmas of their time. The attempt to 
render nature as coeval with scientific inquiry was paramount for Conrad 
Waddington, for example. What he issued in his epigenetic landscapes 
was more than an ‘environmental addendum’ to genetic theories,44 but 
what he called the need for a ‘biologically useful topology’ that could 
illuminate pathways of change in (what he called) ‘remote futures’. His 
rebuke of dogmatic neo-Darwinist attachments of ‘fitness coefficients to 
genotypes’ came with vivid quips: ‘If a horse is escaping from a tiger by 
running away, neither the tiger – nor anyone else – is interested in its gen-
otype.’45 Temporality and topology became key antidotes to the growing 
problem of biodeterminism and the objects it purported to describe.
Today this biodeterminism itself creates problems of projection or, 
rather, a looming projective deficit in which sudden, dramatic, or irrevers-
ible processes readily produce apocalyptic thinking. As I showed, there is 
a critical gap between knowledge of climate change phenomena and their 
interacting sources of uncertainty that engenders a runaway nature. In the 
process, not only has ‘the uncertainty in the models used for prediction 
been underestimated’,46 but so has uncertainty in the ecological phenom-
ena themselves. Such an unsafe distance from suspected points of ecologi-
cal no return itself carries dangerous potential for misrecognition about the 
nature of borrowed time. Rapid modifications in ecosystem dynamics (and 
their cause-and-effect relations) form an invisible present with respect to 
a sensing of demise. Attuned to the existential hazards of such a present, I 
have drawn from scientific and anthropological modes of attention to argue 
for a distinct kind of intellectual and ethical work, a horizoning work, amid 
the uncertainties of time and physical worlds that are on edge.
Notes
1. This activity is part of what is called a ‘critical slowing-down’ (Scheffer et al. 2009). ICU refers 
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2. See Carpenter 2003; Scheffer et al. 2001, 2009. CO2 emissions are the cause today of significant 
human and ecological disruption. Their doubling in the next few decades demands better ways of 
apprehending the poorly understood thresholds of ecological regime shifts and species extinction.
3. Forbes 1887, my italics.
4. On the invisible present concept, see Magnuson 1990 and Petryna 2017.
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Something surprising has happened to social and cultural anthropology 
in recent years: a new rapprochement with the natural sciences. Sud-
denly, it is possible to read an article in anthropology and learn about 
the social lives of bacteria and the difference between those interactions 
with bacteriophages that kill the bacteria and those that offer them an 
advantage. Such departures from humanistic convention add a new 
excitement to the field; unexpected openings multiply. The contributors 
to this volume are developing a new kind of curiosity that brings them 
from the intricacies of epigenetics to the possibilities of critical ecologi-
cal transitions. Furthermore, their voices blend with similar emergences 
across the field in which we are asked to engage with evolution, biolog-
ical development, domestication, ecology, geology, climate science, and 
more (see, for example, Tsing et al. 2016). We are no longer just observ-
ers and critics of these sciences; suddenly, we are participants too.
Why have social and cultural anthropologists become so interested in 
the natural sciences? Despite proclamations of the new materialism, I don’t 
think this was sparked by a turn in philosophy; many philosophies flour-
ish within it. Instead, new problems and new developments in the natural 
sciences have caught the eye of anthropologists. In medical anthropology, 
the conjuncture between long-standing concerns with the social construction 
of illness and the emergence in biology of a newly vital science of epigenet-
ics seems key. If gene expression is caught up in social history, are biologists 
ready for the insights of the social sciences? Does epigenetics segue into what 
we have been doing all along, or are biologists still missing the boat?
This volume begins with questions such as these and takes off into 
other biologies and ecologies in which social relations matter. What is the 
relationship between anthropology and these emerging sciences? Here I 
follow the chapters toward tentative answers.
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Do the new sciences of plasticity lead natural science 
practitioners toward the insights of anthropology?
Margaret Lock answers that question with a history of the concept of epi-
genetics. If epigenetics itself is a changeable beast, perhaps it meets our 
discipline in some places and not others. Indeed, one of her most strik-
ing findings is that the campaign against epigenetics is a modern one, 
a child of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Biologists today 
revive older concepts shut out by modernity’s preformationist essential-
ism. Jörg Niewöhner attacks the same problem through observation; 
molecular biologists, he finds, do believe in social relations but have an 
impoverished view of the social. David Napier and Adriana Petryna draw 
other sciences of plasticity into the story, adding tales of domestication 
and ecological modelling. They too adopt a ‘yes and no’ endorsement of 
these sciences, warning of dangers but clearly excited by possibilities.
Of course, this assumes a disciplinary autonomy from which to safely 
regard the other. What if proposition and critique, natural science and human-
ism, are intertwined? This conundrum has always vexed anthropology, and it 
seems to me that there is no simple answer, only a series of strategies.
Might anthropological fieldwork on scientific turf raise 
problems already inside science and thus subject to prior 
engagement across the disciplines?
Mette Svendsen, studying the use of piglets as models for the care of pre-
mature human infants, quotes her scientist informants, ‘[W]e are your 
piglets.’ By blurring the line between pigs and humans, her scientists also 
play with distinctions between the human and natural sciences. The ques-
tions Svendsen raises are already concerns of her informants; she articu-
lates what they wonder. In speaking for them, her work is thus inside as 
much as outside the science and seems to suggest that biomedicine cre-
ates its own anthropologies by requiring modes of subject formation that 
transgress other cultural distinctions to become self-enclosed worlds. 
Anthropology might then be inside these forms of science and medicine; 
the job of the practitioner would be to uncover that component.
‘Already inside’ has been the productive conceit of a good deal of 
science studies. From such a standpoint, anthropology treads a careful 
line between knowing too much and knowing too little. It is possible to 
enter a maze with no exit. This has both enchantments and terrors as 
illuminated by other strategies in the volume.
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What anthropological findings push the new sciences  
into open dialogue?
In Northern Uganda, Lotte Meinert and Susan Reynolds Whyte explain 
that former militia fighters are often hounded by both trauma and venge-
ful spirits of the unquiet dead. Each requires a different set of diagnostic 
and treatment procedures; each offers a different ontology. Each chal-
lenges the other and yet they co-exist. To analyse ghosts and trauma 
together is difficult for biomedicine, yet it throws down a gauntlet that 
cannot be ignored. Anthropology, here, challenges all those who would 
limit their vision to the one without the other. Their findings provoke nat-
ural scientists to take note.
In such approaches, the worlds explored by anthropology are not 
co-extensive with those of biomedicine. The challenge thrown across the 
disciplines is empirical as much as philosophical; this allows the possibil-
ity of a response.
The possibility of response, in turn, leads me to a different set of 
strategic possibilities: how might the dialogue between anthropology 
and natural science transform each?
How is anthropology changing – and changing its 
scientific interlocutors?
Consider the perspective of a bacterium, requests Jens Seeberg. From 
the bacterium’s point of view, interactions with bacteriophages and 
with antibacterial medicines have something in common. Medical pro-
grammes offer opportunities for resistance for bacteria as well as patients; 
anthropology requires attention to both kinds of resistance. Similarly, for 
Allan Young, biofilm is a multi-species social world informed by quorum- 
sensing. What kind of anthropology is this? Anthropologists, once 
focused on humans alone, now they have to stretch to imagine social life 
among non-human companions. The social will never be the same.
However, anthropologists generally have no microscopes, no DNA-
based diagnostic tests. How are we supposed to learn anything about 
non-human sociality especially when it involves something as tiny as 
microbes? If we cannot come up with independent findings, just what are 
our contributions? One way forward begins with the posing of empirical 
questions; answerable questions that we might like our colleagues in the 
biosciences to explore. Good questions come from outside one’s own field 
in any kind of scholarship; we respond to the urgent requests of social 
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movements, disasters, or big dreams. Ethnographic research on more-
than-human sociality can raise questions that natural scientists might not 
have thought to ask, and can show their importance.
Julie Livingston’s chapter offers just this kind of challenge. In 
the Botswana clinic where she studied, many cancer patients are also 
infected with HIV and tuberculosis. It changes the symptoms of each 
as well as their treatment options. It changes social status and thus 
how patients can be cared for. Description of individuals does impor-
tant work here. It forces the heterogeneity of co-morbidity to the front 
of the research agenda. Our colleagues in the biosciences are asked to 
respond. Livingston’s cases make it clear that we need more research 
on how co-infection and co-morbidity work, and we need this research 
to include considerations of social status. To begin the task of creating 
new interlocutors in the biosciences, we need such empirical challenges, 
which appeal to the curiosities of both scientists and humanists. Here is 
one way to continue beyond biodeterminism.
What’s ahead for ‘bioindeterminism?’
By pointing us beyond ‘biodeterminism’, this volume suggests we might 
pile up tools for analysis of what one would have to call ‘bioindetermin-
ism’, that is, the historically inflected and thus indeterminate courses of 
biological phenomena. In the study of indeterminacy, it is clear: we are 
participants and not just observers and critics. Anthropology refused the 
determinisms of the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernist 
creed; we are among those scholars best equipped to explore the indeter-
minate. We have insights to offer our natural science colleagues if we can 
figure out how to create research in common.
This means moving beyond humanist/scientist divisions of labour, 
such as those that ask anthropologists to study the ethics while scientists 
do the research. That kind of complementarity was built into twentieth- 
century modernism; it maintains conventional gaps rather than estab-
lishing common curiosities. To take ‘indeterminism’ seriously requires 
drawing social science and history inside biological research.
The ‘local biologies’ offered by Jörg Niewöhner and Margaret Lock 
are one kind of guide. If biology (both as knowledge and as interactions 
among living beings and components) is shaped in local scenes, indeter-
minism comes to the fore. In such cases, biologies are creatures of shifting 
material histories as much as conceptual ones. ‘Race’, for example, was 
made in the history of slavery not only because the concept was shaped 
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there but also because slavery informed marriage, property inheritance, 
and extra-marital sexuality, which in turn shaped racial genealogies and 
racial possibilities for health and wellbeing.
For the study of indeterminacy, anthropology has many great tools. 
These include history at multiple scales as well as attention to encounters, 
contingencies, and conjunctures. There are processes of ‘translation’, in 
all that word’s meanings. There are articulations, multiple ontologies, 
botched communications, and the whole world of ‘friction’ in the sense of 
historical trajectories coming into being. There is much to explore in the 
terrain staked out but never fully controlled by modernist projects of sci-
ence and medicine, including biodeterminism. Biodeterminism, indeed, 
has launched institutions that spawn new forms of indeterminacy; in 
those supposedly orderly playgrounds, bacteria, fast food, and ghosts, as 
well as humans, form their own unpredicted socialities.
This volume suggests the adventures still to be had in getting to 
know this terrain. Medical anthropologists have led the way in a process 
that shapes the wider field. It is not enough to observe from afar, they 
explain. We are also players in showing how biologies variously come to 
life. This volume illuminates that path.
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